Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Swindal

• Decision Date: 01 July 1993
• Docket Number: No. 80217,80217
• Citation: 622 So.2d 467
• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Parties: 18 Fla. L. Week. S376 PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Larry S. SWINDAL, et al., Respondents.

Page 467

622 So.2d 467

18 Fla. L. Week. S376

PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Larry S. SWINDAL, et al., Respondents.

No. 80217.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 1, 1993.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 26, 1993.

Raymond T. Elligett, Jr. and Charles P. Schropp of Schropp, Buell & Elligett, P.A., Tampa, for petitioner.

W.C. Airth, Jr. of Williams & Airth, P.A., Orlando, for respondent.

BARKETT, Chief Justice.

This case is before us on the following question certified by the Second District Court of Appeal as one of great public importance:

DOES THE "INTENTIONAL ACT" EXCLUSION IN A TYPICAL HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE POLICY EXCLUDE COVERAGE FOR INJURIES ARISING OUT OF AN INCIDENT INVOLVING AN INTENTIONAL TORT IF THE INJURIES "INEVITABLY FLOW" FROM THE INSURED'S INTENTIONAL ACT, BUT ARE "PROXIMATELY CAUSED" BY A NEGLIGENT ACT?

Swindal v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 599 So.2d 1314, 1319 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). ¹ We rephrase the question in conformity with facts presented to ask:

DOES A HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE POLICY'S "INTENTIONAL INJURY" EXCLUSION CLAUSE EXCLUDE COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURIES SUSTAINED WHERE THE INSURED COMMITTED AN INTENTIONAL ACT INTENDING TO CAUSE FEAR, BUT BODILY INJURIES MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED ACCIDENTALLY AND WERE NOT EXPECTED OR INTENDED BY THE INSURED TO RESULT?

We answer the question as rephrased in the negative and approve the decision below.

Larry S. Swindal suffered permanent head injuries when Nicholas Castellano's gun discharged during the course of an argument. The shooting resulted in three separate legal actions in the circuit court and two district court appeals. In one circuit court action, Castellano was charged with a criminal offense but was acquitted by a jury. In a second case, Swindal filed a civil action against Castellano. ² The instant case is a declaratory judgment action filed by Petitioner, Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company, against Swindal and Castellano based on the homeowners insurance policy it issued to Castellano.

The facts of this case are essentially as follows. ³ Castellano and Swindal were involved in an ongoing feud during 1983. In July 1983, Swindal held Castellano at gunpoint for forty-five minutes. On August 15, 1983, after an unsuccessful effort to resolve their differences at a citizen's dispute settlement mediation meeting, ⁴ Swindal drove through Castellano's circular driveway with a hammer in his hand. Castellano believed that Swindal was holding a gun. Castellano then obtained a handgun from his closet, apparently meaning to frighten Swindal, got in his car, and chased Swindal.

When Castellano caught up with Swindal, he approached Swindal's car with his loaded handgun, safety off, finger on the trigger. He reached inside Swindal's car with both hands to grab what he thought was a gun. Swindal then grabbed Castellano's gun and, in the struggle, the gun fired causing severe and permanent bodily injury to Swindal. Castellano said he never intended to shoot him. Rather, Castellano maintains that the gun accidentally discharged.

Prudential's complaint for declaratory judgment alleged that Prudential had no duty to pay under these facts pursuant to the intentional injury exclusion of the policy. The circuit court originally dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, but the Second District reversed and remanded with instructions that the circuit court determine whether Swindal's injury was caused by accidental or intentional conduct for the purposes of deciding Prudential's then-pending summary judgment motion. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Castellano, 571 So.2d 598 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (Prudential I ).

Upon remand, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Prudential. The court stated that it was "troubled by the public policy ramifications of providing insurance coverage for insureds who engage in intentional, aggressive conduct which then results in injury to their victims." The court held that Swindal's injuries were excluded from coverage under the policy because "the undisputed facts compel the conclusion that the insured intended some harm to Swindal."

The Second District again reversed. Swindal v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 599 So.2d 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (Prudential II ). The court held that the intentional injury exclusion in Castellano's policy did not exclude coverage for Swindal's injuries unless they were

the direct and proximate result of an intentional act. If the damages are caused by a separate act of negligence, even if it occurs in the same general time frame as some intentional act, the damages are not excluded if they are the result of an unexpected or unintended negligent act and are not the result of an intentional act.

Id. at 1318 (footnote omitted). The district court concluded that Swindal's gunshot wound was either the result of "an intentional battery with a deadly weapon or ... a negligent discharge of the weapon." The act of assault with a firearm was the only undisputed intentional act shown on the record, and that was insufficient to satisfy the exclusion because the injury was not caused by the act of intentionally causing fright. ⁵ Id. On this record, the district court said, there remains a disputed question of fact as to whether the gun was fired intentionally or accidentally. Without knowing whether the injury was caused by intentional or negligent conduct, the court could not decide whether Castellano "expected or intended to cause bodily injury" within the language of the policy. Therefore, the court remanded the case for trial to determine whether the gun was fired intentionally or negligently.

However, the Second District Court of Appeal was unsure of its analysis in light of Landis v. Allstate Insurance Co., 546 So.2d 1051 (Fla.1989), and State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Marshall, 554 So.2d 504 (Fla.1989). The court said it could not determine whether Landis changed the intentional injury exclusion into a broader intentional acts exclusion that would exclude coverage for damages that "inevitably flow" from an intentional act but are proximately caused by a separate negligent act. Because the district court believed that its opinion "could impact on standard language in virtually every homeowners insurance policy in Florida," 599 So.2d at 1316, it certified the question for our review.

Florida law has long followed the general rule that tort law principles do not control judicial construction of insurance contracts. Insurance contracts are construed in accordance with the plain language of the policies as bargained for by the parties. Ambiguities are interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer who prepared the policy. Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Nash, 97 So.2d 4, 9-10 (Fla.1957); see also, e.g., Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Butler, 314 So.2d 567, 570 (Fla.1975); Poole v. Travelers Ins. Co., 130 Fla. 806, 814, 179 So. 138, 141 (1937). Thus, intentional act exclusions are limited to the express terms of the policies and do not exclude coverage for injuries more broadly deemed under tort law principles to be consequences flowing from the insured's intentional acts.

For example, in Gulf Life Insurance Co. v. Nash, the insured attempted to frighten his friends by holding a gun to his own chest and pulling the trigger three times, believing all three chambers to be empty. The insured was killed when the gun discharged on the third trigger pull. The insured's "act" in pulling the trigger and attempting to frighten his friends clearly was intentional, but the insured's injury was deemed accidental within the meaning of the special accident insurance policy because the insured never intended to cause a fatal injury even though the shot flowed from an intentional act. Accordingly, the Court held the injury was covered by the policy in which the insurer had agreed to pay if the insured should meet his death by accidental means.

Justice Thomas argued that the injury should be excluded from coverage on the ground that the injury was the foreseeable consequence of a "dangerous, foolhardy act, and although the result was not intended, the means were deliberate as distinguished from accidental." 97 So.2d at 7 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part). The Court, however, expressly rejected that view. Justice Drew, writing for the Court on this issue, said the

doctrine of foreseeability is a doctrine totally unsuited and unadaptable in construing accident policies. Moreover, the rationale of these cases seems to be founded not only in the doctrine of foreseeability but intrinsically in negligence on the part of the insured. Were we to make this principle a part of the law of this State, it would not only do violence to the reason for buying accident insurance but if it did not preclude recovery in a great majority of deaths arising from accidents, it would place an almost insurmountable burden on the insured to enforce the liability.

The principle of the law is firmly imbedded in the jurisprudence of this State that contracts of insurance should be construed most favorably to the insured. To draw such a fine distinction between the words "accident" and "accidental means" would do violence to this principle. It is a classic example of a distinction without a difference. As a practical matter, the average person buying accident insurance policies assumes that he is covered for any fortuitous and undesigned injury. The average man has no conception of the judicial niceties of the problem and even the most learned judge or lawyer, in attempting to understand and comprehend the niceties of the distinction, is left in a state of bewilderment and confusion.

97 So.2d at 9-10 (Drew, J., for the majority in part).

District courts generally have followed the rationale expressed in Nash. In Cloud v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Co., 248 So.2d 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971), the insured, Cloud, pushed out of his way a car that had been...