Pinkard v. Morris
| Decision Date | 21 November 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. A94A1705,A94A1705 |
| Citation | 215 Ga.App. 297,450 S.E.2d 330 |
| Parties | PINKARD v. MORRIS et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Flournoy & Gentry, Matthew C. Flournoy, William C. Gentry, Marietta, for appellant.
Donald W. Huskins, Eatonton, Carter A. Setliff, Smith, Gambrell & Russell, E. Kendrick Smith, Thomas M. Barton, Atlanta, for appellees.
Angela Pinkard sued Christine Morris, the administratrix of the estate of William Ray Morris, deceased ("the deceased") for a share of his intestate estate. The trial court granted summary judgment to Morris, finding Pinkard's claim barred by collateral estoppel, and Pinkard appealed.
Approximately five months before Pinkard was born, her mother, now known as Cheryl Roach, married Thomas Hight. Although Hight was not Pinkard's father, Roach stated she married him "to give a name to her daughter." Eighteen months later, Roach filed for divorce. Roach, who was 16 years old at the time of the divorce, alleged in the divorce petition there had "been one child born as the issue of this marriage, namely [Pinkard]." In her deposition, Roach stated she did not recall ever reading the petition before signing it at the request of her attorney. A final judgment and decree was entered by the court, incorporating the parties' agreement providing for custody, visitation, and support for "the parties' minor child, [Pinkard]." Hight never paid any support for Pinkard and Roach stated she never attempted to enforce the decree because she did not feel that Hight owed them anything and all she was interested in was a divorce.
The deceased died intestate on October 30, 1992. Pinkard now asserts she is the daughter of the deceased and entitled as an heir at law to a pro rata share of his estate. The trial court held Pinkard's claim is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the prior divorce decree established Hight, and not the deceased, as her natural father.
1. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Fleeman, 263 Ga. 756, 757(2), 439 S.E.2d 474 (1994). See generally OCGA § 9-12-40. " ' Macuch v. Pettey, 170 Ga.App. 467, 469(2), 317 S.E.2d 262 (1984). Before privity can be established, the interests of the party must fully "represent" the interests of the privy and be fully congruent with those interests. Miller v. Charles, 211 Ga.App. 386, 388(1), 439 S.E.2d 88 (1993).
In Macuch, a mother, as next friend of her minor daughter, filed a paternity action to have a person, other than her former husband, adjudicated as the daughter's father. In their divorce decree, the mother and former husband expressly acknowledged the...
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Aycock v. Calk
...non-party to the prior action. See Norris v. Atlanta & West Point R. Co., 254 Ga. 684, 686, 333 S.E.2d 835 (1985); Pinkard v. Morris, 215 Ga.App. 297, 450 S.E.2d 330 (1994). Where the parties to the prior action are the same but the issues or claims differ, estoppel by judgment will bar the......
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...as to have such an identity of interest that the party to the judgment represented the same legal right. Pinkard v. Morris, 215 Ga.App. 297, 298(1), 450 S.E.2d 330 (1994). See also Waldroup v. Greene County Hosp. Auth., supra at 866, footnote 6, 463 S.E.2d 5. It has also been said that "[b]......
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Minnifield v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., A14A1592.
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