Pinto v. Collier Cnty.
| Decision Date | 07 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:19-cv-551-FtM-60MRM |
| Parties | FABIANO B. PINTO, Plaintiff, v. COLLIER COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This matter is before the Court on the following motions to dismiss:
Plaintiff Fabiano B. Pinto filed responses in opposition to each of the motions. (Docs. 97, 98, 99, 100, and 101). The Court held a hearing to address this matter on February 10, 2020. (Doc. 106). After reviewing the motions, responses, legal arguments, court file, and the record, the Court finds as follows:
Background1
On December 17, 2017, Pinto was near the entrance to Cavo Lounge in Naples, Florida, where he was attempting to notify his relatives and friends that he had procured a table at a nearby restaurant. As he was waving, Defendant Buro walked toward Pinto and forcefully struck his hand; he claimed that Pinto's hand ventured too close to his own hand. Buro began to insult and yell profanities as Pinto walked away.
Within one minute of Buro striking Pinto's hand, and immediately after Pinto began to walk away from Buro, Defendant Kinney approached Pinto. Kinney - without identifying himself as a law enforcement officer - proceeded to strike or shove Pinto's arm and shoulder, which caused Pinto stumble into his sister-in-law. After being struck, Pinto involuntarily or reactively raised his right arm, making slight and incidental contact with Kinney's bulletproof vest. Pinto began to apologize, but Kinney rushed toward Pinto, grabbed his left arm, twisted it behind his back, and pushed him while applying pressure to his left arm. At the same time, Defendant Campolo grabbed Pinto's right arm, twisting it behind his back.Kinney began to yell for Pinto to "stop resisting," although Pinto was not resisting the actions.
Kinney and Campolo maneuvered Pinto toward a law enforcement vehicle while still applying pressure to Pinto's arms behind his back. At the vehicle, Kinney and Campolo pinned Pinto face first against the vehicle and handcuffed him in a tight fashion. Prior to, during, and subsequent to the handcuffing, Kinney repeatedly slammed Pinto's face and head into the vehicle. Kinney and Campolo then placed Kinney into the vehicle, and Campolo transported him to Naples Jail Center. Pinto complained to Campolo more than fifteen times about the tight handcuffs but was ignored. The handcuffs were removed after approximately one hour.
Following his arrest, Pinto alleges that Defendants knowingly gave false statements or testimony and engaged in the suppression of exculpatory evidence so that he would be prosecuted. Approximately ten months later, on October 4, 2018, a notice of nolle prosequi was filed with the state court, resulting in a termination of the criminal action against Pinto.
On August 6, 2019, Pinto filed the instant action, suing thirteen different persons or entities for various alleged violations of his civil rights. The Court previously dismissed the original complaint due to numerous pleading deficiencies and directed Pinto to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 84). Pinto filed his amended complaint on November 19, 2019. (Doc. 86).
On December 2, 2019, Defendant Matthew Kinney filed his motion to dismiss. (Doc. 92). On the same day, Defendants Jason Buro, SLR Naples Corporation ("SLR"), and Stergios Tallides (collectively, the "Bar Defendants") filed a joint motion to dismiss. (Doc. 93). On December 3, 2020, Defendant Sheriff Kevin J. Rambosk filed his motion to dismiss. (Doc. 94). Defendants Deputy Sheriffs James Byers, Joshua Campolo, Adam J. Dillman, Steve Maholtz, Jay Mulholland, Frank C. Pisano, Jr., and Becki A. Thoman (collectively, the "Deputy Defendants") filed a joint motion to dismiss. (Doc. 95). Defendant Collier County also filed its motion to dismiss. (Doc. 96).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). "Although Rule 8(a) does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' it does require 'more than labels and conclusions'; a 'formulaic recitation of the cause of action will not do.'" Young v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 18-62468, 2018 WL 7572240, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-62468-CIV, 2019 WL 1112274 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2019) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, factual allegations must be sufficient "to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, review is generally limited to the four corners of the complaint. Rickman v. Precisionaire, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 232, 233(M.D. Fla. 1995). Furthermore, when reviewing a complaint for facial sufficiency, a court "must accept [a] [p]laintiff's well pleaded facts as true, and construe the [c]omplaint in the light most favorable to the [p]laintiff." Id. (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
In several of the pending motions to dismiss, Defendants argue that the amended complaint should be dismissed in its entirety due to shotgun pleading issues. Although the Court declines to dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety on this basis, it will address these concerns as it analyzes the different counts of the amended complaint.
Count II (False Arrest and False Imprisonment under Florida Law against Defendants SLR, Buro, Tallides, Kinney, and Campolo, in their Individual and Official Capacities)
A shotgun pleading is one where "it is virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief" and the defendant therefore cannot be "expected to frame a responsive pleading." See Anderson v. Dist. Bd. Of Trustees of Cent. Fla. Cmty. College, 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996). The Eleventh Circuit has identified four primary types of shotgun pleadings:
Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2015). A district court must generally permit a plaintiff at least one opportunity to amend a shotgun complaint's deficiencies before dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018).
Count II of Pinto's amended complaint improperly mixes different causes of action by containing distinct claims for false arrest and false imprisonment under Florida law. As such, the Court finds that Count II constitutes a shotgun pleading and dismisses it without prejudice, with leave to amend. In his second amended complaint, Pinto is directed to separate these distinct causes of action into separate counts.
Kinney and Campolo argue that the official capacity claims against them are duplicative of the official capacity claims against Sheriff Rambosk in his official capacity and should be dismissed. The Court agrees. Here, Collier County and Sheriff Rambosk in his official capacity have been named as Defendants.Consequently, the official capacity claims against the deputies are duplicative of the claims against Sheriff Rambosk in his official capacity and/or the County, which serves no proper purpose and may confuse a jury. See Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991); C.P. by and through Perez v. Collier Cty., 145 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1091 (M.D. Fla. 2015). Consequently, the claims against Defendants Kinney and Campolo in their official capacities are dismissed.
In their motion to dismiss, the Bar Defendants argue that because the only facts alleged in Count II are communication of information to law enforcement, Pinto is unable to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court agrees. According to the allegations of the amended complaint, Buro told the officer that Pinto had accidentally gestured his hand in Buro's face, and that one of the officers pushed Pinto. See (Doc. 86 at ¶¶ 58-59). Even accepting these facts as true, and construing in light most favorable to Pinto, these facts could not be used to support his arrest.
Furthermore, even if the information provided by Buro could be considered incriminating, it would not support liability for false arrest or false imprisonment. Under Florida law, when a citizen provides information to law enforcement, without...
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