Pike v. State
| Decision Date | 12 May 2005 |
| Citation | 164 S.W.3d 257 |
| Parties | Christa Gail PIKE v. STATE of Tennessee. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Donald E. Dawson, Post-Conviction Defender, and Catherine Y. Brockenborough, Assistant Post-Conviction Defender, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Christa Gail Pike.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, Alice B. Lustre, Assistant Attorney General; and Leland Price and S. Jo Helm, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
Wade V. Davies, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Amicus Curiae, Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
Gerald L. Gulley, Jr., Knoxville, Tennessee, for Amicus Curiae, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
Bradley A. MacLean, Nashville, Tennessee, for Amicus Curiae, National Alliance for the Mentally Ill.
FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JANICE M. HOLDER and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., joined.
This appeal presents two determinative issues: (1) whether post-conviction review of a death sentence should be mandatory and should proceed over the objection of a competent death-sentenced inmate; and if not, (2) whether, and under what circumstances, a competent death-sentenced inmate may revoke her waiver of post-conviction review. We conclude that post-conviction review is not mandatory and may be waived by a competent death-sentenced inmate. We also conclude that a competent death-sentenced inmate may revoke a waiver of post-conviction review so long as the revocation occurs within thirty days of the trial court's order permitting the inmate to waive post-conviction review. Our holding is limited to death-sentenced inmates who seek to revoke an initial waiver of post-conviction relief. Our holding does not apply to death-sentenced inmates who attempt to manipulate and to delay the judicial process by repeatedly seeking to waive and thereafter to reinstate post-conviction review. Applying this rule, we conclude that Christa Gail Pike may revoke her waiver and reinstate her post-conviction petition. Pike filed a motion seeking to revoke her waiver on the twenty-ninth day after the trial court filed its order permitting her to waive post-conviction review. Pike had not previously waived post-conviction review. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to reinstate the petition for post-conviction relief and to schedule an evidentiary hearing.
A jury convicted Christa Gail Pike of first degree murder and imposed a sentence of death for her role in the brutal killing of a fellow student at the Job Corps Center in Knoxville.1 The Court of Criminal Appeals and this Court affirmed Pike's convictions and sentences, and the United States Supreme Court denied her petition for a writ of certiorari. State v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d 904 (Tenn.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1147, 119 S.Ct. 2025, 143 L.Ed.2d 1036 (1999).
On June 3, 1999, Pike timely filed a pro se petition seeking post-conviction relief.2 The trial court appointed the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender to represent Pike. During a hearing on June 25, 2001, Pike orally advised the trial court of her desire to withdraw her post-conviction petition and to schedule an execution date. The trial court advised Pike to discuss her options with her attorneys and to listen to their advice and instructed her to file a written motion seeking waiver if she persisted in her desire to waive post-conviction review.
Approximately two months later, on September 4, 2001, Pike submitted to the trial court a letter reiterating her desire to withdraw her post-conviction petition and to schedule an execution date. At an October 2001 hearing, the trial court pointed out that the courts of this State had not previously adjudicated a death-sentenced inmate's request to waive post-conviction review.3 After questioning Pike and confirming that Pike remained unchanged in her desire to waive post-conviction review, the trial court concluded that Pike has the right to make that choice "as long as she is competent." The trial court then appointed Dr. William Kenner to conduct a psychiatric evaluation to determine Pike's competency and directed Dr. Kenner to submit to the trial court a written report of his findings.
Dr. Kenner interviewed Pike, reviewed Pike's psychological records and submitted his written report to the trial court. On June 25, 2002, one year after Pike orally announced her desire to withdraw her post-conviction petition, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine Pike's competence. The trial court considered Dr. Kenner's written report and heard testimony from several witnesses. Dr. Kenner did not testify at the hearing. Neither the district attorney general nor counsel for Pike received Dr. Kenner's written report until the morning of the hearing.4 Ultimately, the trial court found that Pike had "freely and voluntarily" decided to withdraw her petition and to waive post-conviction review. The trial court commented: "Miss Pike has the right as a competent individual ... to make a decision about her case, whatever all of us feel about that decision, and I grant her ... motion to withdraw her appeals."
On June 27, 2002, the trial court filed a written judgment dismissing Pike's petition and setting an execution date. One day later, the trial court filed an amended judgment. On July 8, 2002, Pike's attorneys filed a notice of appeal. On July 26, 2002, the twenty-ninth day after the trial court filed its order finding Pike competent and granting her request to withdraw her petition, Pike's attorneys filed a second notice of appeal, and a supporting affidavit, each of which Pike had signed. Also on July 26, Pike filed in the trial court through her attorneys a motion seeking to vacate the order dismissing her petition, to reinstate her post-conviction petition, and to set a date for an evidentiary hearing on her post-conviction petition. Attached to this motion was Pike's sworn statement explaining that she had changed her mind and that she wished to "go forward" with the post-conviction proceeding. Pike's handwritten addendum to the sworn statement explained: "I still feel conflicted about what I want to do, but as of now I feel this is the only logical decision."
The State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the trial court's June 27 and June 28 orders were not appealable as of right and that Pike's attorneys lacked standing to pursue an appeal. On August 1, 2002, the Court of Criminal Appeals denied the State's motion to dismiss, granted a stay of execution, and remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing on Pike's motion to vacate the order dismissing her post-conviction petition.
The hearing on remand occurred on February 20, 2003. Pike's attorneys urged the trial court to grant the motion and to reinstate Pike's post-conviction petition. Relying upon Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, section 11, they argued that the order dismissing Pike's petition had not been final when Pike moved to reinstate her petition. Pike's attorneys relied in particular upon section 11(A)(4), which provides in pertinent part that "[a]n order of the trial court granting withdrawal and dismissing the petition shall become final thirty days after its entry."
Testifying at this hearing, Pike confirmed that she had changed her mind about waiving post-conviction review and emphasized that it was her desire to reinstate her post-conviction petition. Pike explained that she had not fully understood "exactly how final" her decision to withdraw her post-conviction petition and waive further appeals would be. Pike also maintained that she had not understood how her decision to waive post-conviction review would affect her family. Pike testified that she then realized that her life meant more "than being stuck in that little room" and that she had reasons to pursue post-conviction relief. Pike assured the trial judge that no one had influenced her decision-making — she stated that she had decided on her own to withdraw her post-conviction petition and that she later decided on her own to revoke her withdrawal. Pike also reported experiencing "great improvement" in her mental health since Dr. Kenner had prescribed for her an anti-depressant in addition to lithium.
The trial court denied Pike's motion to vacate the order dismissing her post-conviction petition, stating:
Again, we are in a court of law bound by rules. To me this is most akin to a decision to waive one's right to enter ... a plea. When one does that and ... make[s] a binding decision and the Court accepts that decision, just like in this case, even five minutes later, they cannot change their mind unless they can show that their will has been overborne or ... they did not understand their rights. Only then would a guilty plea be overturned.
The trial court further found that Pike's will had not been overborne "then or now" and that Pike had simply changed her mind. The trial court commented, "Unfortunately, I do not think she can just do that under this situation." Accordingly, the trial court denied Pike's motion seeking to vacate the dismissal order and to reinstate her post-conviction petition. Pike appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We granted Pike's application for permission to appeal.
We first consider Pike's argument that post-conviction review of death sentences should be mandatory, regardless of a competent death-sentenced inmate's desire to waive post-conviction review. Pike argues that mandatory review is necessary to ensure the reliability of the process by which death sentences are imposed.
We have previously recognized that post-conviction procedures are...
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