Pilley v. State
| Decision Date | 14 August 1998 |
| Citation | 789 So.2d 870 |
| Parties | Stephen PILLEY v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Joe W. Morgan, Jr., Birmingham, for appellant.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Michelle Riley Stephens, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
Stephen Pilley appeals from his conviction on a charge of capital murder, see § 13A-5-40(a)(10). Pilley was tried before a jury on the charge that he murdered five persons pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct. Following a guilty verdict, the jury recommended, by a 12-0 vote, that Pilley be sentenced to death by electrocution. On May 30, 1997, the trial court sentenced Stephen Pilley to death. This appeal follows. We affirm.
The State's evidence tends to show the following. On the morning of October 16, 1994, the bodies of Lester Edward Dodd, Pamela Dodd, William A. Nelson, Sr., James Watkins, and Florence Adell Elliott were found in the Changing Times Lounge, a neighborhood bar, in Birmingham. The Dodds, who worked at the bar, were found lying facedown in the pooltable area of the lounge, while the other three, who were regular bar patrons, were found lying facedown in the bar area. The positions of the bodies suggested an "execution style" killing. All five died from gunshot wounds to the top or back of the head inflicted by two distinctive types of handgun ammunition: .25 caliber CTI Blazer bullets and 9mm Glazer bullets. A forensic expert testified that, while no guns were ever recovered, he was certain that two weapons had been used in these murders. The bar had been ransacked, the cash register emptied, and the personal effects of the victims scattered around the bar.
A bartender at the Crazy Eights Bar in Bessemer testified that, around 7:00 p.m. on October 15, 1994, while working in the bar, he overheard Pilley and Andrew Apicella discussing a way to make some "easy money." The bartender testified that he heard Pilley tell Apicella that he did not have a gun, and Apicella responded by telling him he could get guns. Shortly after this conversation, Pilley and Apicella left the Crazy Eights Bar.
Five customers who had been at the Changing Times Lounge at various times the night of October 15, 1994, identified Pilley as having been in the bar that night with another male. These witnesses remembered Pilley and his friend because they were not regular customers and because Pilley would yell at persons putting money in the jukebox to play country music. While Pilley's friend was playing pool, Pilley would wander about the bar. The last of these witnesses to leave the bar testified that when he left at between 11:30 p.m. and midnight, Pilley and his friend were still in the bar with about five other customers and the Dodds.
Rhonda Haynes, a friend of Pilley's, testified that, after she had gone to bed on the night of October 15, 1994, Pilley and Andrew Apicella came to her house unannounced, and asked her to arrange for a motel room where they could spend the night. They stayed with her until daybreak, injecting each other with a cocaine solution. During that stay, Haynes helped the two men count and divide money they claimed to have won at a bar playing pool, amounting to $150 for each man. From this money, Pilley handed Haynes five $2 bills, asking her to hold them for him.
The former testimony of Pamela Haddix was read into evidence, indicating that Ms. Haddix had lived with one of the victims, William A. Nelson, Sr. According to Ms. Haddix's testimony, it was their custom to save $2 bills to give to their grandchildren as gifts. Ms. Haddix testified that, at the time of his death, Mr. Nelson had five $2 bills folded in a "secret pocket" in his wallet.
A lawyer, retained by the Apicella family on an unrelated matter, turned over to police jewelry that was subsequently identified as belonging to Pamela Dodd.
Pilley argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for capital murder. Specifically, he argues that there was no direct evidence and that the circumstantial evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction, that there was no evidence of Pilley's particularized intent to kill, and that there was no evidence of Pilley's complicity in the acts of robbery and murder.
Anderson v. State, 542 So.2d 292, 295-96 (Ala.Cr.App.1987), quoted in Bankhead v. State, 585 So.2d 97, 104 (Ala.Cr.App.1989), aff'd. in part, , 585 So.2d 112 (Ala.1991), aff'd on return to remand, 625 So.2d 1141 (Ala.Cr.App.1992), rev'd on unrelated grounds, 625 So.2d 1146 (Ala.1993).
Where a defendant's conviction is based solely on circumstantial evidence, "if the circumstances can be reconciled with the theory that someone else may have done the act, then the conviction is due to be reversed." Ex parte Brown, 499 So.2d 787, 788 (Ala.1986). "Circumstantial evidence alone is enough to support a guilty verdict of the most heinous crime, provided the jury believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty." White v. State, 294 Ala. 265, 272, 314 So.2d 857, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 373, 46 L.Ed.2d 288 (1975). "Circumstantial evidence is in nowise considered inferior evidence and is entitled to the same weight as direct evidence provided it points to the guilt of the accused." Cochran v. State, 500 So.2d 1161, 1177 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), aff'd in part, reversed in part on other grounds, 500 So.2d 1179 (Ala.1985). "It is not necessary for a conviction that the defendant be proved guilty to the `exclusion of every possibility of innocence.'" Burks v. State, 117 Ala. 148, 23 So. 530 (1898). "The facts and circumstances in evidence, if dissevered and disconnected, may be weak and inconclusive; but their probative force, when combined, as it was the province of the jury to combine them, under proper instructions from the court, may have satisfied them of the guilt of the defendant." Howard v. State, 108 Ala. 571, 18 So. 813, 815 (1895).
"`Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely, if ever, susceptible of direct or positive proof, and must usually be inferred from the facts testified to by witnesses in the circumstances as developed by and through the evidence.'" Hunt v. State, 642 So.2d 999, 1008 (1993), quoting the trial court's oral charge to the jury. Likewise, the culpable participation of an accomplice is rarely proved by positive testimony. "Rather, the jury must examine the conduct of the parties and the testimony as to the surrounding circumstances to determine its existence." Travis v. State, 776 So.2d 819, 863 (Ala.Cr. App.1997).
In this case, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the use of circumstantial evidence in its deliberations. (R. 657-60.) The trial court also correctly instructed the jury on the requisite specific intent to kill (R. 669-70) and the law of complicity (R. 660-63).
The evidence before the jury indicated that Pilley had been in the Changing Times Lounge previously, and that he knew the layout of the bar. (R. 364.) There was testimony that the night of the murders he had been overheard discussing obtaining weapons and "easy money." (R. 379.) Witnesses saw him and Andrew Apicella in the Changing Times Lounge late on the night of the murders. Witnesses described him as acting nervous during the evening. At one time, he asked a bar patron if Edward Dodd owned the bar and whether Dodd was carrying a gun. (R. 441.) Evidence indicated that two weapons were used in the murders; the position of the bodies of the victims when found indicated the five victims had been separated —the Dodds were killed in the pool-table area of the bar, and the three customers were killed on the other side of the establishment. That the victims appeared to have been laid on their faces with their heads in their hands before being shot in the head indicates that they had been deliberately "executed" by their killers. Later that evening, Pilley and Apicella split approximately $300, including five $2 bills, similar to the bills that...
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