Pinson v. U.S. Dep't of Justice

• Decision Date: 30 September 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 12–1872 RC
• Citation: 70 F.Supp.3d 111
• Parties: Jeremy Pinson, Plaintiff, v. U.S. Department of Justice, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

70 F.Supp.3d 111

Jeremy Pinson, Plaintiff

v.U.S. Department of Justice, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No.: 12–1872 RC

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed September 30, 2014

Jeremy Pinson, Florence, CO, pro se.

Michael Stine, Florence, CO, pro se.

Greg Murray, Florence, CO, pro se.

John H. Spittell, Shannon L. Fagan, Carl Ezekiel Ross, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

Re Document No.: 45

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Granting In Part And Denying In Part Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Jeremy Pinson currently is an inmate at ADX Florence, a federal prison located in Colorado. While in prison, Mr. Pinson has filed multiple Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, requests with different components of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”). On several occasions, the DOJ has asked Mr. Pinson to clarify his records requests, told him that it could not find records that are responsive to his requests, or informed him that the records he sought were exempt from disclosure by law. Mr. Pinson took issue with some of these determinations, so he filed a complaint claiming that the DOJ improperly withheld numerous records from him in violation of FOIA. In addition, Mr. Pinson's complaint alleges that the DOJ and two government officials violated the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and certain unspecified provisions in the U.S. Constitution. In response, the DOJ filed nine pre-answer motions, each asking the Court to dismiss or grant summary judgment in its favor on different portions of Mr. Pinson's complaint.

Now before the Court is the DOJ's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment as to Mr. Pinson's FOIA claims against the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”). (See ECF No. 45.) Mr. Pinson's complaint contends that the DEA wrongfully withheld records in response to two FOIA requests that he submitted between 2010 and 2013: (1) a request for records related to himself (Request No. 11–0080–P), and (2) a request for records on Ismael Guzman (Request No. 12–0429–F). The DOJ argues that Mr. Pinson's claims must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In addition, the DOJ argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because it conducted an adequate search as to Request No. 11–0080–P, and because Request No. 12–0249–F failed to reasonably describe the records sought and was accompanied by a certification of identity that was of questionable authenticity.

For the reasons explained below, the Court grants the DOJ's motion for summary judgment as to FOIA Request No. 11–0080–P but denies the DOJ's motion for summary judgment as to FOIA Request No. 12–0429–F.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2010, Mr. Pinson submitted an undated FOIA request (Request No. 11–0080–P) to the DEA requesting a copy of “[a]ll records which pertain to, mention, or make reference to myself.” (Pinson Letter Ex. A, Nov. 3, 2010, ECF No. 45.) When the DEA received this request, it searched its Investigative Reporting and Filing System (IRFS) for any records pertaining to Mr. Pinson and came up empty-handed. (See Little Decl. ¶¶ 20–23, ECF No. 45.) On November 16, 2010, the DEA mailed Mr. Pinson a letter informing him that no records responsive to his request could be located and advising him of his right to appeal. (See id. ¶ 23–24. DEA Letter Ex. B, Nov. 16, 2010, ECF No. 45.) Mr. Pinson received the DEA's response letter on November 29, 2010. (Corr.2d Am. Compl. 9, ECF No. 32.) Although Mr. Pinson's verified complaint asserts that in all requests in which a response was received he submitted an appeal the following day, (id. at 12), the DEA asserts that no record of any such appeal exists (see Little Decl. ¶ 15).

On July 8, 2012, Mr. Pinson submitted a second FOIA request (Request No. 12–0429–F) to the DEA. (See Pinson Letter Ex. C, July 8, 2012, ECF No. 45.) This second request sought “production of all information, in any format in which it exists regarding, referencing or containing the name Ismael Eduardo Guzman, including investigative reports, transcripts, photographs, records, memorandums, electronic files or data, emails, video or audio recordings, and any other available information.” (Id. ) The DEA sent two letters to Mr. Pinson in response to this request.

First, in a letter dated July 23, 2012, the DEA wrote that it had assigned Mr. Pinson's request a case number and that it would need additional time to make a determination because Mr. Pinson had requested “investigative records.” (See Little Decl. ¶ 17; DEA Letter Ex. D, July 23, 2012, ECF No. 45.) Then, on February 21, 2013, the DEA sent Mr. Pinson a second letter informing him that his request could not be processed because it was “not a proper request.” (DEA Letter Ex. E, Feb. 21, 2013, ECF No. 45.) The letter stated that the request did not reasonably describe the records sought,¹ and that the attached certification of identity, which allegedly provided Mr. Guzman's consent to release information to Mr. Pinson, required an original signature. (See Little Decl. ¶¶ 18, 25–32; DEA Letter Ex. E.) Further, the letter informed Mr. Pinson that if the DEA did not receive a reformulated request and original certification form within 30 days, it would be presumed that Mr. Pinson no longer wanted the DEA to process his request and the request would be administratively closed. (See DEA Letter Ex. E.)

Although Mr. Pinson acknowledges receiving some response to Request No. 12–0429–F on December 10, 2012, (see Corr.2d Am. Compl. 10), he also contends that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) intercepted and confiscated his mail so that he did not receive either the July 2012 or the February 2013 letter from the DEA, (Pinson Resp. Mot. Dismiss, 2, Mar. 31, 2014, ECF No. 74; Pinson Decl. ¶ 5, Mar 31, 2014, ECF No. 74). DEA records show that Mr. Pinson did not respond to their February 2013 letter. (See Little Decl. ¶¶ 19, 33.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Analyzing the DOJ's Motion Under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56

The DOJ moves for dismissal of Mr. Pinson's causes of action under Rule 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, for summary judgment under Rule 56. In general, exhaustion arguments in FOIA cases are analyzed under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Hidalgo v. FBI, 344 F.3d 1256, 1260 (D.C.Cir.2003) (vacating the district court's summary judgment order and remanding the case with instructions to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) on exhaustion grounds); Jean–Pierre v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 880 F.Supp.2d 95, 100 n. 4 (D.D.C.2012) (“Although FOIA cases ‘typically and appropriately are decided on motions for summary judgment,’ where an agency argues that the requester has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, courts analyze the matter under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.” (citations omitted)). If, however, the defendant's motion references matters outside the pleadings, a court must treat the motion as one for summary judgment, not as one for dismissal based on failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) ; Colbert v. Potter, 471 F.3d 158, 164 (D.C.Cir.2006) ; Yates v. District of Columbia, 324 F.3d 724, 725 (D.C.Cir.2003) ; see also Rosenberg v. U.S. Dep't of Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 956 F.Supp.2d 32, 36–43 (D.D.C.2013) (granting summary judgment for the government “on the grounds [that] the Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial review”).

In this case, both the DOJ and Mr. Pinson refer to materials that are not part of the pleadings. Specifically, the DOJ's motion relies on a declaration by a DOJ employee who avers that he conducted a search of the DOJ's records and found no evidence that Mr. Pinson ever appealed the DEA's determination of his two FOIA requests. (See Little Decl. ¶¶ 15, 19.) The DOJ's motion also references several letters that were exchanged between Mr. Pinson and the DEA. (See, e.g., Pinson Letter Ex. A; DEA Letter Ex. B; Pinson Letter Ex. C; DEA Letter Ex. E.) For his part, Mr. Pinson offers a declaration averring that he never received either one of the DEA's response letters to FOIA Request No. 12–0429–F. (See Pinson Decl. ¶ 5.) Under these circumstances, the Court will evaluate the DOJ's entire motion under the summary judgment standard.²

B. Summary Judgment Standard

“FOIA cases typically and appropriately are decided on motions for summary judgment.” Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol, 623 F.Supp.2d 83, 87 (D.D.C.2009) (citing Bigwood v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 484 F.Supp.2d 68, 73 (D.D.C.2007) ). A court may grant summary judgment when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material” fact is one capable of affecting the substantive outcome of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” if there is enough evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-movant. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).

The principal purpose of summary judgment is to streamline litigation by disposing of factually unsupported claims or defenses. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant bears the initial burden of identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) ; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In response, the non-movant must point to specific facts in the record that reveal a genuine issue that is suitable for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must avoid “making credibility determinations,” Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C.Cir.2007), and analyze all underlying facts and inferences...