Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-2460, Matter of

• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: HATHAWAY; ROLL, P.J., and HOWARD
• Citation: Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-2460, Matter of, 781 P.2d 634, 162 Ariz. 156 (Ariz. App. 1989)
• Decision Date: 19 October 1989
• Docket Number: CA-JV,No. 2,S-2460,2
• Parties: In the Matter of the Appeal in PIMA COUNTY JUVENILE ACTION NO.89-0022.

Page 634

781 P.2d 634

162 Ariz. 156

In the Matter of the Appeal in PIMA COUNTY JUVENILE ACTION NO. S-2460.

No. 2 CA-JV 89-0022.

Court of Appeals of Arizona Division 2, Department A.

Oct. 19, 1989.

Sarah Michelle Martin, Tucson, for Natural Mother.

Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by Sara S. Wisdom, Tucson, for Dept. of Economic Sec.

Paul F. Tosca, Jr., Tucson, for Minors.

OPINION

HATHAWAY, Judge.

The mother appeals from the order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights to two of her children pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) and (B)(6)(b). She argues that the juvenile court erred in ordering severance in the absence of a plan for adoption of these children and, further, that the court's findings were contrary to the evidence. We disagree and affirm.

The evidence presented to the juvenile court reveals the following facts. The mother has a total of nine children, the two oldest of whom have resided with their maternal grandmother in another state. In December of 1982, the minor girls who are the subject of these proceedings ("G." and "V.") and four of their siblings were removed from the mother's home and subsequently adjudicated dependent. Following the provision of extensive services to the mother and completion of her "contract" with the Department of Economic Security (DES), the two oldest siblings were returned to her care in June of 1984. In November of 1984, she was given the care of a third child, and in April of 1985, a fourth child was returned to her. In the meantime, a ninth child was born to the mother and her husband. From 1982 to the present, the dependency proceedings have continued and the mother and children have received a broad range of services from DES.

G. was two and one-half years old and V. nine months old when the dependency proceedings were initiated. Both are developmentally delayed and emotionally handicapped. Several of the experts appearing at the severance hearing testified that their problems were attributable in whole or in part to poor parenting and the absence of emotional stimulation during their infancy. Both require special education classes and therapy, as well as attentive, patient, individualized care from their parents. They have remained in the same foster placement since January of 1983, where they have made considerable progress in their development, in large measure due to the devoted care they have received from their foster parents.

For several years, G. and V. had regular lunchtime visits with their natural mother. During the first months of 1986, the mother was allowed to have them for weekend visits. After such visits, however, the children's behavior deteriorated, as did their developmental progress. Moreover, after two of the weekend visits the girls returned with evidence of injuries and illness which the natural mother either failed to notice, failed to prevent or failed to treat. The visits were discontinued, and DES changed its plan for the children from eventual return to the family to severance. The common thread of the witnesses' testimony was that the natural mother could barely cope with the five children presently living with her, and that she was unable to meet the special needs of G. and V. The foster parents wish to continue to care for G. and V., however, at present there is no plan for adoption.

The juvenile court found grounds for severance under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) and (B)(6)(b), which provides:

B. Evidence sufficient to justify the termination of the parent-child relationship shall include any one of the following, and in considering any of the following grounds, the court may also consider the needs of the child:

* * * * * *

2. That the parent has neglected or wilfully abused the child.

* * * * * *

6. That the child is being cared for in an out-of-home placement under the supervision of the juvenile court, the division or a licensed child welfare agency, that the agency responsible for the care of the child has made a diligent effort to provide appropriate remedial services and that either of the following circumstances exists:

* * * * * *

(b) The child has been in an out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of two years or longer pursuant to court order, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances which cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement and there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.

The natural mother first argues that the juvenile court erred in ordering severance under subsection (B)(6)(b) because the present plan for the minors is not adoption, but rather long-term foster care, citing two recent decisions of Division One of this court. Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-7359, 159 Ariz. 232, 766 P.2d 105 (App.1988); Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-6520, 157 Ariz. 238, 756 P.2d 335 (App.1988). In the latter case, Division One noted that "[t]he express purpose of [subsection (B)(6) ] is to 'expedite the adoption of numerous children who remain in temporary foster care with no hope of being returned to their natural parents and in so doing promote a stable and long term family environment for these children.' " 157 Ariz. at 243, 756 P.2d at 340 (citation omitted). The children in that case were teenagers, and the uncontroverted testimony was that they were not likely to be adopted. The court concluded Moreover, while the legislative history of A.R.S. §...