Pinkham v. State National Insurance Company, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 January 2017
• Docket Number: KNLCV166027740S
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Joseph Pinkham v. State National Insurance Company, Inc

Joseph Pinkham v. State National Insurance Company, Inc

No. KNLCV166027740S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New London, New London

January 20, 2017

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Robert F. Vacchelli, Judge

This case is an action by the plaintiff, Joseph Pinkham, seeking a declaratory judgment obligating the defendant, State National Insurance Company, Inc., to provide a defense for and indemnify certain of its insureds being sued by the plaintiff in separate litigation. Pending before the court is a motion to dismiss, filed by the defendant, arguing that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this suit. The court also asked the parties to address the issue of whether the case was ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons, the court concludes that the motion to dismiss should be granted. Judgment shall enter in favor of the defendant, accordingly.

I

" A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) RC Equity Group, LLC v Zoning Commission of Borough of Newton, 285 Conn. 240 248, 939 A.2d 1122 (2008).

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is obligated to " take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader . . . [A] motion to dismiss admits all facts well pleaded and invokes any record that accompanies the motion, including supporting affidavits that contain undisputed facts . . . If a resolution of a disputed fact is necessary to determine the existence of standing when raised by a motion to dismiss, a hearing may be held in which evidence is taken." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) May v. Coffey, 291 Conn. 106, 108-09, 967 A.2d 495 (2009). " [I]t is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) Novak v. Levin, 287 Conn. 71, 79, 951 A.2d 514 (2008).

" Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy . . . When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue . . . Standing requires no more than a colorable claim of injury; a [party] ordinarily establishes . . . standing by allegations of injury. Similarly, standing exists to attempt to vindicate arguably protected interests . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) St. Germain v. LaBrie, 108 Conn.App. 587, 591, 949 A.2d 518 (2008).

Standing implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 254, 990 A.2d 206 (2010). " Subject matter jurisdiction [implicates] the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . . The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by any party and can be raised at any stage in the proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted; citation omitted.) Bingham v. Dep't of Public Works, 286 Conn. 698, 701, 945 A.2d 927 (2008).

" Ripeness is one of several justiciability doctrines, including standing and mootness . . . An issue regarding justiciability . . . must be resolved as a threshold matter because it implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction . . . While the declaratory judgment procedure may not be utilized merely to secure advice on the law . . . or to establish abstract principles of law . . . or to secure the construction of a statute if the effect of that construction will not affect a plaintiff's personal rights . . . it may be employed in justiciable controversy where the interests are adverse, where there is an actual bona fide and substantial question or issue in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal relations which requires settlement, and where all persons having an interest in the subject matter of the complaint are parties to the action or have reasonable notice thereof." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hamilton v. United Services Automobile Assn., 115 Conn.App. 774, 781-82, 974 A.2d 774, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 924, 980 A.2d 910 (2009).

II

Based on the allegations of the complaint, the relevant facts are as follows: The defendant is an insurance company authorized to do business in the State of Connecticut. By way of complaint filed February 13, 2015, the plaintiff commenced a lawsuit against several persons and companies, including Gary Picardi and Family Bowl, LLC and Half Time Sports Lounge, LLC d/b/a Picardi's Pub (" insureds") in a case titled Joseph Pinkham v. Briana Picardi et al., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Doc. No. KNL CV 15-6023458 . In that case, the plaintiff alleges that on March 9, 2013, he suffered personal injuries while he was a patron at Picardi's Pub, located within the Family Bowl, located at 122 Boston Post Road in Waterford, CT due to the negligence and carelessness of the insureds.

Prior to March 9, 2013, the defendant issued a renewal policy to the insureds, which policy was in full force and effect at the time of the events that caused injury to the plaintiff. Pursuant to the terms of the policy, the defendant had an obligation to provide a defense for and indemnify the insureds against plaintiff's claims. Despite said obligation, and in contravention to the terms of the policy, the defendant refused to provide a defense on behalf of the insureds. To date, the defendant has not provided counsel for the defense. The plaintiff alleges that he is directly harmed by the defendant's refusal to provide a defense and indemnify its insureds. Therefore, he seeks a judgment from the court declaring that the defendant has a duty to defend and/or indemnify the insureds under the policy in connection with his lawsuit against the insureds.

III

The issue before the court is whether an injured party can bring an action against his insured tortfeasor's liability insurer, prior to obtaining a judgment against the insured to determine issues of coverage. Under the circumstances of this case, the answer is negative.

For analytical purposes, this case involves two issues: the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify. " It is beyond dispute that an insurer's duty to defend, being much broader in scope and application than its duty to indemnify, is determined by reference to the allegations contained in the complaint . . . The obligation of the insurer to defend does not depend on whether the injured party will successfully maintain a cause of action against the insured, but on whether he has, in his complaint, stated facts [that] bring the injury within the coverage . . . If an allegation of the complaint falls even possibly within the coverage, then the [insurer] must defend the insured. Accordingly, an insurer's duty to defend its insured is triggered without regard to the merits of its duty to indemnify." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Company, 273 Conn. 448, 470, 870 A.2d 1048 (2005); Harman v. Belisle, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Doc. No. CV 126035291, (September 4, 2014, Wiese, J.); Korbusieski v. CHK-Waterbury Assoc., LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Doc. No. CV065001916, (August 29, 2008, Roche, J.); Yuniskis v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Doc. No. CV 045000074, (March 8, 2006, Domnarski, J.). The points are discussed seriatim:

A

With regard to the duty to indemnify, the law is well-settled. A case is not ripe when any claim for indemnity that plaintiff may have against the defendant is contingent on the plaintiff prevailing in the underlying action, which has not yet been adjudicated. Hamilton v. United Services Automobile Assn., supra, 115 Conn.App. 782. That is precisely the circumstance in the instant case. Therefore, until there has been a judicial determination that the tortfeasors are liable to the plaintiff, the question of whether the defendant is obligated to provide insurance coverage in this declaratory judgment action is a hypothetical one. Id.

Having disposed of the duty to indemnify issue on the grounds of ripeness, it is unnecessary to resolve the issue of whether the plaintiff has standing to raise issues regarding indemnity.

With regard to the duty to defend issue, on the other hand, the question of whether the defendant is obligated to provide a defense in a pending case is not merely hypothetical in the instant case. There is no dispute that there is an actual case pending against the tortfeasors or that an insurance policy was in effect at the time. Therefore, the court shall resolve the issue of standing with respect to the duty to defend issue.

B

With regard to standing with respect to the duty to defend, " [i]t is a basic principle of our law . . . that the plaintiff's must have standing in order for a court to have jurisdiction to render a...