Pinczkowski v. Milwaukee County
| Decision Date | 01 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 2003AP1732.,No. 2003AP2127.,2003AP1732.,2003AP2127. |
| Citation | 2005 WI 161,706 N.W.2d 642 |
| Parties | Gloria C. PINCZKOWSKI and Leroy S. Pinczkowski, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, v. MILWAUKEE COUNTY, Defendant-Respondent. Gloria C. Pinczkowski, Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, v. Milwaukee County, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs by Alan Marcuvitz, Andrea H. Roschke, and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Alan Marcuvitz and Andrea H. Roschke.
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief and oral argument by Timothy R. Karaskiewicz, principal assistant corporation counsel, with whom on the brief was William J. Domina, corporation counsel.
The petitioner, Gloria Pinczkowski, seeks review of a published court of appeals decision affirming two circuit court judgments relating to the condemnation of her property for purposes of an airport expansion project.1 She asserts that the circuit court erred by excluding evidence of the sale price of two adjacent properties previously sold to Milwaukee County and evidence of a private party's letter of intent to purchase her property. Pinczkowski also contends that she was entitled to a replacement housing payment.
¶ 2 Relying on well-established precedent, we determine that the circuit court properly excluded evidence of the sale price of the adjacent properties because the sales were to a condemning authority in the process of obtaining property for a public project. Likewise, we determine there was no circuit court error in excluding evidence of the letter of intent because it was speculative evidence of fair market value, and we observe that Pinczkowski was otherwise able to put her theory of private party interest before the jury. Finally, adhering to principles of deference to agency interpretations of statutory and administrative code provisions, we uphold the state Department of Commerce determination that Pinczkowski was not entitled to a replacement housing payment. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
¶ 3 In 1987, the County began planning to expand General Mitchell International Airport. The County's plan was eventually detailed in an "Airport Master Plan," dated April 1992, and was approved by the Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors in 1993. The Plan reflected an intent to acquire private property, including Pinczkowski's property and two adjacent properties, for uses related to expansion of the airport. In 1996, the County Board passed a resolution directing County officials to commence negotiations with the property owners.
¶ 4 Also by the mid-1990s, Hertz Corporation and another rental car company were informed that they would need to relocate their service facilities. Hertz contacted Pinczkowski and in July 1997 sent her a letter of intent to purchase her property for a specified amount. Hertz did not, however, ultimately purchase the property.
¶ 5 The County purchased the adjacent properties in 1997 and 1998. Then, in August 1999, it initiated negotiations to purchase Pinczkowski's property. It sent her a letter indicating an offer of $93,027 and explaining her eligibility for a replacement housing payment of $24,178.47, provided that she sold her house to the County for the offered amount.
¶ 6 After Pinczkowski rejected the County's $93,027 offer, the County acquired title to her property in November 2000 through eminent domain with an award of damages for $350,000. Pinczkowski challenged the amount of the award by bringing an action in circuit court, and the case was set for trial.
¶ 7 Prior to trial, the County brought a motion in limine to exclude certain evidence, and the circuit court made two key rulings that correspond to the issues now before us. First, the circuit court barred evidence of the price the County paid for its 1997 and 1998 purchases of the properties adjacent to Pinczkowski's property. The circuit court determined that the evidence was not admissible because the County purchased these properties in pursuit of the airport expansion project, with the right to acquire the property by eminent domain. Therefore, the circuit court reasoned that the sales were not arms-length transactions and thus not indicative of fair market value. Second, the circuit court barred evidence of the Hertz letter of intent, determining that it was conditional, non-binding, and speculative.
¶ 8 At trial, during Pinczkowski's testimony, her counsel sought to introduce evidence of the Hertz letter, including the letter itself but with the amount of the offer redacted. Counsel asserted that, despite the court's previous ruling, evidence of the fact of the Hertz letter was admissible to show that there was private interest in Pinczkowski's property for a specific purpose. She also sought to rely on the letter to show that when the County bought the adjacent properties, it ruined Hertz's plan to assemble Pinczkowski's property with adjacent property. The circuit court ruled the evidence inadmissible.
¶ 9 The jury determined the fair market value of Pinczkowski's property was $300,000, or $50,000 less than the County had paid pursuant to its award of damages. It also found that $15,000 should be deducted from Pinczkowski's award because of environmental conditions on the property. Thus, the verdict resulted in a net award of $285,000.
¶ 10 Meanwhile, Pinczkowski had purchased a new residence for $155,000 and sought to claim a replacement housing payment. The County denied her claim. Pinczkowski petitioned the state Department of Commerce for review. The department agreed with the County's decision. It explained that 2
¶ 11 Pinczkowski then brought an action on the claim in circuit court that was consolidated with her award-of-damages case. After the jury trial in the award-of-damages case, the circuit court dismissed Pinczkowski's claim for the replacement housing payment on a County motion for summary judgment. The circuit court agreed with the County and department that Pinczkowski was not entitled to the payment.
¶ 12 Pinczkowski appealed both the judgment in the award-of-damages case and the judgment dismissing her claim for the replacement housing payment. She challenged the circuit court's determinations that the sale prices of the adjacent properties were inadmissible at trial, that evidence of the Hertz letter of intent was inadmissible, and that she was not entitled to a replacement housing payment.
¶ 13 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court. It determined that clear precedent prohibits the introduction of the sale price of otherwise comparable properties when they are sold to a condemning authority engaged in negotiations to obtain property for a public project. The court of appeals agreed with the circuit court that the expired letter of intent submitted by Hertz was conditional and speculative. In addition, it determined that the exclusion of evidence of the letter was not prejudicial to Pinczkowski. The court of appeals also agreed with the department and circuit court that Pinczkowski was ineligible for a replacement housing payment.
¶ 14 Broadly stated, this case presents three issues for our review. Two issues involve evidentiary rulings and the third issue focuses on the interpretation of statutory and administrative code provisions.
¶ 15 We will uphold a circuit court's evidentiary rulings if it examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, used a demonstrated rational process, and reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach. Loy v Bunderson, 107 Wis.2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982). Whether the circuit court applied the proper legal standards, however, presents a question of law subject to independent appellate review. See City of Madison v. DWD, 2003 WI 76, ¶ 10, 262 Wis.2d 652, 664 N.W.2d 584. The interpretation of a statute or administrative code provision also presents a question of law, but may warrant deference when we review that question in the context of an agency decision. See Board of Regents v. State Personnel Comm'n, 2002 WI 79, ¶ 42, 254 Wis.2d 148, 646 N.W.2d 759.
¶ 16 We turn first to the issue of whether the circuit court erred in excluding evidence of the price for the 1997 and 1998 sales of the properties adjacent to Pinczkowski's property. In order to resolve this issue, we begin with an examination of a long-standing evidentiary rule pertaining to the exclusion of purchase prices paid by condemning authorities as evidence of fair market value. Based on that rule, we determine that evidence of the sale price for the adjacent properties was not admissible to show the fair market value of Pinczkowski's property. We also determine that regardless of whether the rule leaves room for an exception advanced by Pinczkowski, the facts here do not fit within that exception. Because the circuit court's ruling barred Pinczkowski's appraisers from relying on the sales, we address whether such reliance is a permissible use of the evidence in light of the long-standing rule, and we conclude that it is not.
¶ 17 This court recognized in Blick v. Ozaukee County, 180 Wis. 45, 46, 192 N.W. 380 (1923), that "the price paid in settlement of condemnation proceedings, or the price paid by the condemnor for similar land, even if proceedings had not been begun, where the purchaser has the power to take by eminent domain, is not admissible." This general rule of inadmissibility is firmly rooted in market principles and logic:
What the party condemning has paid for other property is incompetent. Such...
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