Pinnix v. Griffin
| Decision Date | 20 May 1942 |
| Docket Number | 665. |
| Citation | 20 S.E.2d 366,221 N.C. 348 |
| Parties | PINNIX v. GRIFFIN et al. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Civil action to recover damages for wrongful death.
This case was here on former appeal, Pinnix v. Griffin, 219 N.C. 35, 12 S.E.2d 667. On the first trial, there was a judgment of nonsuit as to the corporate defendant entered at the conclusion of the evidence for the plaintiff and verdict and judgment against Griffin for $1,000. Plaintiff excepted to the judgment of nonsuit and appealed. The other facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion on the former appeal.
The nonsuit as to the corporate defendant having been reversed the case again came on for trial when the following issues were submitted to the jury:
There was judgment on the verdict and the corporate defendant excepted and appealed.
R. M. Robinson, of Greensboro, for appellant Gate City Life Ins. Co.
C. L. Shuping, of Greensboro, for appellee.
The decision by the Supreme Court on a prior appeal reversing the judgment of nonsuit constitutes the law of the case both in subsequent proceedings in the trial court and on a subsequent appeal. Templeton v. Kelley, 216 N.C. 487, 5 S.E. 2d 555; Robinson v. McAlhaney, 216 N.C. 674, 6 S.E.2d 517; Wall v. City of Asheville, 220 N.C. 38, 16 S.E.2d 397. As defendant concedes that plaintiff's evidence on the second trial was substantially the same as on the first trial its motion to dismiss as of nonsuit was properly overruled. We will not review on a second appeal questions which were discussed and decided on the first appeal. Defendant's remedy, if any, was by petition to rehear.
The defendant, in apt time, tendered in writing a prayer for instructions as follows:
"In respect to the issue as to damages, if you come to consider that issue, the Court charges you, as a matter of law, that in no event can you award damages in excess of the sum of $1,000.00."
The Court declined to charge the jury as requested and the defendant excepted. This exception is the basis of the primary assignment of error on this appeal and presents this question: Can the master, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, be held in damages in an amount greater than that assessed against the servant, or is the verdict and judgment against the servant conclusive and binding upon the plaintiff?
The individual defendant and not the corporate defendant was the active tort-feasor. While it is true the appellant on the finding of the jury was negligent in the sense that the act of the agent, as such is the act of, or is imputed to, the principal, it is, strictly speaking, liable only under the doctrine of respondeat superior. This is established by the verdict. It must pay the damages inflicted by its servant while he was about his master's business and acting within the scope of his employment. The amount of these damages has been ascertained and fixed by a jury in an action to which plaintiff was a party.
She did not appeal. May she now recover a much larger sum from the master?
This question has been decided, in principle, by this court. We have held that the verdict and judgment against the plaintiff on the issue of negligence in an action against the servant is conclusive and bars a later action by the same plaintiff against the principal. This is the law when the master is not guilty of any independent or concurrent wrong but must be held, if at all, under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Whitehurst v. Elks, 212 N.C. 97, 192 S.E. 850; Morrow v. Southern R. R., 213 N.C. 127, 195 S.E. 383; Hudson v. Gulf Oil Co., 215 N.C. 422, 2 S.E.2d 26; Leary v. Virginia-Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank, 215 N.C. 501, 2 S.E.2d 570; Lindsey v. Danville, 46 Vt. 144; 15 R.C.L., 1027.
The applicable law is fully discussed and the authorities are gathered and cited in the well considered and comprehensive opinion in the Leary case, supra.
What is said in that and the other cases cited applies with equal force to the question presented on this appeal. The plaintiff can have but one satisfaction-- payment of the damages caused by the wrongful act of Griffin. Manufacturing Co. v. Moore, 144 N.C. 527, 57 S.E. 213, 10 L.R.A.,N.S., 734, 119 Am.St.Rep. 983. She cannot recover twice for the same wrong or, in other words, she cannot have two compensations for the same complete tort, but must abide the first recovery as her full satisfaction for the wrong. Barcliff v. Norfolk Southern R. R., 176 N.C. 39, 96 S.E. 644. Nor may she now reopen and recanvass the question, or assert that the act of Griffin inflicted greater damage than she recovered in the former trial. With that verdict she was then content. As to her, it is res judicata. 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, § 6, p. 194; Manufacturing Co. v. Moore, supra.
Neither will she be permitted to allege that the former recovery was upon a wrong basis or in an inadequate amount; for if there was any error to her prejudice in the trial of that case she should then have excepted and had it corrected by an appeal. It is now too late to raise the question, as the judgment forecloses and estops her as to all issues determined on that hearing.
"A judgment is an estoppel upon a party not only insofar as it decides a question adversely to his claim or contention in the suit in which it is rendered, but where it recognizes or sustains his theory or claim it estops him from afterward taking a different position" as against those entitled to plead the estoppel. 34 C.J., 907, § 1318.
But plaintiff argues, however, that the defendant was...
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