Pinkston v. Semple

• Decision Date: 19 May 1891
• Citation: 9 So. 329,92 Ala. 564
• Parties: PINKSTON v. SEMPLE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

9 So. 329

92 Ala. 564

PINKSTON v. SEMPLE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 19, 1891

Appeal from circuit court, Montgomery county; JOHN P. HUBBARD Judge.

This was a statutory action of ejectment, brought by the appellee H. C. Semple, as administrator of the estate of William Thomas Williams, against the appellant, J. R. Pinkston, and sought to recover from the defendant a tract of land of which the intestate of plaintiff had been possessed, and which he had professed to sell and convey to the defendant in this action. Prior to the pretended sale of the land in controversy to the defendant by said William Thomas Williams deceased, a bill had been filed by his father, under § 2502 of the Code, alleging that by reason of his intemperance he was unable and unfit to manage or control his estate, and asking that a trustee be appointed, and describing the property which he then held, among which was the tract involved in this suit. Upon this bill his father was appointed trustee, and as such took charge of his property. After this proceeding, and after the trustee had taken possession of the property of said William Thomas Williams he, said William Thomas Williams, at one time sold and made to the defendant in this suit, J. R. Pinkston, a deed to the tract of land here involved; and it is under this deed that he now bases his right to defend and defeat this action brought by the administrator. On the trial of the case the court overruled the defendant's objections to the introduction in evidence of the chancery proceedings, and the defendant duly excepted. The defendant also duly excepted to several rulings of the lower court in sustaining the plaintiff's objection to evidence sought to be introduced by the defendant showing the execution of the deed by the said William Thomas Williams, the payment of the purchase money, the receipt of a portion of it by the trustee, the trustee's assent to the sale of said land, and that it was done at a time when the said William Thomas Williams was sane and sober. At the request of the plaintiff, the court gave the general affirmative charge in his favor. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant on this appeal assigns the various rulings of the lower court as error.

Arrington & Graham and Watts & Son, for appellant.

Semple & Gunter, for appellee.

McCLELLAN J.

In the view we take of this case there is but one question in it namely, whether the chancery court acquired jurisdiction to appoint a trustee for the protection of the estate of William Thomas Williams, an intemperate person, by a bill filed to that end, under chapter 5, §§ 2502-2506, Code, by the father of the inebriate, which did not negative his having a brother or sister or other next of kin, or allege that the complaint was next of kin of said Williams. The statute provides: "When any unmarried man over twenty-one years of age is by reason of intemperance unfit to manage his estate, or is wasting or squandering it, and thereby in danger of being reduced to poverty and want, his brothers or sisters or next of kin, or any or either of them, may themselves, or by next friend, if minors or married women, file their bill in chancery to preserve the estate of such intemperate person from further waste, and for general relief." Other provisions are for making the inebriate a party defendant, for the hearing, a decree thereon, if the averments are established by confession or admissions of the answer, or by proof, depriving him of all control of the estate described, and appointing a trustee thereof, prescribing his duties, etc., and for the restoration of the estate on petition and proof of reformation and fitness of the person whose estate has been committed to a trustee to have charge of the same. The manifest purpose of this legislation is the protection and preservation of the inebriate's estate for his support and maintenance, and to avert the danger of his being "reduced to poverty and want." It not only does not involve, but negatives, the idea of conserving any interest his heirs expectant or distributees may be supposed to have in his estate; and this appears, not alone from the purposes which are expressed in the act, but also from the fact that the trustee to be appointed need not be the complainant in the bill, nor any brother or sister or next of kin of the intemperate person, but is to be selected by the chancellor, whose discretion in that regard is in no degree controlled by considerations of relationship of the trustee to the inebriate or to the proceeding. Indeed, it may well be conceived that there might be cases in which such relationship, involving an expectancy of succeeding to the estate, and an interest in preserving it to that end, would be inimical to suitable support of the cestui que trust, and which would supply good reason for committing the property to a stranger. The limitation in the statute of the right to institute and prosecute the proceeding could not, therefore, have had any basis in the minds of the law-makers, upon considerations of the pecuniary or property interests in futuro of the classes of persons who are allowed to file the bill. It was not rested upon considerations which underlie statutes of distribution and descent, whereby the brother has priority of the father, though one degree further removed in kinship, and descendants take in preference to the brother, though one or many degrees further removed in blood. The interest in view of which the right of action is confined to brothers and sisters and next of kin is a personal one, an assumed personal solicitude for the well-being of the inebriate, growing out of and incident to the relationship of blood, wholly apart from any consideration of a possible property right that may or may not be also incident to the relationship, as the party moving in the matter may or may not be the next of kin of the inebriate. Another consideration, doubtless conducing to the limitation of the right of action found in this statute, was the assumption that persons belonging to the designated classes would be advised of the situation and of the necessity for intervening for the protection of the inebriate's estate. It may therefore be safely affirmed that the two considerations moving the legislature to the limitation referred to were the personal solicitude for the welfare of the inebriate, and the knowledge of his condition and estate on the part of those allowed to file the bill, inducing them to act advisedly, intelligently, and disinterestedly in the premises. There can be no question but that these qualifications might exist in a...