Pinnock v. International House of Pancakes

• Decision Date: 08 November 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 92-1370-R (CM).
• Citation: 844 F. Supp. 574
• Parties: Theodore A. PINNOCK, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL HOUSE OF PANCAKES FRANCHISEE, et al., Defendants. Majid ZAHEDI doing business as International House of Pancakes, Counterclaimant, v. Theodore A. PINNOCK, and Does 1 Through 50, Counterdefendants, and The United States of America, Counterdefendant-Intervenor.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California

844 F. Supp. 574

Theodore A. PINNOCK, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL HOUSE OF PANCAKES FRANCHISEE, et al., Defendants.

Majid ZAHEDI doing business as International House of Pancakes, Counterclaimant, v. Theodore A. PINNOCK, and Does 1 Through 50, Counterdefendants, and The United States of America, Counterdefendant-Intervenor.

Civ. No. 92-1370-R (CM).

United States District Court, S.D. California.

November 8, 1993.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Theodore A. Pinnock, Law Offices of Theodore A. Pinnock and Hugh D. Kelso, III, San Diego, CA, for plaintiff/counterdefendant.

Peter Lepiscopo, Law Offices of Peter Lepiscopo, San Diego, CA, for defendant/counterclaimant.

Joseph Russo, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for U.S.

AMENDED ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING CROSS-MOTION BY UNITED STATES FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES¹

RHOADES, District Judge.

I. Background

Plaintiff, Theodore A. Pinnock ("Pinnock") filed the complaint in this action against Defendant, Majid Zahedi, owner of an International House of Pancakes franchise ("Zahedi").² Pinnock, an attorney representing himself, is unable to walk and uses a wheelchair. Pinnock dined at the defendant's restaurant on June 21, 1992, and then attempted to use the restroom. The entrance to the restroom, however, was not wide enough to admit his wheelchair. Pinnock therefore removed himself from his wheelchair and crawled into the restroom. As a result of this encounter, Pinnock alleges nine causes of action against Zahedi. Five of the causes of action arise under state law, alleging violations of the state health and safety code, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and infliction of emotional distress. The remaining four causes of action are alleged under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), arising from Zahedi's alleged failure to comply with the statute's provisions governing access for disabled individuals in public accommodations ("title III").³

Zahedi presented twenty-five affirmative defenses in his answer to the complaint. Among these, and at issue here, are allegations that the ADA violates numerous provisions of the United States Constitution. Zahedi filed a compulsory counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment on the constitutional challenges pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2201. The United States intervened pursuant to rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 2403, to defend the constitutionality of the ADA, and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the constitutional issues. As no court has yet considered the constitutional challenges raised by Zahedi, these motions call upon the Court to decide questions of first impression.

II. Zahedi is a Member of an Industry Which Affects Interstate Commerce and is Properly Regulated by Title III

Zahedi argues that Congress does not have constitutional authority to regulate his facility, asserting that title III of the ADA exceeds the powers granted Congress by the U.S. Constitution. Congress enacted title III pursuant to Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution, which grants Congress the power to "regulate Commerce ... among the several States" and to enact all laws necessary and proper to this end. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 18; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-02, 85 S.Ct. 377, 382, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964). The Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress is empowered under the Commerce Clause to regulate not only interstate activities, but also intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. See, e.g., McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241, 100 S.Ct. 502, 508, 62 L.Ed.2d 441 (1980); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 1360, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971) (citing United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119, 62 S.Ct. 523, 526, 86 L.Ed. 726 (1942)); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 122-25, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87-89, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942); M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819).

The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate any entity, regardless of its individual impact on interstate commerce, so long as the entity engages in a class of activities that affects interstate commerce. Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 862, 105 S.Ct. 2455, 2457, 85 L.Ed.2d 829 (1985); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 277, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2360, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547, 95 S.Ct. 1792, 1795, 44 L.Ed.2d 363 (1975)); Perez, 402 U.S. at 151-54, 91 S.Ct. at 1360-61. As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Darby, Congress has "recognized that in present day industry, competition by a small party may affect the whole and that the total effect of the competition of many small producers may be great." 312 U.S. 100, 123, 61 S.Ct. 451, 461, 85 L.Ed. 609 (1941). See also Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29, 63 S.Ct. at 90-91.

Courts must defer to congressional findings that an activity affects commerce, so long as there is a rational basis for such a finding. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276, 101 S.Ct. at 2360; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-04, 85 S.Ct. at 383 (1964). As the Supreme Court recognized in the context of racial discrimination, the restaurant industry unquestionably affects interstate commerce in a substantial way. In Katzenbach, the Court noted,

discrimination in restaurants has a direct and highly restrictive effect upon interstate travel by Negroes. This resulted ... because discriminatory practices prevent Negroes from buying prepared food served on the premises while on a trip, except in isolated and unkempt restaurants and under most unsatisfactory and often unpleasant conditions. This obviously discourages travel and obstructs interstate commerce for one can hardly travel without eating.

379 U.S. at 300, 85 S.Ct. at 381-82. Thus, regardless of Zahedi's individual circumstances, he is subject to Commerce Clause regulation as a member of the restaurant industry.

Even aside from its membership in an interstate industry, Zahedi's restaurant demonstrates characteristics which place it squarely in the category of interstate commerce. It is a franchise of a large, international, publicly traded corporation ("IHOP Corp."), organized under Delaware law. IHOP Corp. had total retail sales of $479 million in 1992, operates 547 franchises in thirty-five states, Canada, and Japan, and employs 16,000 persons.⁴ Furthermore, Zahedi's restaurant is located directly across the street from State Highway 163, and within two miles of two interstate highways. There are three hotels within walking distance, and three motels within one and one-half miles of the restaurant.⁵ The courts have found these facts to be indicia of a business operating in interstate commerce. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 300-01, 85 S.Ct. at 381-82 (restaurant on state highway, 11 blocks from interstate highway, affected commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243, 85 S.Ct. 348, 350, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964) (motel two blocks from downtown road and "readily accessible" to two intrastate and two interstate highways affected commerce); Miller v. Amusement Enters., Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 345 (5th Cir.1968) (amusement park 150 yards from interstate highway affected commerce).

Congressional enactment of title III of the ADA was well within Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause. As part of the restaurant industry, Zahedi is subject to the provisions of title III, which by its own terms, reaches as broadly as the Commerce Clause permits.⁶ As a member of the restaurant industry and as an individual enterprise which caters to travelers, Zahedi's restaurant is properly regulated by title III of the ADA.

III. Title III of the ADA is Not Unconstitutionally Vague

Zahedi argues that many of the terms used in section 12182(b)(2) of title III are unconstitutionally vague and are therefore in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Statutes which fail to adequately specify the actions or conduct necessary to conform with the law pose problems for which the Supreme Court has expressed serious concern.⁷ However, the terms with which Zahedi takes issue do not deprive private businesses of the ability to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct. To the contrary, the statute, its preamble, the legislative history, and the accompanying guidelines provide more than ample explanation of the statute's application.

A. Statutes Regulating Commercial Activity are Subject to Lower Standards of Specificity

Vagueness challenges are considered under varying standards, depending upon the nature of the statute. Statutes which threaten to inhibit freedom of speech or other constitutionally protected rights face a more stringent vagueness test. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 & n. 7, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1192 & n. 7, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964). Criminal statutes, in general, face a higher vagueness standard than do civil statutes: "The Court has ... expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe." Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499, 102 S.Ct. at 1193. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515, 68 S.Ct. 665, 670, 92 L.Ed. 840 (1948) (where a statute imposes criminal penalties, the standard of certainty is higher).⁸

By contrast, purely economic regulations are subject to lower standards of specificity. In Hoffman Estates, the Supreme Court held that:

Economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult

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