Pion v. Caron
| Decision Date | 07 January 1921 |
| Parties | PION v. CARON (two cases). |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Robert F. Raymond, Judge.
Actions of tort for slander by Elizabeth Pion against Amedee Caron and Marie L. Caron. Verdicts for plaintiff, and defendants except. Exceptions overruled.Qua, Howard & Rogers, Stanley E. Qua, and Francis M. Qua, all of Lowell, for plaintiff.
Henry V. Charbonneau, of Lowell, for defendants.
These are actions of tort for slander. The defendants are husband and wife; the latter was the proprietor of a department store and her husband was employed by her therein as assistant manager, charged with the general duty of looking after the store and the stock. On the night of April 9, 1919, she told him to discharge the plaintiff, who was employed as a clerk in the store; on the following morning when he discharged the plaintiff, there was evidence that he charged her with theft in substantially the words set forth in the declaration, spoken in French, in the presence of several persons who understood that language.
The defendant Amedee Caron, testified that on the occasion referred to he did not accuse the plaintiff of theft, but discharged her for other reasons, and that whatever words he then used were spoken in answer to a question by her as to what she had done; this was denied by the plaintiff; in these circumstances it was a question of fact for the jury on all the evidence as to what was said by the parties on that occasion.
It is the contention of the defendants that, if the words alleged were spoken, they were spoken under such circumstances as to be privileged. It is undoubtedly true that if the defendants, having reasonable cause to believe that some one had been stealing goods from the store, had attempted merely to discover the guilty party for their own protection, and in good faith, without malice, and in the belief that it was true had charged the plaintiff with theft, the words would be privileged. Brow v. Hathaway, 13 Allen, 239;Dale v. Harris, 109 Mass. 193;Billings v. Fairbanks, 136 Mass. 177;Christopher v. Akin, 214 Mass. 332, 101 N. E. 971,46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 104;Wormwood v. Lee, 226 Mass. 339, 115 N. E. 494.
Where, as in the case at bar, the words alleged to have been spoken are of themselves actionable, the law infers that they were spoken with a malicious intent. This inference, however, may be rebutted when the circumstances are such as to exclude the idea of malice and it is shown that they were spoken in good faith in the performance of a duty with an honest intent to protect the interest of the party using the words, and the plaintiff must prove malice in fact in order to recover. There was evidence that the defendant, who is alleged to have made the charge, spoke in a loud tone of voice; he testified that he was ‘a little angry’; he further testified that when he discharged the plaintiff he did not believe that she had stolen anything; as the verdict has established the fact that he did accuse her of stealing, it would seem that he made the charge although he believed it to be false. It was a question of fact whether he was acting in good faith or in part from malice. Robinson v. Van Auken, 190 Mass. 161, 76 N. E. 601;Crafer v. Hooper, 194 Mass. 68, 80 N. E. 2. Accordingly the defendant's first, second, third and fourth requests were rightly refused.
There was evidence that several employees and two police officers who understood French were in the store when the words were spoken; that they were spoken in French, and one witness testified that she understood that language and heard and understood the words complained of. If this evidence was believed, it was sufficient to show a publication of the words in question. Accordingly the fifth request could not properly have been given.
It was not necessary to show that the exact words charged were spoken, but only that the substance of the language was proved. Robinson v. Van Auken, supra. In the case at bar, there was evidence that the words spoken were substantially as alleged. It follows that the ninth request was rightly denied.
The tenth request could not have...
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Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc.
...damages for actual injury, which include mental suffering, Chesley v. Tompson, 137 Mass. 136, 137 (1884); Pion v. Caron, 237 Mass. 107, 111, 129 N.E. 369 (1921), and harm to reputation. Ellis v. Brockton Publishing Co., supra. Punitive damages are prohibited, Ellis v. Brockton Publishing Co......
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Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc.
...is limited to general damages, which include mental suffering, Chesley v. Tompson, 137 Mass. 136, 137 (1884); Pion v. Caron, 237 Mass. 107, 111, 129 N.E. 369 (1921), and harm to reputation. Ellis v. Brockton Publishing Co., supra. Punitive damages are never allowed, Ellis v. Brockton Publis......
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Correllas v. Viveiros
...(defendant told police that plaintiff had stolen a dish washing machine and made a formal complaint for larceny); Pion v. Caron, 237 Mass. 107, 110, 129 N.E. 369 (1921) (plaintiff was discharged by defendant store owner and then charged with stealing merchandise); Zinkfein v. W.T. Grant Co.......
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Themo v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co.
...take into account mental suffering. Markham v. Russell, 12 Allen 573,90 Am.Dec. 169;Chesley v. Thompson, 137 Mass. 136.Pion v. Caron, 237 Mass. 107, 111, 129 N.E. 369. Another important difference is that truth could not justify an invasion of a legally recognized right of privacy, although......