Pineo v. Heffelfinger

• Decision Date: 07 June 1882
• Parties: CYNTHIA A. PINEO <I>vs.</I> C. B. HEFFELFINGER.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

29 Minn. 183

CYNTHIA A. PINEO vs. C. B. HEFFELFINGER.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 7, 1882.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Meeker county, Brown, J., presiding, refusing to dissolve an injunction.

Hiler H. Horton, for appellant.

S. A. Plumley, for respondent.

BERRY, J.

This action is brought for the purpose of cancelling a mortgage and preventing its foreclosure. Proceedings to foreclose by advertisement having been instituted, a temporary injunction was issued, restraining the sale. Defendant's motion to dissolve having been denied, he appeals.

Was the refusal to dissolve error? At the time of the execution of the mortgage the mortgaged premises were, and ever since have been, the homestead of the plaintiff's husband, (Dan Pineo,) and in the occupation of him and his family. The mortgage was in fact executed by the plaintiff and her husband, but the complaint alleges that she signed it in ignorance that it covered the homestead; an ignorance induced by the false and fraudulent representations and concealments of her husband, as respects which he acted for and in behalf of the defendant. The injunction was granted ex parte, upon the verified complaint and an affidavit of the plaintiff, the important statements of which are as above. In support of his motion to dissolve, defendant read his verified answer, together with five affidavits, all containing statements to the effect that the mortgage was in good faith received by him for himself and others, as creditors of Dan Pineo, in pursuance of an agreement by which, in consideration of the execution of the mortgage, the times for the payment of debts owing to them by Pineo were extended. The answer and affidavits also fully and explicitly deny all knowledge on the part of defendant of, and all connection with, any false or fraudulent representations or concealments of Dan Pineo in procuring the plaintiff's execution of the mortgage, as well as that, as respects any such false or fraudulent representations or concealments, whether as alleged in the complaint or otherwise, he acted for and in behalf of the defendant. No counter-affidavits were presented by plaintiff.

The general rule is that when all the equities of the complaint are fully and positively denied by the sworn answer of the defendant, (as they are in the present instance, as well as by the affidavits,) an interlocutory, or, as our statute styles it, a temporary injunction will be dissolved. Moss v. Pettingill, 3 Minn. 145 (217;) 2 High on Injunctions, § 1505. To this rule there are exceptions, resting upon recognized principles of equity.

The dissolution, like the granting and continuing, of such injunctions, is largely a matter of discretion, to be exercised according to the nature and circumstances of the particular case, — a consideration of much weight when the action of the original tribunal in reference to the same comes before an appellate court for review. 2 High on Injunctions, § 1508; Poor v. Carleton, 3 Sumn. 70; De Godey v. Godey, 39 Cal. 157. But the discretion referred to is nevertheless a sound legal discretion. To warrant its exercise in making an exception to the general rule as the effect of a full denial in the answer of the equities of the complaint, there must be ground for apprehending some irreparable injury or great hardships to the plaintiff if...