Pioneer Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Langdon

• Decision Date: 15 April 1981
• Docket Number: No. 5424,5424
• Citation: 626 P.2d 1032
• Parties: PIONEER NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, Fidelity National Insurance Company, and Chicago Title Insurance Company, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. John T. LANGDON, Insurance Commissioner of the State of Wyoming, and Wyoming Insurance Department, Appellees (Defendants).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 1032

626 P.2d 1032

PIONEER NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, Fidelity National Insurance Company, and Chicago Title Insurance Company, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. John T. LANGDON, Insurance Commissioner of the State of Wyoming, and Wyoming Insurance Department, Appellees (Defendants).

No. 5424.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

April 15, 1981.

Paul J. Hickey, of Horiskey, Bagley & Hickey, Cheyenne, and John A. Sundahl, of Godfrey & Sundahl, Cheyenne, for appellants (plaintiffs).

John D. Troughton, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Walter Perry, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees (defendants).

Before ROSE, C. J., RAPER, THOMAS and ROONEY, JJ., and JOHNSON, D. J.

ROSE, Chief Justice.

This appeal comes to this court under the auspices of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. The appellants ask us to reverse the district court's judgment which says that the insurance commissioner may disapprove a proposed title-insurance rate schedule without first holding a hearing. The district court based its ruling on its interpretation of Chapter 15 of the Wyoming Insurance Code (Title 26, W.S.1977) and on the facts which were stipulated by all parties.

Because we do not find that there is a justiciable issue presented in this appeal, we will reverse the district court and remand with directions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

THE FACTS

Appellants are all members of the Wyoming Title Insurance Bureau. On April 18, 1979, the Bureau filed a schedule of rates and policy forms with the Wyoming Insurance Department and on June 5, 1979, it requested that a hearing be held on this rate schedule. Following negotiations among the parties, an amended filing was made. On August 21, 1979, the deputy insurance commissioner, without hearing or notice, entered an order disapproving this last-mentioned filing.

In response to this order, the insurance companies filed two court actions on August 30, 1979, one of which was a petition for review by the district court and the other a declaratory-judgment action which sought a declaration that the insurance commissioner was bound to hold hearings before rejecting such a rate filing as is in issue here. The district court granted a stay of execution of the deputy insurance commissioner's order, and required the insurance companies to post bond pending a decision on the merits.

Soon after initiating these lawsuits, the companies, through the Wyoming Title Insurance Bureau, filed a revised rate schedule. On September 27, 1979, the deputy insurance commissioner accepted this revised filing, and vacated his previous order. The petition for review was then dismissed at the request of all parties.

The declaratory-judgment action was not, however, withdrawn, and on October 22, 1980 an order was entered in district court holding that the insurance commissioner did have the authority to approve or disapprove title-insurance forms and rates without first conducting a hearing. In addition, the order contained a finding to the effect that there did in fact exist a justiciable controversy under the facts of this case. Appellants challenge the district court's holding concerning the insurance commissioner's power to disapprove rate schedules without a hearing, but on appeal neither of the parties have taken issue with the finding of justiciability.

JUSTICIABILITY/THE LAW

Justiciability is a jurisdictional requirement that must be complied with before the issues in a declaratory-judgment action can be reached. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Inc. v. Hallmark Insurance Company, Wyo., 561 P.2d 706, 710 (1977); Anderson v. Wyoming Development Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318 (1944). It is not enough for the parties to stipulate that there is a justiciable controversy; a justiciable controversy must exist in fact. Brimmer v. Thomson, Wyo., 521 P.2d 574 (1974). Parties cannot confer jurisdiction by consent. Church v Quiner, 31 Wyo. 222, 224 P. 1073 (1924); White v. Board of Land Commissioners, Wyo., 595 P.2d 76 (1979). This rule is not altered by the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (Title 1, Chapter 37, W.S.1977). Police Protective Association of Casper v. City of Casper, Wyo., 575 P.2d 1146 (1978). Under Rule 57, W.R.C.P., and by virtue of our holding in Police Protective Association of Casper v. City of Casper, supra, a petition for declaratory judgment may not be used to obtain an advisory opinion. Neither may the declaratory-judgment vehicle be utilized to secure or deny rights in the future. White v. Board of Land Commissioners, supra.

In order for the facts in a declaratory-judgment action to be regarded as justiciable, there must exist a factual controversy over which a court order may be effective. Brimmer v. Thomson, supra. Once the factual dispute is resolved, the issues become moot and the courts may not consider the issues further. White v. Board of Land Commissioners, supra.

The opinion in Brimmer sets out a four-part test to determine justiciability under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act:

" ' * * * First, a justiciable controversy requires parties having existing and genuine, as distinguished from theoretical, rights or interests. Second, the controversy must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate, * * *. (Emphasis added.) Third, it must be a controversy the judicial determination of which will have the force and effect of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, status or other legal relationships of one or more of the real parties in interest, (or lacking these first three requirements it must) be of such great and overriding public moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of them. Finally, the proceedings must be genuinely adversary in character and not a mere disputation, but advanced with sufficient militancy to engender a thorough research and analysis of the major issues. * * *' " (Second ...