Pinson v. Pinson

• Decision Date: 09 May 1929
• Docket Number: 12657.
• Citation: 148 S.E. 211,150 S.C. 368
• Parties: PINSON et al. v. PINSON et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

148 S.E. 211

150 S.C. 368

PINSON et al. v. PINSON et al.

No. 12657.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

May 9, 1929

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Edgefield County; C. C Featherstone, Judge.

Action by W. W. Pinson and others, as executors of the will of L. M Pinson, deceased, against Lillie V. Pinson and others. From the decree, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

The decree of his honor, C. C. Featherstone, trial judge, is as follows:

"The action in this case was instituted for the purpose of having the will of L. M. Pinson, deceased, construed, and the contract of sale of pine timber on the tract of 65 acres of land devised to Clifford Pinson construed, in connection with the said will, the writings of all parties in the premises determined, and for a discovery of any property belonging to the estate of L. M. Pinson, deceased and praying that the proceeds for the pine timber on said 65-acre tract of land be declared as property of the said L. M. Pinson, passing under the residuary clause of said will.

"At the death of the said L. M. Pinson, an unrecorded deed of conveyance of 17 acres of land to W. W. Pinson was found among his papers, but it had never been delivered, and it is conceded by all parties to this action, that he died intestate as to that tract of land, and that it passed under the residuary clause of his will.

"The said L. M. Pinson on the 10th day of June, 1926, duly executed his last will and testament, and passed away on the 14th day of March, 1927. After the execution of said will, to wit, on the 20th day of October, 1926, the said L. M. Pinson entered into a written contract for the sale of the timber on the said 65-acre tract of land devised to Clifford Pinson, wherein and whereby he agreed to sell the said timber on said place to T. W. Quarles, and received $50 of the purchase money on said contract of sale before his death.

"Since the death of the said L. M. Pinson, the said T. W. Quarles has cut said timber, and the purchase price thereof amounts to $974.18, which amount by agreement of all parties interested has been deposited with the clerk of court of common pleas in and for Edgefield county, to be held by him subject to the determination of the only issue involved in the matter before me; that is, whether the proceeds of the sale of the timber passed under the will to Clifford Pinson or passed under the residuary clause of the said will. It is contended by Clifford Pinson and Claud Pinson, represented by Mr. Nickles, attorney at law, Abbeville, that the proceeds of the sale of said timber go to Mr. Clifford Pinson under the provision of the will, while the other parties to the action contend that the proceeds of the sale pass to the plaintiff herein. The controversial issue is clear and definite.

"It is urged by Clifford Pinson and Claud Pinson that the contract of sale aforesaid does not revoke the will as to the sale of the timber on the tract of land described, for the reason that the writing was not such as is contemplated by section 5341, Code of Laws, 1922, vol. No. 3.

"My opinion is that section has no application to the facts of this case. That clause applies to subsequent will or written instruments in the nature of will revoking former wills. As I see the matter, it narrows itself down to this question: Does the money from the sale of the timber belong to Clifford Pinson, or does it pass to the executors?

"A contract for the sale of land works a conversion; equity treating the vendor as holding the land in trust for the purchaser and the purchaser as a trustee of the purchase price for the vendor. The vendor's interest thereafter is in the unpaid purchase price, and it is treated as personalty, while the purchaser's interest is in the land and is treated as realty. 13 C.J. 855.

"Where real estate is directed to be sold, equity considers it converted into personalty, even though the election to purchase rests merely with the purchaser. 9 Cyc. 828. This rule applies, even where the purchase is not completed until after the death of the testator. 9 Cyc. 828.

"In the case before me, it will be noted that the testator entered into a contract for the sale of the 65 acres described in the complaint, but in that contract the testator specifically reserved the timber in order to handle it as he saw fit. Then, after the testator had made his will, he conveyed the timber as above mentioned. I hold that this contract revokes the will in so far as it relates to the timber. A contract, made good by a testator after his will for the sale of land thereby devised, is a revocation of such devise in equity, and thereby converts such realty into personalty. 9 Cyc. 828; Loring v. Cunningham, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 87; Donohoo v. Lea, 1 Swan (Tenn.) 119, 55 Am. Dec. 725. See, also, McFaddin v. Lumpkin, 112 S.C. 431, 100 S.E. 168.

"It will be noted that the payments provided for in the contract for the sale of the timber were to be made to L. M. Pinson, the testator, and no provision was made for the payment to any other party.

"If a contract for the sale of land might have been enforced against the vendor had he lived, the conversion from realty into personalty may be completed, even though the vendee had not paid the purchase price, and even though the contract be executory in character. As a result of this principle, an estate under contract of sale is regarded as converted into personalty from the time of the contract, notwithstanding an election to complete the purchase rests entirely with the purchaser, and, if a seller dies before the election is exercised, the purchase money when paid will go to his executors as assets. 6 R. C. L. 1077.

"As is fully discussed in the case of the estate of Edward Bernhard, 134 Iowa, 603, 112 N.W. 86, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1029, the doctrine is fully set out, in which the principle is laid down that the proceeds arising from a contract of...