Pilstrand v. Swedish Methodist Church

• Decision Date: 24 October 1916
• Docket Number: No. 10794.,10794.
• Citation: 275 Ill. 46,113 N.E. 958
• Parties: PILSTRAND v. SWEDISH METHODIST CHURCH et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

275 Ill. 46

113 N.E. 958

PILSTRAND

v.SWEDISH METHODIST CHURCH et al.

No. 10794.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 24, 1916.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Henry County; E. C. Graves, Judge.

Proceedings by Jonas Pilstrand, to contest the will of Olof Pilstrand, deceased, against the Swedish Methodist Church and others, proponents of the will. From a judgment for proponents dismissing the bill, contestant appeals. Affirmed.Root & Root, of Galva, and H. A. Weld, of Rock Island, for appellant.

Lawrence C. Johnson, of Galva, and Nels F. Anderson, of Kewanee, for appellees.

CRAIG, C. J.

The appellant filed his bill in the circuit court of Henry county to contest the will of his deceased brother, Olof Pilstrand, on the ground of undue influence of the appellee Andrew G. Peterson. The defendants answered, denying the allegations of the bill. The complainant replied, and the cause was tried before a jury on the following issues: First, was the writing purporting to be the last will and testament of Olof Pilstrand, deceased, his last will and testament? And, second, was said purported will procured by undue influence? A verdict was returned by the jury in favor of the proponents of the will, and a decree was rendered dismissing the bill. Contestant perfected an appeal to this court.

The errors assigned that have been argued and are relied upon for reversal are, that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the evidence, the improper admission of evidence offered on the part of the proponents of the will, and the giving and refusal of certain instructions.

The testator, was was a retired farmer of Swedish descent, resided in the village of Bishop Hill. The will in question was executed September 24, 1912. The testator was then about the age of 75 years and had a wife but no children or descendants of children. He died April 10, 1914, leaving his brother, the appellant, his only heir at law, his wife having predeceased him about a year. The testator had long been a member and officer of the Swedish Methodist Church of Bishop Hill. At the time the will was made appellee Peterson had been pastor of that church for about two years, and some six years before that time he had been pastor of a church in the city of Galva, about five miles distant, and had known the testator during that time. The testator lived near the church in the village and also near the residence of the pastor. They visited each other frequently and prayed together, and the testator had a great deal of admiration and friendship for the Rev. Peterson. According to the testimony of the latter, the testator, some two weeks before making the will, came to the minister's house and offered to give him all of his property to dispose of as he wished, but the latter advised him not to do so. Peterson testified further that the deceased had talked with him about making a will, and Peterson had given a memorandum to an attorney, Lawrence C. Johnson, in Galva, as to what the will was to contain. A few weeks afterwards, on September 24, 1912, Peterson took the testator in his buggy to Galva and to the office of the attorney, Johnson. There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether the will was already drawn when they arrived or was dictated to a stenographer after they arrived. The will was read to the testator, and at his request Peterson went out and returned with three men whom the testator had directed him to procure to act as witnesses, and the will was duly executed and witnessed and delivered for safekeeping to one of the witnesses, Oran E. Yocum, a banker of Galva, in whose bank the testator had a safety deposit box. By the will the testator, after directing the payment of his debts and funeral expenses, gave all his property to his wife, Martha Pilstrand, for and during her natural life, and provided that she might use from said property so much thereof as should be necessary to maintain her in comfort as long as she should live. He further provided that upon the death of his wife should she survive him, or upon his death should he survive her, the said property should be divided into five portions, of which he bequeathed one portion to the Swedish Methodist Church of Bishop Hill to establish a fund to be known as the ‘Pilstrand Fund,’ the interest only to be used for the support of the ministry, and on the condition that the trustees of said church maintain and care for the family lot of the testator in the Bishop Hill cemetery. He bequeathed one portion to the Swedish Methodist Episcopal Theological Seminary at Evanston, Ill., one portion to the fund for superannuated ministers of the Central Swedish Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, one portion to the Bethany Home, in Chicago, of the Central Swedish Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and one portion to appellee Andrew G. Peterson, pastor of the Swedish Methodist Church of Bishop Hill. He also appointed Peterson executor of said will.

It is contended by appellant that the evidence establishes a confidential and fiduciary relation between Peterson and the testator, and also that the former procured the making of the will; that this being true, the presumption arises that undue influence induced the execution of the will, and the burden was cast upon the proponents of the will of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the execution of the will was the result of free deliberation on the part of the testator. Appellees claim that the evidence shows that the testator made the will in question freely and voluntarily, that he was not influenced by Peterson, and that the latter did nothing except, at the testator's request, to give him the correct names of certain of the beneficiaries named in the will, take him to the lawyer who drew the will, and get the witnesses who witnessed the execution of the will.

We have heretofore held that the relation between a priest or spiritual adviser and a parishioner is a confidentialone, which renders a gift causa mortis from the parishioner to the priest prima facie void, and the burden is on the donee to prove that the donor's intention to make the gift originated with the donor, without the donee's influence. Dowie v. Driscoll, 203 Ill. 480, 68 N. E. 56;Gilmore v. Lee, 237 Ill. 402, 86 N. E. 568,127 Am. St. Rep. 330. This rule, however, does not apply in the case of gifts by will. Michael v. Marshall, 201 Ill. 70, 66 N. E. 273;Yess v. Yess, 255 Ill. 414, 419, 99 N. E. 687, 688. As stated in the latter case:

‘To place the burden of proof upon one standing in a confidential relation to show the absence of fraud or undue influence in the making of a will, such person must be shown to have been directly connected in some manner with the making of the will. In re Will of Barry, 219 Ill. 391 .’

See, also, Lloyd v. Rush, 273 Ill. 489, 113 N. E. 122.

As to the question of the burden of proof, a similar question arose in the case of Michael v. Marshall, supra, in which it was held that proof that the executor had been the guardian of the testatrix until a short time before the will was made and that members of his family were substantially benefited by the will, which he assisted in preparing no further than to request the attendance of witnesses, did not cast upon the defendants the burden of proving there was no undue influence, although such facts might be considered by the jury as bearing upon the question. In discussing this question it is said in the opinion (201 Ill. on page 76, 66 N. E. on page 275):

‘As a matter of law, the burden of proof in any case is determined by the issues and it does not shift, but at the end the party upon whom the burden rests by the pleadings, must have sustained his position by a preponderance of evidence. Phelps v. Jenkins, 4 Scam. 48;Slingloff v. Bruner, 174 Ill. 561 ; 5 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 30. The burden of proof is often spoken of as equivalent to the duty of introducing evidence to meet or overcome a prima facie case, and in asking the court to instruct the jury that by the proof of certain facts the burden was cast on the defendants, the complainant in fact sought to have the court tell the jury that such facts constituted a prima facie case for complainant on the question of undue influence.’

The relationship of the testator and appellee Peterson was...