Pinkston v. Bensinger
Decision Date | 18 May 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 72 C 2153.,72 C 2153. |
Citation | 359 F. Supp. 95 |
Parties | Aaron PINKSTON, Plaintiff, v. Peter BENSINGER and John J. Twomey, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Aaron Pinkston, pro se.
James B. Zagel for William J. Scott, Atty. Gen. of Ill., Chicago, Ill., for defendants.
This cause comes on the defendants' motion either to dismiss the complaint or for summary judgment in their favor. The plaintiff is presently incarcerated in the Illinois State Penitentiary, Joliet Branch, Special Programs Unit, pursuant to a conviction by the Circuit Court of Cook County for armed robbery. Plaintiff was sentenced to serve from two to five years in the penitentiary on June 10, 1971.
The defendants are Peter B. Bensinger, former director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, and John J. Twomey, Warden of the Illinois State Penitentiary, Joliet Branch.
This is an action to redress an alleged deprivation of the plaintiff's civil rights guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act of 1870 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. The jurisdiction of this Court is predicated on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3).
The plaintiff in his complaint alleges the following deprivations of his constitutional rights:
The plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants.
It is the opinion of this Court that the motion of the defendants is meritorious and that the instant case is controlled by the Seventh Circuit decision in Armstrong v. Bensinger, 479 F.2d 701 (1973) in that the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint do not rise to the stature of a constitutional violation.*
The defendants, in support of their instant motion, have submitted affidavits and exhibits which clearly demonstrate the following important factors regarding the existing conditions:
It is well settled that segregated confinement, comparable to the Special Program Unit at Joliet, does not in itself violate the Eighth Amendment. Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Knight v. Ragen, 337 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985, 85 S.Ct. 1355, 14 L.Ed.2d 277 (1965); United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 333 F. Supp. 1352 (N.D.Ill.1971).
Federal courts have also held that allegations similar to the specific allegations in the plaintiff's complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The mere fact that a concrete base is used to support plaintiff's mattress does not constitute a condition "so foul, so inhuman and so violative of basic concepts of decency" to fall within the proscription of the Eighth Amendment. Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2nd Cir. 1967). This is especially true since plaintiff is not forced to sleep on bare concrete, but is provided with a mattress, sheets and blankets which are exactly the same as those provided the general prison population. The use of the word "filthy" in this context as was used by the plaintiff in the instant complaint has been held to be a general conclusory allegation insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971). See also, Ford v. Board of Managers, 407 F.2d 937 (3rd Cir. 1969).
In the absence of any factual allegation that the sheets and two blankets are inadequate covering, the plaintiff's allegations are without merit. Metcalf v. Ogilvie, 436 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1970); Sanberg v. Daley, 306 F.Supp. 277 (N. D.Ill.1969).
The lighting conditions in the Joliet penal institution's Special Programs Unit complex are quite superior to those found in Adams v. Pate, supra, wherein the turning on of the cell light only when the inmate was fed was held not to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
It is the opinion of this Court that the defendant's procedure and opportunities for showers did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See also Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2nd Cir. 1971).
In dealing with the medical needs of the inmates, prison officials have broad discretion as to the type of medical treatment which is demanded and federal courts will not inquire into the adequacy or sufficiency of such medical care. United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Ragen, 323 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963). Only when the inmate has presented "exceptional circumstances" will the court intervene. United States ex rel. Knight v. Ragen, supra. General allegations of negligence or inadequate medical treatment fail to state a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act. United States ex rel. Knight v. Ragen, supra; Hopkins v. County of Cook, 305 F.Supp. 1011 (N.D.Ill.1969); Church v. Hegstrom, 416 F.2d 449 (2nd Cir. 1969). In the instant action, the plaintiff does not contend that he has ever been denied a request for medical care. Nor is his allegation of "inadequate medical attention" supported by any other factual allegation which could constitute "exceptional circumstances." The plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act.
The plaintiff's allegations that he was served cold food, which is contrary to the defendants' affidavits and exhibits, is insufficient to establish a denial of constitutional rights. To establish such a violation plaintiff would have had to allege that he was denied that quality or quantity of food required for appropriate nutrition. Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F.Supp. 257 (D.C.Md. 1972); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D.Va.1971). The plaintiff in the instant complaint makes no such allegations.
Visitation procedures are clearly matters within the scope of prison discipline and security. Perez v. Turner, 462 F.2d 1056 (10th Cir. 1972); Walker v. Pate, 356 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1966).
Any inconvenience suffered by plaintiff's lack of privacy during visitation periods is certainly outweighed by the state's interest in preventing the introduction of weapons or other contraband into a penal institution. If, as it has been held, prison authorities may bar certain visitors altogether, surely they may require that a prison official be present during visitation periods. See Rowland v. Wolff, 336 F.Supp. 257 (D.C.Neb.1971); Walker v. Pate, supra.
Restricted recreation as allowed by the Special Programs Unit has been held not to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Landman v. Peyton, supra; Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971); State ex rel. Pingley v. Coiner, 186 S.E.2d 220 (W.Va.Sup.Ct.1972).
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