Pilgrim v. First Nat. Bank of Rome, 30023

• Decision Date: 16 September 1975
• Docket Number: No. 30023,30023
• Citation: 219 S.E.2d 135,235 Ga. 172
• Parties: A. C. PILGRIM v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ROME, Executor, et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 135

219 S.E.2d 135

235 Ga. 172

A. C. PILGRIM v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ROME, Executor, et al.

No. 30023.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Sept. 16, 1975.

Horace T. Clary, Rome, for appellant.

Walton, Smith, Shaw, Maddox & Davidson, John M. Graham, III, Rome, for appellees.

UNDERCOFLER, Presiding Justice.

A. C. Pilgrim sought a declaratory judgment against the First National Bank of Rome and Mrs. Verda B. Shahan, as executors and trustees under the will of Louis N. Shahan, deceased.

The record shows that in 1944 and 1948, the predecessors in title of Pilgrim purchased from the City Land Company, a corporation, two lots of land in the City of Rome on which the following building restrictions appear: 'This conveyance is made subject to the following building restriction: that without the consent of the first party, no building other than a dwelling house and necessary outbuildings going therewith shall be erected on said property, the dwelling to cost no less than $3500.'

The deed to Pilgrim contained the following language: 'Said property is conveyed subject to existing easement and valid restrictions, if any.'

The City Land Company was wholly owned by Louis N. Shahan and Verda B. Shahan. After the death of Mr. Shahan the City Land Company was dissolved by the executors. The petition alleges that since the fiduciaries dissolved the corporation, they are the proper defendants in the case; that the character of the neighborhood has changed; that the lots are located on a street which is predominately commercial; and that the lots are vacant and due to their shapes, it is impracticable and unserviceable to erect dwelling houses on them.

The petition sought (1) to have the restrictions declared null, void and of no effect and to have been made for the personal benefit of the grantor, the City Land Company; (2) since the corporation's dissolution, the lots should be declared free from any and all restrictions as to their use, and (3) for general equitable relief.

The defendants contend that the petition should be dismissed because the property has been sold and the selling corporation dissolved; that they have no interest in the property and should be completely out of the matter; and that they have no claims adverse to the petitioner. The defendants also contend that the petition should be dismissed for failure to join as necessary parties the owners of the other lots in the subdivision.

The trial court held that no justiciable controversy existed between adverse parties and that a claim for declaratory judgment would not lie. The court also held that the claim of Pilgrim amounted to a request for an advisory opinion. The appeal is from that judgment. Held:

In Cook v. Sikes, 210 Ga. 722, 725, 82 S.E.2d 641, 644, this court said: 'Under our Declaratory Judgment Act which the legislature passed in 1945, Ga.L.1945, p. 137, the respective superior courts of this State have power on petition therefor to declare the rights and other legal relations of an interested party, (a) in cases of actual controversy; and (b) in any civil case in which it appears to the court that the ends of justice require that such a declaration should be made for the guidance and protection of the petitioner. Code (Ann.Supp.) § 110-1101(a-b); Calvery Independent Baptist Church v. City of Rome, 208 Ga. 312, 66 S.E.2d 726. But, in either event, a declaration will be refused where no party to the proceeding has an interest in the controversy adverse to that of the petitioner. 16 Am.Jur. 300, § 26. 'It may be stated as a general rule, applicable to declaratory judgment actions generally, that the parties seeking to maintain the action must have the capacity to sue, and must have a right which is justiciable and subject to a declaration of rights, and it must be brought against an adverse party with an antagonistic interest.' Anderson on Declaratory Judgments, 2d Ed. 364, § 185. 'Actions or opinions are denominated 'advisory' when there is an insufficient interest in the plaintiff or defendant to justify judicial determination, where the judgment sought would not constitute specific relief to a litigant or affect legal relations or where, by...