Pihl v. Morris
Decision Date | 15 May 1946 |
Citation | 319 Mass. 577,66 N.E.2d 804 |
Parties | FRANK H. PIHL v. THEODORE A. MORRIS (and a companion case [1]). |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
March 4, 1946.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., LUMMUS, QUA DOLAN, & SPALDING, JJ.
Evidence Competency, Privileged communication, Relevancy and materiality. Malicious Prosecution. Libel and Slander. Agency, Agent's knowledge, Scope of authority or employment. Corporation, Officers and agents. Error, Whether error harmful. Practice, Civil, Exceptions: whether error harmful.
At the trial of actions for slander and malicious prosecution, evidence of statements, made by the defendant to a police officer, that the plaintiff had committed a theft was not to be excluded on the ground that the statements were privileged communications where the defendant's identity as the informer against the plaintiff and the substance of the accusations had already become a matter of public record through the defendant's instituting a criminal complaint for larceny against the plaintiff.
Want of probable cause and malice sufficient to support an action for malicious prosecution based on a complaint for larceny of a machine, on which the plaintiff was found not guilty, could properly be concluded on evidence warranting findings that the defendant, knowing that the plaintiff had bought the machine on conditional sale and had not stolen it, instituted the complaint in order to force the plaintiff to pay for the machine.
An action for slander might be maintained without proof of special damage on evidence warranting findings that the defendant, knowing that the plaintiff had bought a machine and had not stolen it, maliciously stated to a police officer that the plaintiff had stolen it.
A corporation was bound by the knowledge of its agent respecting certain matters material to causes of action against it for slander and malicious prosecution.
A finding was warranted that an employee of a corporation in charge of its business acted within the scope of his authority in making a defamatory statement that the plaintiff had stolen property of the corporation and in instituting an unfounded complaint for larceny against the plaintiff.
A newspaper article indicating that the plaintiff had been acquitted in a criminal proceeding for larceny would be competent on the issue of damages at the trial of an action for malicious prosecution based on the defendant's having instituted such proceeding.
If a newspaper article, stating that a person of a certain name similar to the plaintiff's had been acquitted of larceny, did not identify the plaintiff as the person referred to, its admission in evidence would not be error prejudicial to the defendant at the trial of an action for malicious prosecution based on the defendant's having instituted the proceeding for larceny.
TWO ACTIONS OF TORT. Writs in the Superior Court dated October 14, 1939. At a trial before Brogna, J., there were verdicts for the plaintiff. The defendants alleged exceptions.
J. C. Johnston, for the defendants. J. W. Vaughan, for the plaintiff.
The plaintiff has obtained verdicts against both defendants on counts for slander and malicious prosecution growing out of statements by the individual defendant to a police officer of Malden to the effect that the plaintiff had stolen a dish washing machine and out of a complaint for larceny of the machine made by the individual defendant against the plaintiff in the District Court in that city. The individual defendant was an officer of the corporate defendant and was in charge of its business of selling restaurant equipment. There was evidence that at the time of the alleged larceny the corporate defendant was the owner of the machine. The plaintiff was found not guilty by the District Court.
1. The defendants' first contention is that evidence lying at the foundation of each case, to wit, evidence of the statements of the individual defendant to the police officer necessarily including evidence of that defendant's identity as the informer against the plaintiff, was incompetent on the grounds stated in Worthington v Scribner, 109 Mass. 487, at page 488, in these words: See Attorney General v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458 , 490-491; Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 316.
We fully recognize the principle set forth in Worthington v. Scribner, and we agree that it exists for the protection of the public interest and not of a party or a witness. But we are satisfied that the principle does not apply in this case. Here both the identity of the informer and the substance of the accusation became a matter of record the moment the complaint was filed. At the time of the trial of these civil actions there was longer anything secret or confidential about either the identity of the informer or the accusation made by him. Moreover, in so far as respects the substance of the accusation, the very purpose of giving the information was that it might be used publicly in a criminal prosecution. Wigmore says of the rule illustrated by Worthington v Scribner: ...
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