Pineda v. JTCH Apartments, L.L.C.

• Decision Date: 19 December 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15-10932,15-10932
• Citation: 843 F.3d 1062
• Parties: Santiago Pineda, and all others similarly situated under 29 U.S.C. 216(B); Maria Pena, Plaintiffs–Appellants Cross–Appellees v. JTCH Apartments, L.L.C.; Simona Vizireanu, Defendants–Appellees Cross–Appellants
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

843 F.3d 1062

Santiago Pineda, and all others similarly situated under 29 U.S.C. 216(B); Maria Pena, Plaintiffs–Appellants Cross–Appellees

v.JTCH Apartments, L.L.C.; Simona Vizireanu, Defendants–Appellees Cross–Appellants

No. 15-10932

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed December 19, 2016

Robert Lee Manteuffel, Jamie Harrison Zidell, Attorney, J.H. Zidell, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Plaintiffs–Appellants Cross–Appellees

Nadine Rowena King–Mays, King–Mays Firm, Dallas, TX, Joseph C. Putnam, Jr., Irving, TX, for Defendants–Appellees Cross–Appellants.

Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:

This appeal raises two questions about the retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act: Does the Act allow a retaliation victim to recover damages for emotional distress? Does the Act protect a nonemployee spouse from employer backlash? We conclude that the FLSA allows only employees to bring suit, but that an employee may recover for emotional injury resulting from retaliation.

I.

Santiago Pineda and Maria Pena, a married couple, lived in an apartment owned by JTCH Apartments, L.L.C. and leased to Pena. Pineda did maintenance work in and around the apartment complex. As part of Pineda's compensation for this work, JTCH discounted Pena's rent.

Pineda filed this lawsuit initially just seeking unpaid overtime under the FLSA. He sued JTCH and its owner and manager, Simona Vizireanu. Three days after Pineda served JTCH with the summons, he and his wife received a notice to vacate their apartment for nonpayment of rent. The amount JTCH demanded equaled the rent reductions Pena had received over the period of Pineda's employment. In response to the notice, the couple left the apartment.

Pena then joined Pineda's suit, and the amended complaint included retaliation claims based on the back rent demanded after the filing of the lawsuit. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). During the jury trial that followed, Defendants moved successfully for judgment as a matter of law on Pena's retaliation claim, arguing that a nonemployee like Pena is outside the protections of the FLSA. At the charge conference, Pineda unsuccessfully sought an instruction on emotional distress damages for his retaliation claim.

The jury found for Pineda on both his overtime wage claim and his retaliation claim. It awarded him $1,426.50 on the former and $3,775.50 on the latter. In post-trial rulings, the district court awarded Pena liquidated damages of $1,426.50 and awarded his counsel $76,732.88 in attorney's fees, which was a 25% reduction from the amount requested. The court ordered the reduction primarily because the fee request was "grossly disproportionate to the modest recovery."

Pineda and Pena appeal. Pineda argues that the court should have instructed the jury on damages for emotional harm. Pena argues that she is within the zone of interests protected by the FLSA retaliation provision and thus should have also been able to seek such damages from the jury.

Defendants also appeal. Their brief seeks to undo the jury's verdict on a number of grounds, among them that Pineda was an independent contractor and failed to prove that JTCH was an enterprise engaged in commerce. Their notice of appeal raising those issues was deemed untimely, however, by a motions panel of this court. The only issue they timely raised relates to the fee award.

II.

A

We begin by considering whether the district court should have asked the jury whether it believed Pineda had proven damages for emotional distress. As the availability of such damages under the FLSA is a question of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. GE Capital Commercial, Inc. v. Worthington Nat. Bank , 754 F.3d 297, 302 (5th Cir. 2014) ("[W]hen ‘a jury instruction hinges on a question of statutory construction, this court's review is de novo .’ " (quoting United States v. Garcia–Gonzalez , 714 F.3d 306, 312 (5th Cir. 2013) )).

The damages provision of the FLSA provides the following remedies for retaliation claims: "Any employer who violates the provisions of section 215(a)(3) of this title shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section 215(a)(3) of this title, including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Although we have not decided whether this language allows a plaintiff to recover for emotional injuries, the two courts of appeals that have analyzed the question have. Moore v. Freeman , 355 F.3d 558, 563 (6th Cir. 2004) ; Travis v. Gary Cmty. Mental Health Ctr. , 921 F.2d 108, 112 (7th Cir. 1990). And a number of other circuits have upheld jury awards for emotional damages in FLSA retaliation cases though the legal question was not challenged on appeal. Travers v. Flight Servs. & Sys., Inc. , 808 F.3d 525, 530, 539–42 (1st Cir. 2015) ; Broadus v. O.K. Indus., Inc. , 238 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Lambert v. Ackerley , 180 F.3d 997, 1011 (9th Cir. 1999).

The remedies provision for retaliation claims was added to the FLSA in 1977. Travis , 921 F.2d at 111. Prior to the 1977 amendments, plaintiffs only had a cause of action for minimum wage and overtime violations. For those claims, section 216(b) was limited, as it still is today, to awarding lost pay, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees. Id. ; 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The amendment, however, provided a private cause of action to enforce the FLSA's antiretaliation provision (before 1977, the Secretary had to bring an enforcement action). Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-151, 91 Stat. 1252 (Nov. 1, 1977). In granting employees the ability to enforce the antiretaliation provision on their own, Congress allowed them to recover not just wages and liquidated damages but also "such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, this is expansive language that should be read to include the compensation for emotional distress that is typically available for intentional torts like retaliatory discharge. Travis , 921 F.2d at 112 ("Compensation for emotional distress, and punitive damages, are appropriate for intentional torts such as retaliatory discharge."). This also explains the more limited damages available for failure to pay minimum wage or overtime pay because an employer can inadvertently pay less than the law requires, see 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (recognizing that not all FLSA wage and overtime claims are willful); it cannot unintentionally retaliate against an employee who complains about it.

Despite the uniform view of our sister circuits that damages for emotional distress are available in FLSA retaliation suits, this district court was not the only one in our circuit to conclude otherwise. Compare Little v. Tech. Specialty Prods. , LLC , 940 F.Supp.2d 460, 479 (E.D. Tex. 2013), and Saldana v. Zubha Foods, LLC , 2013 WL 3305542, at *6 (W.D. Tex., June 28, 2013) (holding that emotional distress damages are available under the FLSA), with Adams v. Cedar Hill Indep. Sch. Dist. , 2014 WL 66488, at *6–7 (N.D. Tex., Jan. 8, 2014), and Douglas v. Mission Chevrolet , 757 F.Supp.2d 637, 639–40 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (holding that emotional damages are not available under the FLSA). The disagreement stems from our decisions stating that the remedies provision of the FLSA and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act should be interpreted consistently. See Lubke v. City of Arlington , 455 F.3d 489, 499 (5th Cir. 2006). That congruity is the result of the ADEA incorporating the FLSA's remedy provision. See id . ; 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (providing that the "provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections 211(b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof) and 217 of this title [all FLSA provisions] and subsection (c) of this section"). Applying this equivalence principle, some courts have concluded that our ruling in Dean v. American Security Insurance Co. , 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), that emotional distress damages were not available under the ADEA must mean they are also unavailable under the FLSA. See , e.g. , Mission Chevrolet , 757 F.Supp.2d at 639.

The trouble with this line of reasoning is that when Dean considered whether the ADEA afforded a remedy for emotional harm by looking to the FLSA remedy provision via the cross reference, it was looking at the pre-1977 FLSA.¹ As already discussed, that statute limited relief to economic damages and did not even allow private retaliation suits. Dean thus observed that "[r]eading together the ADEA and the identified sections of the FLSA, an employer is subject to liability to the employee for ‘unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation’ and that amount may be doubled to provide ‘liquidated damages,’ in cases of willful violations." Dean , 559 F.2d at 1037.

In contrast to its ready rejection of the argument that the ADEA allowed recovery for emotional distress through its incorporation of the since amended FLSA damages provision, Dean spent more time considering whether a standalone provision of the ADEA provided such relief. After the ADEA incorporates the FLSA damages provision, it goes on to provide that: "In any action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter...." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Analyzing this language, Dean concluded that awarding emotional damages to ADEA plaintiffs would "frustrate, rather than [ ] ‘effectuate the purposes' " of the statute because allowing emotional damages would "introduce[ ] a volatile ingredient into the tripartite negotiations involving Secretary, employee and employer" that is the dispute resolution procedure the ADEA prefers. 559 F.2d at 1038–39 (citing Rogers...