Pinewood Condo. Apartments v. Scottsdale Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 15 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-CV-61596-RUIZ/STRAUSS |
| Parties | PINEWOOD CONDOMINIUM APARTMENTS, INC., Plaintiff, v. SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE CO., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS MATTER came before the Court upon Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Defendant's First, Fifth and Seventh Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim (“Plaintiff's Motion”) [DE 44] and Defendant Scottsdale Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Its First, Fifth, and Seventh Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim () [DE 50]. The motions were referred to me to take all necessary and proper action as required by law [DE 55]. I have reviewed the motions, the responses and replies to the motions [DE 48, 51, 52, 53], all other summary judgment materials, and all other pertinent portions of the record. I also held a hearing (the “Hearing”) on the motions on July 11, 2022. See [DE 59]. For the reasons discussed herein, I respectfully RECOMMEND that Defendant's Motion [DE 50] be GRANTED and that Plaintiff's Motion [DE 44] be DENIED.
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff Scottsdale Insurance Co. (“Scottsdale”), issued a policy of insurance (“Policy”) [DE 44-1] to Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, Pinewood Condominium Apartments Inc. (“Pinewood”). See Defendant Scottsdale Insurance Company's Statement of Material Facts (“Scottsdale SMF”) [DE 49] ¶ 1 (undisputed). As reflected in the Policy, the Policy Period covers April 17, 2020 to April 17, 2021. SIC 000004.[1] On December 16, 2020 (during the Policy Period), Pinewood suffered a “Drainline Backup loss” that was caused by a “Broken/Fractured Drainline”; it subsequently submitted a claim for this loss. See Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss [DE 47-6]. As made clear at the Hearing, the events that occurred at the insured property on December 16, 2020 (i.e., the cause of the claim submitted by Pinewood) are undisputed. Specifically, both parties acknowledged - at the Hearing - that it is undisputed that broken or cracked drain lines underneath the property led to water backup from sinks and toilets, which caused some damage to property such as cabinets. But the parties dispute whether Pinewood is entitled (under the Policy) to recover costs for tearing out and replacing part of the structure that Pinewood will need to tear out to reach and fix the broken/cracked drain lines.[2]
Following the submission of Pinewood's claim, Scottsdale issued a payment to Pinewood for $116,405.24. Compare Scottsdale SMF ¶ 13 with Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Material Facts [DE 52] at 2, ¶ 13; see also [DE 47-4]. Of that amount, Pinewood received $104,764.72, following a payment to its independent adjuster. Scottsdale SMF ¶ 14 (undisputed); see also [DE 49-8]. Subsequently, Scottsdale demanded that Pinewood return the funds it received from Scottsdale, contending that Pinewood's claim was limited to $5,000 under the Policy and that Pinewood was therefore required to repay the funds it received over and above that $5,000 amount. See [DE 49-10]. Notwithstanding Scottsdale's demand, Pinewood retained the funds. Scottsdale SMF ¶ 17 (undisputed). Additionally, as Pinewood disagreed with Scottsdale's position - and also sought a greater amount than it received from Scottsdale, see supra note 2 - it filed a breach of contract claim against Scottsdale in state court. See Complaint [DE 12]. After removing this matter from state court [DE 1], Scottsdale filed a Counterclaim [DE 3] against Pinewood, asserting an unjust enrichment claim on account of its alleged overpayment to Pinewood.
A “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996)). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Hornsby-Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
Initially, it is the moving party's “burden to demonstrate the basis for its motion, and [it] must identify the portions of the record ‘which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “The movant may meet this burden by demonstrating that the nonmoving party has failed to present sufficient evidence to support an essential element of the case.” Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23). See also Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir. 1995) . Provided that the moving party meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Hornsby-Culpepper, 906 F.3d at 1311-12.
To establish a dispute of fact sufficient to avoid the entry of summary judgment, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” A.L. ex rel. D.L. v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts US, Inc., 900 F.3d 1270, 1289 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “However, a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. 242). Nevertheless, courts “must view all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Moreover, all reasonable doubts regarding the facts must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Both parties seek summary judgment on Scottsdale's First Fifth, and Seventh Affirmative Defenses, as well as Scottsdale's Counterclaim for unjust enrichment. The parties agree that the three affirmative defenses turn on whether the Policy limits Pinewood's recovery for its claim to $5,000 or whether the Policy permits Pinewood to recover tear out and replacement costs over and above that amount. If Pinewood's insurance claim is limited to $5,000 (or less), Scottsdale will prevail on its affirmative defenses and, thus, the Complaint. If not so limited, Pinewood will defeat the three affirmative defenses (and effectively establish Scottsdale's liability on the Complaint, leaving the issue of damages open). Additionally, if not limited to $5,000, Pinewood will defeat Scottsdale's Counterclaim for unjust enrichment. However, if limited to $5,000, and provided that the existence of the Policy (an express contract) does not bar Scottsdale's unjust enrichment claim (Pinewood argues it bars the claim), Scottsdale will be entitled to a judgment against Pinewood for $99,764.72 (the $104,764.72 Pinewood received less the $5,000 amount Pinewood is entitled to under the Policy). See infra note 7.
Because the material facts here are undisputed, the issue of whether the Policy limits Pinewood's claim to $5,000 turns on the interpretation of the Policy. The standard governing the interpretation of insurance policies under Florida law is discussed in Section A below. In Section B below, I explain why the Policy does in fact limit Pinewood's insurance claim to $5,000. Finally, in section C below, I explain that Scottsdale is entitled to judgment on its unjust enrichment claim because the elements of unjust enrichment are met and because Pinewood's express contract argument does not bar Scottsdale's unjust enrichment claim.
“Under Florida law, an insurance policy should be read ‘as a whole, endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and operative effect.'” SA Palm Beach, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 32 F.4th 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So.2d 871, 877 (Fla. 2007)). Courts must interpret the terms of insurance policies “in accordance with the plain language of the policies as bargained for by the parties.” Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. RichardMckenzie & Sons, Inc., 10 F.4th 1255, 1264 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Swindal, 622 So.2d 467, 470 (Fla. 1993)). “When ‘a policy provision is clear and unambiguous, it should be enforced according to its terms whether it is a basic policy provision or an exclusionary provision.'” Id. (quoting Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So.2d 528, 532 (Fla. 2005)). However, if a provision is ambiguous, “it is construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage.” SA Palm Beach, 32 F.4th at 1356 (citing U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So.2d 871, 877 (Fla. 2007)).
“While ambiguities are construed in favor of coverage, ‘a true ambiguity exists only when the language at issue is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation.'” Richard Mckenzie & Sons, 10...
To continue reading
Request your trial