Pinney v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan
| Decision Date | 30 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-CV-125-LRR,14-CV-125-LRR |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
| Parties | R. JAN PINNEY, Plaintiff, v. AEGON COMPANIES PENSION PLAN, Defendant. |
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................... 2
II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY ......................... 2
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION .......................... 2
IV. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND ........................ 2
V. ANALYSIS ............................................ 4
VI. CONCLUSION ........................................ 13
I. INTRODUCTION
The matter before the court is Defendant AEGON Companies Pension Plan's ("the Plan") Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Motion") (docket no. 39).
II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 4, 2014, Plaintiff R. Jan Pinney filed a Complaint ("Original Complaint") (docket no. 1) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. On August 25, 2014, Pinney filed an Amended Complaint (docket no. 18) on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals. The Amended Complaint alleges that the Plan violated the terms of its pension plan when it denied Pinney's claim for pension benefits. On August 29, 2014, the Plan filed a Motion to Dismiss or in Alternative to Transfer ("Motion to Dismiss") (docket no. 21). On October 30, 2014, the case was transferred to this court. See October 30, 2014 Minute Entry (docket no. 21). On November 21, 2014, the Plan filed an Answer (docket no. 36). On that same date, the Plan filed the Motion. On December 22, 2014, Pinney filed a Resistance (docket no. 47). On January 2, 2015, the Plan filed a Reply (docket no. 48). The matter is fully submitted and ready for decision.
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The court has federal question jurisdiction over Pinney's claim against the Plan, which arises under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ().
IV. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Accepting all factual allegations in the Amended Complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Pinney, the facts are as follows.
Pinney is a citizen of California and resides in Roseville, California. In 1971, he became an employee of Occidental Life Insurance Company of California ("Occidental"), an affiliate of Transamerica Corporation ("Transamerica"), and thereby became a participant in its employee benefit pension plan. The Plan is an employee benefit pension plan within the meaning of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002, and is administered in Iowa.
The case arises out of Pinney's claim that the Plan denied him pension benefits to which he is entitled. In 1971, Pinney began working as an Assistant Branch Manager for Occidental. In 1972, Pinney began working as a General Agent for Occidental. In 1985, Pinney became a Branch Manager for Transamerica. Pinney continued working for Transamerica until July 31, 1997. As an employee of Occidental and Transamerica, Pinney participated in the employee benefit pension plan, which was sponsored by Transamerica and its predecessors and successors in interest.
The pension plan has undergone several amendments and changes since Pinney began his employment, but is currently named the "AEGON Companies Pension Plan." In 2011, Pinney received estimates of his pension benefits and noticed that the Plan had not credited him for thirteen years of his employment—from May 14, 1972 through May 28, 1985—when he worked as a General Agent. On or about December 6, 2011, Pinney submitted documents to the Plan claiming that he was an "employee" eligible for pension benefits during his tenure as a General Agent. The Plan interpreted this as a claim for benefits. On March 5, 2012, the Plan issued an adverse benefit determination, finding that Pinney "was not an 'Employee' within the meaning of the Plan during the time he worked as a General Agent" because that position fell outside the Plan's definition of "employee." Amended Complaint ¶ 39. Pinney timely requested review of the adverse benefitdetermination and has exhausted administrative remedies under the Plan.
V. ANALYSIS
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed. Such a motion is analyzed under the same standard that the court employs for a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). St. Paul Ramsey Cnty. Med. Ctr. v. Pennington Cnty., S.D., 857 F.2d 1185, 1187 (8th Cir. 1988); see also Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that the court may dismiss a complaint when it "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); accord B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 569 F.3d 383, 387 (8th Cir. 2009). "Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint [that] there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal . . . is appropriate." Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 546 (8th Cir. 1997)). Poehl v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 528 F.3d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Faibisch v. Univ. of Minn., 304 F.3d 797, 803 (8th Cir. 2002)) (internal citation omitted).
The Plan argues that Pinney's claim is barred by Iowa's ten year statute oflimitations on contract claims. The Plan states that "the decision to exclude [the] service from the calculation of [Pinney's] benefit was communicated . . . to [Pinney] in 1998, when he was told the amount of benefits to which he was entitled and the service on which his benefits were based." Answer at 4. The Plan argues that this letter ("the 1998 Letter") constitutes a "clear repudiation" of Pinney's pension benefits and put Pinney on notice for purposes of the statute of limitations. The Plan argues that because Pinney knew, or should have known, about his claim in 1998, his claim is now barred by Iowa's statute of limitations for contract actions. Motion at 1-2. Pinney argues that the court should not consider the 1998 Letter in resolving the Motion, or, if the court does consider it, then the court must convert the instant Motion into a motion for summary judgment. Resistance at 11. Furthermore, Pinney argues that the statute of limitations does not bar his claim because there was never a "clear repudiation" of the relevant pension benefits. Id. at 5.
The Plan argues that "[t]he 1998 [L]etter and the other documents the . . . Plan used to support its Rule 12(c) motion are embraced by the pleadings, incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, and items appearing in the record of the case" and it is therefore permissible for the court to consider them without converting the Motion into a motion for summary judgment. Reply at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). Pinney argues that the 1998 Letter is not necessarily embraced by the pleadings and should not be considered. Resistance at 11.
"When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings . . . , the court generally must ignore materials outside the pleadings, but it may consider 'some materials that are part of the public record or do not contradict the complaint.'" Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999) . The court may also consider "materials that are 'necessarily embraced by the pleadings.'" Id. (quoting Piper Jaffray Cos. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 967 F. Supp. 1148, 1152 (D. Minn. 1997)). "Documents necessarily embraced by the pleadings include 'documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions.'" Ashanti v. City of Golden Valley, 666 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kushner v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 317 F.3d 820, 831 (8th Cir. 2003)). Therefore, "courts are not strictly limited to the four corners of complaints." Dittmer Properties, L.P. v. F.D.I.C., 708 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir. 2013).
"[W]hile courts primarily consider the allegations in the complaint in determining whether to grant a [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6) motion, courts additionally consider matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is unquestioned . . . without converting the motion into one for summary judgment."
Id. (quoting Miller v. Redwood Toxicology...
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