Pinkerton v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 04 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 5:18-cv-1371 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
| Parties | SANDRA PINKERTON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, PLAINTIFFS, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., DEFENDANTS. |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court are two motions: the motion of defendant GEICO Choice Insurance Company ("GEICO") to dismiss the complaint (Doc. No. 9 ["GEICO Mot."]), and the motion to dismiss filed by defendant Government Employees Insurance Company ("Government") (Doc. No. 10 ["Government Mot."]). The motions are opposed and fully briefed. (Doc. No. 14 ["GEICO Opp'n"]; Doc. No. 16 ["GEICO Reply"]; Doc. No. 15 ["Government Opp'n"]; Doc. No. 17 ["Government Reply"].) For the reasons discussed herein, GEICO's motion to dismiss is granted, and Government's motion is denied as moot.
All disputed facts are taken from the allegations in the complaint and, for consideration of the present dispositive motions, are presumed to be true. GEICO is in the business of selling and underwriting insurance policies. GEICO offers automobile insurance policies that contain various coverages and various "coverage limits, including bodily injury liability, property damage, uninsured motorist ['UM'] coverage and underinsured motorist ['UIM'] coverage." (Id. ¶ 9.) GEICO is the wholly owned subsidiary of Government. (Id. ¶ 26.)
The parties agree that Ohio law requires that all drivers maintain minimum bodily injury liability coverage of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per occurrence. It is equally well settled that Ohio law does not require any minimum UIM coverage limits. Ohio Rev. Code § 3937.18(A) ().
In 2018, plaintiff Sandra Pinkerton ("Pinkerton") purchased an automobile insurance policy (the "Policy") from GEICO. (Id. ¶ 6.) She alleges that she purchased the Policy in response to an email advertisement promising a "savings estimate." (Id. ¶ 7.) She alleges, generally, that she "relied on the guidance and advice of [GEICO], a sophisticated insurance corporation in selecting appropriate coverage limits[.]" (Id. ¶ 10.) She further alleges that she was advised as to "state minimum coverage limits" and that she received advice on selecting the appropriate coverage. (Id. ¶ 11.)
The insurance ultimately selected by Pinkerton provided for $25,000 of coverage for each person for property damages and bodily injury, and a $50,000 bodily injury limit for each occurrence. (Doc. No. 9-2 (the Policy), Declaration Page, at 92.) The Policy further provided UM and UIM coverage with limits of $12,000 per person and $25,000 per occurrence. The premium for UIM coverage was $6.89 every six months for each of thevehicles covered by the Policy. (See Policy at 92.) Prior to filing the present lawsuit, Pinkerton had never filed a claim with GEICO for UIM benefits.
On June 18, 2018, Pinkerton, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, filed a six-count complaint in federal court, on the basis of diversity, alleging breach of contract, fraud and misrepresentation, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and unjust enrichment.2 Pinkerton asserts that the UIM coverage offered in the Policy is a "nullity" because the UIM Policy limits of $12,000 per person and $25,000 per occurrence are less than the Ohio minimum bodily injury liability limits of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per occurrence. (Compl. ¶¶ 19-24.) According to Pinkerton, she could never make a claim for UIM coverage under the Policy because a driver could not maintain less than $25,000 in insurance in Ohio. (Id. at ¶ 23.) She complains that she has been injured by expending funds on coverage that is "void as a matter of law, useless in practice or operation, [and] provides no coverage against an underinsured driver[.]" (Id. ¶ 47.)
GEICO and Government bring their dispositive motions under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the pleading. Davis H. Elliot Co., Inc. v. Caribbean Util. Co., Ltd., 513 F.2d 1176, 1182 (6th Cir. 1975). All allegations of fact by the nonmoving party are accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to that party. See Grindstaff v. Green, 133 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 475 (6th Cir. 1990)). The Court,however, "need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences." Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987)). Nor is the Court required to accept as true complaint allegations that are contradicted by public records and other evidentiary materials of which the Court may take judicial notice. See Moody v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 3d 869, 874-75 (W.D. Mich. 2014) (); see also Williams v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 498 F. App'x 532, 536 (6th Cir. 2012) ().
The sufficiency of the pleading is tested against the notice pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which provides that a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Although this standard is liberal, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). If the plaintiff has not "nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court generally may not consider matters outside of the pleadings without converting the motion into a motion forsummary judgment under Rule 56. As the Sixth Circuit has held, however, there are a number of exceptions to this rule. Indeed, it is well settled that, in ruling on a Rule 12 dispositive motion, a district court "may consider the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant's motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained therein." Bassett v. Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Comm. Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335 (6th Cir. 2007) () (citations omitted).
While the Policy is not appended to the complaint, it is central to the claims contained therein. Accordingly, the Court may take judicial notice of the Policy without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motions into ones for summary judgment. Comm. Money Ctr., 508 F.3d at 335-36.
In its dispositive motion, GEICO argues that Pinkerton lacks standing to bring this action, and that, in any event, each of her claims fails to state a cause of action. Government insists that it is entitled to dismissal because the complaint also fails to set forth factual allegations that would demonstrate that it is liable for damages allegedly caused by its subsidiary, GEICO.
As a threshold matter, GEICO challenges Pinkerton's standing to bring the present action. Noting that Pinkerton has not alleged that she has ever made a claim for and was denied UIM coverage under the Policy, GEICO urges a finding that Pinkerton cannot establish a "current, concrete injury[.]" (GEICO Mot. at 69.) To meet the minimum constitutional standardfor individual standing in federal court, a litigant must show, among other things, an injury that is "concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling." Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 185 L. Ed. 2d 264 (2013) (quotation marks omitted); see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992). Additionally, Ohio law requires a controversy to be "grounded on a present dispute, not on a possible future dispute." Kincaid v. Erie Ins. Co., 944 N.E.2d 207, 211 (Ohio 2010); see also Morell v. Star Taxi, 343 F. App'x 54, 57 (6th Cir. 2009) ().
Relying on Kincaid, GEICO maintains that Pinkerton cannot demonstrate a justiciable injury grounded in a present dispute. (GEICO Mot. at 69-70.) In Kincaid, the Ohio Supreme Court held that an insured had failed to demonstrate a "present dispute" against his insurer, and as such lacked standing, where the insurer had not yet refused to pay a claim for certain expenses under a motor vehicle policy. Kincaid, 944 N.E.2d at 211. GEICO argues that by failing to first...
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