Pike v. Farmers' Mut. Fire & Lightning Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 10 May 1923 |
| Docket Number | No. 3235.,3235. |
| Citation | 251 S.W. 115 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
| Parties | PIKE v. FARMERS' MUT. FIRE & LIGHTNING INS. CO., OF POLK COUNTY. |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Polk County; C. H. Skinker, Judge.
Action by J. C. Pike against the Farmers' Mutual Fire & Lightning Insurance Company, of Polk County. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Harman Pufahl, of Bolivar, for appellant. L. Cunningham, of Bolivar, for respondent.
It is with regret that we find this case in such condition that the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded. The claim in dispute between the parties is only $15.61, and it seems a pity that, after going to the great expense of a jury trial in the circuit court and the cost of an appeal, all amounting to many times more than the sum involved, the matter should round up here, showing that the trial court was without jurisdiction in the case.
The plaintiff owned a farm, and insured his barn, hay, corn, and implements against destruction by fire. There is no dispute about the loss sustained on the barn, hay, and corn, and the insurance has been paid for these items. A question of difference did arise between plaintiff and defendant's officers concerning the amount due under the policy for loss of the farm machinery. Plaintiff claimed the full amount called for in the policy, $50, on this item; defendant claiming that, owing to a provision contained in the policy as to farm products, there was only $34.61 due under this item, although it is admitted that the value of the machinery destroyed was $181. It is admitted by plaintiff that, had the policy contained a provision as to the machinery like the one as to the hay and the corn, his only claim under the policy would have been $34.61. It is, however, at the same time admitted by the defendant that the policy contained no such provision as to machinery that it did concerning farm products.
It was agreed that the matter would be left to Attorney Pufahl to settle, and here is where a dispute of fact arises. Plaintiff testified that he agreed only to leave it to the arbiter to say what the language of the policy entitled him to, while the defendant's testimony tends to show that the question of what defendant owed plaintiff was the matter submitted to Pufahl. Pufahl held that the language of the policy upheld plaintiff's contention, but that, owing to a custom which had always been practiced by the defendant, which practice plaintiff had for seven years enjoyed as to assessments in other losses, he was bound by the custom, irrespective of the written provision of the policy. This sufficiently states the facts concerning the dispute between the parties. Plaintiff, being unwilling to abide by the decision of the arbitrator, claiming that he had decided a matter which he had not submitted to him to be decided, brought suit in the circuit court of Polk county for $50 due under the policy, 10 per cent. for vexatious delay, and $50 attorney fee, making the amount prayed for in the petition to be $105.
It is contended by appellant that the petition on its face shows that the claim is one which could not be sued for in the first instance in the circuit court, citing section 2436, R. S. of 1919, which fixes the amount at exceeding $50, exclusive of interest and costs, to give the circuit court jurisdiction, and also cites the case of Knight v. Railway Co., 120 Mo. App. 311, 96 S. W. 716. That case first discusses the constitutionality of a provision allowing attorney fees as a penalty, and then discusses the question of the amount involved in order to confer jurisdiction in the circuit court, besides the constitutionality of such statute. Its discussion of that question is as follows:
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