Pilcher v. State

• Citation: 136 S.W.3d 766,355 Ark. 369
• Decision Date: 11 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. CR 02-549.,CR 02-549.
• Parties: Darrell PILCHER v. STATE of Arkansas.
• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas

136 S.W.3d 766

355 Ark. 369

Darrell PILCHER v. STATE of Arkansas.

No. CR 02-549.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

December 11, 2003.

Jo Kelly Hardin, Benton, for appellant.

Mike Beebe, Att'y Gen., by: David R. Raupp, Sr. Ass't Att'y Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

RAY THORNTON, Justice.

Appellant, Darrell Pilcher, was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder of Carolyn Farley. In November 2000, Carolyn Farley disappeared. During an investigation of her disappearance, law enforcement officials questioned appellant, who had been romantically linked to Ms. Farley. After questioning, appellant led the law enforcement officials to Ms. Farley's body, but denied that he had murdered her. Upon further questioning, appellant admitted that he had stabbed Ms. Farley numerous times, tied cement blocks to her body, and attempted to conceal the body. On November 30, 2000, a criminal information was filed charging appellant with capital murder.

In a motion filed on November 2, 2001, and through oral motions raised during pretrial hearings, appellant sought to suppress statements made while he was in custody. The trial court held a Denno hearing on each of appellant's in-custody statements, and concluded that the statements were voluntarily given. Specifically, it concluded that the statements were made after appellant voluntarily waived his rights, and that the statements were not given in response to improper police compulsion, promises, or inducement.

Appellant's trial was held in the Hot Spring County Circuit Court. During the trial, appellant testified that he had murdered Carolyn Farley. In addition to appellant's judicial confession, other evidence directly linking appellant to Ms. Farley's death was introduced at trial. After considering the evidence, the jury found appellant guilty of capital murder.

During the sentencing phase of appellant's trial, the jury heard additional testimony and arguments. Thereafter, the jury sentenced appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

It is from this conviction that appellant appeals.¹ On appeal, appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence upon which his conviction is based, and in his judicial confession, he testified that he stabbed Carolyn Farley twenty-two times, tied cement blocks to her body, and attempted to hide the body. Based upon the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. We affirm the trial court's denial of appellant's motions to suppress, and we affirm appellant's conviction.

On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motions to suppress statements made to law enforcement officials. Specifically, appellant argues that these statements should have been suppressed because they were not voluntarily given. Appellant argues that his statements were made in response to improper police coercion and offers of false promises.²

In Cox v. State, 345 Ark. 391, 47 S.W.3d 244 (2001), we outlined our standard for reviewing the voluntariness of statements resulting from police interrogation. We explained:

We have said that statements made while in police custody are presumed to be involuntary and the burden rests on the State to prove their voluntariness and a waiver of Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence. See Rychtarik v. State, 334 Ark. 492, 976 S.W.2d 374 (1998); Smith v. State, 334 Ark. 190, 974 S.W.2d 427 (1998). In determining voluntariness, this court looks to whether the statement and waiver were the result of free and deliberate choice rather than coercion, intimidation, and deception. Rankin v. State, 338 Ark. 723, 1 S.W.3d 14 (1999); Smith v. State, supra, citing Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987) and Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). On appeal, this court makes an independent determination of the voluntariness of a confession, but in doing so, we review the totality of the circumstances and will reverse only when the trial court's finding of voluntariness is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. See Jones v. State, 323 Ark. 655, 916 S.W.2d 736 (1996); Trull v. State, 322 Ark. 157, 908 S.W.2d 83 (1995). We recognize in our determination of whether a trial court's finding is clearly erroneous that conflicts in testimony are for the trial court to resolve. See Jones v. State, supra. Where it is apparent from the record that a statement is not the product of an accused's free and rational choice and where the undisputed evidence makes clear that the accused did not want to talk to police detectives, the Supreme Court has held that due process of law requires that the resulting statement not be used against the accused. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978).

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This court has also consistently held that relevant factors in determining whether a confession was involuntary are age, education, and the intelligence of the accused as well as the lack of advice as to his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of questioning, and the use of mental or physical punishment. See, e.g., Sanford v. State, 331 Ark. 334, 962 S.W.2d 335 (1998); Davis v. State, 330 Ark. 76, 953 S.W.2d 559 (1997).

Cox, supra (citing Riggs v. State, 339 Ark. 111, 3 S.W.3d 305, (1999)); see also Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003). Other relevant factors in considering the totality of the circumstances include the statements made by the interrogating officer and the vulnerability of the defendant. Hood v. State, 329 Ark. 21, 947 S.W.2d 328 (1997).

In accordance with our standard of review, we turn now to the issues before us. Appellant argues that his statements were not voluntary because they were made in response to police coercion. Specifically, appellant argues that law enforcement officials threatened to prosecute his parents and that this coercion induced his statements. To determine whether appellant's statements were obtained by the use of improper police threats, we look to the facts surrounding the giving of appellant's statements. At the suppression hearing, Sheriff Mark Collie was questioned about the alleged coercion during the following colloquy:

SHERIFF MARK COLLIE: [I] told him [appellant] that I was going to be in the office about thirty-three more days, that the city police was convinced that she [Carolyn Farley] might be out there around his parents' property and that, you know, if there were anything going on out there that he needed to tell me because he didn't need his parents involved in something that he done.

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: What happened when you said that?

SHERIFF COLLIE: He basically said that how could they [appellant's parents] be, you know, be in any kind of problem and I explained to him that, you know, if they knew anything or were covering up for him in any way that he could be, his parents could be charged along with him at one level below whatever crime that he was charged with, and that his parents didn't need those kind of problems. And he needed to just shoot straight with me and we would, you know, recommend to the prosecutor a number of years versus, you know, getting charged with life in prison or something.

PROSECUTOR: What did he do?

SHERIFF COLLIE: At that point he wanted to, you know, go into a little more detail as to, you know, if he would of, you know, have to talk to the city because he didn't like the city and he wasn't going to tell them anything. And I told him, you know, that I'd shoot straight with him. I couldn't make any promises, you know but all I could do was recommend to the prosecutor's office whether or not he cooperated and told us the truth.

PROSECUTOR: What did he do then?

SHERIFF COLLIE: He told me that if I'd sign him out he would take me to where she was at.

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DEFENSE ATTORNEY: So did you imply to him that his parents would become more so involved if he didn't, in fact, waive his rights and speak to you on this matter?

SHERIFF COLLIE: No, sir. I explained to him that if his parents knew what had happened to Carolyn Farley and were helping hide what transpired that they could be charged with hindering along with him.

DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Did you advise him of this fact in order to encourage him to speak with you?

SHERIFF COLLIE: I advised him that he needed to, if he wanted me to help his parents he needed to talk to me. But the only way I could help anyone would be if he told the truth.

DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Did you tell him that you would help his parents if he talked to you?

SHERIFF COLLIE: I told him that I would try to keep them from being charged if they were not involved.

A review of Sheriff Collie's testimony does not reveal improper police coercion, but rather shows that Sheriff Collie was attempting to appeal to appellant's sympathies when he discussed the possibility of prosecuting appellant's parents. We have approved the use of such "psychological tactics" in several cases. In Hood v. State, 329 Ark. 21, 947 S.W.2d 328 (1997), we were asked to review a custodial statement to determine whether it was voluntarily given. The challenged statement was given during an interrogation in which law enforcement officials had threatened to arrest Hood's wife, who was in the hospital. After reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we held:

As to the officers' appeal to Hood to consider the health of his wife and the threat of her arrest, we have observed that the police may, without violating an accused's rights, attempt to play on his sympathies or explain to him that honesty is the best policy, provided that the accused's decision to make a custodial statement is voluntary in the sense that it is the product of the accused's exercise of his free will. Id. [Noble v. State, 319 Ark. 407, 892 S.W.2d 477 (199...