Pinkham v. Rite Aid of Maine, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 February 2006
• Citation: 889 A.2d 1009,2006 ME 9
• Parties: Gloria A. PINKHAM v. RITE AID OF MAINE, INC.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 1009

889 A.2d 1009

2006 ME 9

Gloria A. PINKHAM v. RITE AID OF MAINE, INC.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: November 15, 2005.

Decided: February 1, 2006.

Arthur J. Greif, Esq. (orally), Gilbert & Greif, P.A., Bangor, for plaintiff.

Anne M. Carney, Esq. (orally), Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, LLC, Portland, for defendant.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, LEVY, and SILVER, JJ.

SILVER, J.

[¶ 1] Gloria A. Pinkham appeals from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Hancock County, Mead, J.) contending that the court erred by (1) denying her motion to strike specified portions of Rite Aid of Maine, Inc.'s statement of material facts, and (2) finding that Pinkham was not a "qualified individual with a disability" pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 4553(8-D) (2005). Because a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning the essential functions of the job and Pinkham's ability to perform those functions, we vacate the judgment.¹

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] Pinkham began working at Rite Aid in Ellsworth as a cashier on June 2, 2001. She had sustained a work-related injury prior to her employment with Rite Aid. As a result of that injury, Pinkham's treating physician severely restricted her in certain activities. Despite these restrictions, Rite Aid hired her, and she did her work with some accommodation through assistance from other store employees. After working at Rite Aid for approximately seven months, Pinkham's symptoms worsened, and she began suffering increased pain from her activities. Ultimately, on the advice of her primary care physician, she took a leave of absence from her job for approximately two months.

[¶ 3] When Pinkham returned to work at Rite Aid in late February of 2002, her primary care physician had updated her work restrictions, but she resumed her work as a cashier with management accommodating her special requirements. Just as prior to her absence, she was not able to crank up the security shades in the morning, or carry totes into the store from the delivery trucks. Otherwise, Pinkham contends that she performed the duties of a cashier.

[¶ 4] In early March of 2002, Rite Aid's district manager claims to have observed Pinkham standing by the cash register reading a magazine, which is not permitted. During an ensuing conversation, the district manager and the two store managers discussed Pinkham's work restrictions and decided that, due to the restrictions from her physician, she was unable to perform the essential functions of the cashier position. Rite Aid thereafter terminated Pinkham's employment, but told her that she could return to work once she could lift two pounds. When she returned to Rite Aid with a note from her doctor, she was given a written cashier's job description and told that she could not return to work until she could perform all of the required duties.

[¶ 5] After satisfying the procedural requirements of the Human Rights Act, see 5 M.R.S. §§ 4611, 4612, 4613 (2005), Pinkham filed a complaint in the Superior Court, claiming that Rite Aid had violated her right to freedom from employment discrimination based on her disability. Rite Aid filed a motion for a summary judgment, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56(b), arguing that Pinkham failed to generate any evidence that she was capable of performing the essential functions of a Rite Aid cashier. Pinkham filed a motion to strike certain portions of Rite Aid's statement of material facts. The Superior Court denied Pinkham's motion to strike and granted Rite Aid's motion for a summary judgment. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 6] "We review a ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, to decide whether the parties' statements of material fact and referenced record evidence reveal a genuine issue of material fact." Rice v. City of Biddeford, 2004 ME 128, ¶ 9, 861 A.2d 668, 670. "A material fact is one having the potential to affect the outcome of the suit." Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000 ME 84, ¶ 6, 750 A.2d 573, 575. "A genuine issue exists when sufficient evidence supports a factual contest to require a factfinder to choose between competing versions of the truth at trial." Id.

[¶ 7] Title 5 M.R.S. § 4572(2) (2005) provides in part: "A covered entity may not discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of the individual in regard to . . . discharge of employees. . . ." The statute defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a physical or mental disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the...