Piggie v. Riggle
| Decision Date | 21 March 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:06 CV 523 JM.,3:06 CV 523 JM. |
| Citation | 548 F.Supp.2d 652 |
| Parties | Clyde PIGGIE, Plaintiff, v. Ms. RIGGLE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Clyde Piggie, Pendleton, IN, pro se.
Cory C. Voight, David A. Arthur, Indiana Attorney General's Office, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant.
Clyde Piggie, a pro se prisoner, filed a complaint raising several constitutional due process claims. After screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, he was allowed to proceed against a single defendant. Mr. Piggie alleges that, in retaliation against him for engaging in constitutionally protected activities, Ms. Riggle caused his transfer from Miami Correctional Facility ("MCF"), a medium security facility, to Pendleton Correctional Facility ("PCF"), a maximum security facility. Specifically, he maintains that she asked the Indiana Department of Corrections ("IDOC") to move him because he had filed grievances and lawsuits against the correctional facility's staff.
Ms. Riggle seeks summary judgment on three bases, that: (1) she merely initiated the reclassification and transfer process for legitimate reasons and was not the decision-maker; (2) she enjoys immunity from suit for seeking the plaintiffs transfer; and (3) the plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies. (Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, DE # 60 and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, DE # 61). The motion for summary judgment is primarily supported by the declarations of Ms. Riggle (Declaration of Traci Riggle, DE # 60, Exhibit 2) and James Csenar, an IDOC classification analyst. (Declaration of James E. Csenar, DE # 61, Exhibit 4). Mr. Piggie submitted a response in opposition with his own declaration as well as other various exhibits. (Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Summary Judgment, DE # 62, Exhibits 1-10). The defendant then filed a reply (Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, DE # 64) to which Mr. Piggie responded. (Plaintiffs Reply to the Defendant's Reply, DE # 65 and Attachment 1).
The standard for reviewing a summary judgment motion is the same regardless of whether a party is represented by counsel. Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 836-837 (7th Cir.2001).
[T]he plain language of [FED. R. CIV. P.] 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a "genuine" dispute as to those facts. As we have emphasized, when the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.
Scott v. Harris, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) ().
The First Amendment guarantees prisoners the right to petition for redress of grievances, and retaliation for filing a grievance or complaining about treatment by officials strikes at the heart of an inmate's Constitutional right to seek redress of grievances. Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450 (8th Cir.1989). Prison officials may not retaliate against an inmate for exercising his First Amendment rights, even if their actions would not independently violate the Constitution. See Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir.2000). Whether a defendant acted in retaliation is a question of fact. Ustrak v. Fairman, 781 F.2d 573, 578 (7th Cir. 1986).
Ms. Riggle admits that she sought Mr. Piggie's transfer. However, she contends that he was moved to PCF at the request of other staff "because of his overall negative adjustment, recent negative adjustment and failure to adjust," reasons different from those she cited in her request to transfer him. In her declaration Ms. Riggle attests that:
... 14. On December 21, 2005, I requested that Clyde Piggie, DOC offender number 933044 be reclassified and transferred on state forms 3412 (report of classification) and 44355 (report of transfer) due to his conduct history and subsequent addition of time added to his remaining time to serve at the DOC as a result of being found guilty of a conduct violation. Piggie was found guilty by the conduct board at MCF for intimidation of staff on December 21, 2005. The forms were submitted to the classification department and were approved by individuals within those departments. Additionally the facility transfer was approved by DOC central office.
15. On December 21, 2005, after receiving his latest conduct violation, offender Piggie scored, for purposes of classification, at a medium security level and had time added to his remaining term of incarceration. At the time, offenders with a certain amount of time remaining on their sentences were not eligible to stay at MCF's medium security level because the term for the remainder of his incarceration was now for more than ten years as a result of his being found guilty of a conduct violation.
16. Although I had recommend [sic] offender Piggie's transfer based upon his conduct history, the inter-facility transfer document ... shows that those who reviewed the matter after me noted that offender Piggie should be transferred because of his overall negative adjustment, recent negative adjustment, and failure to adjust ...
18. Additionally, other staff sought reclassification of offender Piggie as a result of his conduct history which effected his assignment to certain activities and to housing 20. I initiated a reclassification and transfer of offender Piggie due to his conduct history and its effect upon his security level assignment and not in retaliation for offender Piggies's requests for public records or the filing of complaints against me.
(DE # 60, Exhibit 2).
Although she knew that Mr. Piggie requested her personnel file, Ms. Riggle did not recall when she learned about it. (DE # 60, Exhibit 2 at ¶ 19).
In her declaration Ms. Riggle further explains that staff-initiated reclassification requests are submitted to the classification counselor and classification supervisor in the classification department on form 3412 while transfer requests are submitted on form 44355. (DE # 60, Exhibit 2 at ¶¶ 12-13). A 3412 form dated January 9, 2006, shows another staff member, H. Hammond, requested Mr. Piggie's reclassification based upon the December 21, 2005, conduct violation; he did not ask for a transfer, however.* (DE # 60, Exhibit 3 at 2). In contrast, the recommendation section of the 3412 form dated December 21, 2005, that Ms. Riggle completed states: she also apparently asked that Mr. Piggie be reclassified from a "3-H-G-A-C" to a "3-I-G-C" designation. (DE # 60, Exhibit 3 at 3). A. Siefert, a counselor in the classification department, approved H. Hammond's and Ms. Riggle's requests on January 11, 2006. That same day, A. Siefert signed a 44355 transfer form for a "disciplinary" transfer of Mr. Piggie "to maximum due to conduct history." The 44355 form notes only that the request for transfer is by the "offender," "facility" or "administrative." (DE # 60, Exhibit 3 at 6). Although her name does not appear on it, Ms. Riggle admits she submitted that 44355 transfer form. (DE # 60, Exhibit 2 ¶ 14).
At the next step, A. Siefert reviewed Ms. Riggle's request and recommended it. Again on January 11, 2006, a supervisor in the classification department, N. White, also recommended the transfer. Then, on January 12, 2006, James Csenar of the central office, approved it. In his declaration, Mr. Csenar states in part:
5. My review of records indicates that in January 2006 I approved the transfer of Clyde Piggie, offender no. 933044, from Miami Correctional Facility ("MCF") to a maximum security facility due to MCF staffs assessment that offender Piggie's disruptive and negative behavior posed a threat to MCF's security.
(DE # 60, Exhibit 4).
Six days later, on January 18, 2006, the actual move was set. (DE # 60, Exhibit 3 at 9).
Personal involvement is an element of every claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir.2001). A plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendant's participation or direct responsibility for the conditions of which he complains, Starzenski v. City of Elkhart, 87 F.3d 872, 879 (7th Cir.1996), by demonstrating a causal link between the defendant's conduct and the...
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Ryan v. Ctr. Twp. Constable's Office, Case No. 1:15-cv-01387-TWP-TAB
...were considered an arrest, it is undisputed that Ryan was detained by MCSD deputies, not Duncan. Relying on Piggie v. Riggle, 548 F. Supp.2d 652 (N.D. Ind. 2008), and Acevedo v. Canterbury, 457 F.3d 72 (7th Cir. 2006), Ryan responded to the Motion explaining that "personal involvement or re......
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Part 1: complete case summaries in alphabetical order.
...Act GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, PRISONER: Exhaustion, PLRA-Prison Litigation Reform Act, Retaliation TRANSFERS: Retaliation Piggie v. Riggle, 548 F.Supp.2d 652 (N.D.Ind. 2008). A prisoner brought a pro se action against a prison official, alleging that she transferred him to another facility beca......