Piotrowski v. Commissioner of Public Safety, C6-88-1039

• Decision Date: 13 December 1988
• Docket Number: No. C6-88-1039,C6-88-1039
• Citation: 433 N.W.2d 124
• Parties: William Mark PIOTROWSKI, petitioner, Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 124

433 N.W.2d 124

William Mark PIOTROWSKI, petitioner, Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Respondent.

No. C6-88-1039.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Dec. 13, 1988.

Review Granted Feb. 10, 1989.

Syllabus by the Court

The stop of appellant's vehicle in North Dakota was without jurisdiction, and thus was unlawful. North Dakota law does not confer authority on a law enforcement officer from another state to make an arrest in the State of North Dakota when in fresh pursuit of a person who has committed a petty misdemeanor in the State of Minnesota.

There was no factual basis, and no jurisdiction, for the stop in North Dakota based on a "citizen's arrest." The Minnesota officer observed no criminal activity in North Dakota. North Dakota law confers no authority on its "citizens" or "private persons" to detain and arrest people in North Dakota for misdemeanors committed in other states when the venue for trial is another state. North Dakota law confers authority on private persons to make citizen's arrests in North Dakota only for offenses committed in North Dakota to be tried in North Dakota.

William Kirschner, William Kirschner & Associates, Fargo, N.D., for appellant.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., Joel A. Watne, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent.

Considered and decided by PARKER, P.J., and RANDALL and BOWEN ^*, JJ., without oral argument.

OPINION

RANDALL, Judge.

Appellant was arrested for driving while under the influence, failed a breath test, and had his Minnesota driving privileges revoked. He petitioned for judicial review, challenging the validity of the stop because it was made in North Dakota, outside the officer's jurisdiction. Appellant argued that all evidence collected was the result of an illegal stop, and thus should have been suppressed. The trial court sustained the revocation, and Piotrowski appeals. We reverse.

FACTS

On January 1, 1988, at approximately 2:35 a.m., Moorhead Police Officer Russell Wicklund (Wicklund) observed appellant's vehicle drive through a flashing red light ¹ at Twenty-Fourth Avenue and Eighth Street South in Moorhead, Minnesota. Wicklund observed no other traffic violation, nor had any articulable suspicion thereof. He was not in fresh pursuit of anyone other than a traffic statute offender. Wicklund followed appellant onto westbound Interstate 94 leading towards North Dakota. Wicklund activated his red lights approximately four seconds before appellant crossed the Minnesota/North Dakota border. Appellant proceeded into North Dakota and stopped his vehicle approximately 100 yards west of the Interstate 94 bridge. At this point where the stop, detention, investigation, and arrest took place, appellant was in Fargo, North Dakota.

Wicklund, in full uniform and carrying his side-arm, pulled his vehicle behind appellant's, exited his vehicle, and approached appellant's vehicle. As appellant was opening his door to leave his vehicle, Wicklund instructed him to stay in the car because of traffic hazards. Wicklund asked appellant to produce his driver's license and appellant did so. Wicklund asked appellant to leave his vehicle and perform several field sobriety tests. Wicklund also administered a preliminary breath test, which appellant failed. Wicklund then arrested appellant for a violation of Minn.Stat. Sec. 169.121 (1986), and read him the Minnesota Implied Consent Advisory. All the evidence was collected in North Dakota by Wicklund operating under "full color" authority of a Minnesota police officer.

Wicklund then informed appellant that he had the choice of going back to Minnesota and being charged with a DWI offense there, or remaining in North Dakota and potentially being charged with DWI in both North Dakota and Minnesota. Assuming that he had to choose between a DWI charge in one state and DWI charges in two states, appellant decided to return to Minnesota. A short time after the stop, a Fargo police officer appeared on the scene, spoke to Wicklund and left. Appellant did not speak to the Fargo police officer. The Fargo police officer took no part in Wicklund's investigation, apprehension, and arrest of appellant; and the Fargo officer's appearance is not in issue. Wicklund then brought appellant to the Clay County Law Enforcement Center in Moorhead, Minnesota, for booking.

Appellant's driver's license was subsequently revoked and he petitioned for judicial review. The trial court found upon stipulated facts that the stop was lawful, that the evidence of driving while intoxicated was collected legally, and therefore the arrest and revocation were proper. The court sustained the revocation of appellant's driving privileges, and Piotrowski brings this appeal. We reverse.

ISSUE

Was the pursuit into North Dakota and subsequent stop of appellant's vehicle lawful, when made by a Minnesota peace officer who observed activity in the State of Minnesota constituting a violation of a traffic statute less than a felony?

ANALYSIS

Officer Wicklund stopped appellant for driving through a flashing red traffic signal in violation of Minn.Stat. Sec. 169.06, subd. 7(1) (1986). The controversy in this case stems from the officer's pursuit of appellant into North Dakota to make a stop in North Dakota based solely on acts occurring in the State of Minnesota. It is stipulated that the arrest occurred outside the officer's jurisdiction. The question becomes whether "fresh pursuit" or "citizen's arrest" legitimize the foreign-state stop of appellant by Wicklund.

In State v. Goff, 118 N.H. 724, 393 A.2d 562 (1978), a New Hampshire court addressed the same issue presented here. A New Hampshire police officer saw the defendant commit a traffic offense in New Hampshire. A high speed chase ensued in which the defendant fled to Maine. The officer followed defendant into Maine, apprehended him, and issued two summonses to him to appear in a New Hampshire court. The defendant challenged the officer's authority to issue the summonses in a foreign state. Id. at 726, 393 A.2d at 564.

The court first noted that the territorial jurisdiction of New Hampshire police extends only to the borders of the sovereign state of New Hampshire. However, the Uniform Law on Interstate Fresh Pursuit, adopted by both New Hampshire and Maine, allows border crossing if in fresh pursuit for a felony.

The authority of a New Hampshire State police officer while in a foreign jurisdiction is derived from the law of that jurisdiction. Thus, we look to Maine law to determine whether the officer in the present case had authority to issue valid summonses to the defendant. N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 7; RSA 625:4, :7 (1974). Maine law confers only limited authority on peace officers of a foreign State, specifically the authority to enter Maine and make an arrest if in fresh pursuit of a suspected felon. 15 Me.R.S.A. Sec. 154 (1964). Neither offense committed by the defendant in the present case is a felony. Thus, because the New Hampshire officer was without authority to make an arrest, he was without authority to issue summonses to the defendant. R.S.A. 594:14 (Supp.1977).

Id. at 727-28, 393 A.2d at 565 (emphasis in original). It held that the summonses issued were invalid.

We find our relevant facts identical and New Hampshire's reasoning persuasive and in accord with due process. Just as in New Hampshire, the sovereignty and jurisdiction of Minnesota extend to all places within its boundaries. Minn.Stat. Sec. 1.01 (1986). Both Minnesota and North Dakota have laws governing jurisdiction of foreign officers when in fresh pursuit of a suspected felon. Minn.Stat. Secs. 626.65-.70 (1986); N.D.Cent.Code Secs. 29-06-05 to -07 (1974). As in Goff, we examine the laws of North Dakota, the state in which the stop occurred, to determine whether this Minnesota peace officer had authority to arrest in North Dakota based on a fresh pursuit of someone who had committed a traffic offense less than a felony.

North Dakota law provides:

Any member of a duly organized state, county, or municipal peace unit of another state of the United States who enters this state in fresh pursuit, and continues within this state in such fresh pursuit of a person in order to arrest him on the ground that he is believed to have committed a felony in such other state, shall have the same authority to arrest and hold such person in custody as has any member of any duly organized state, county, or municipal peace unit of this state to arrest and hold in custody a person on the ground that he is believed to have committed a felony in this state.

N.D.Cent.Code Sec. 29-06-05 (emphasis added). Thus, fresh pursuit and arrest by a foreign officer is authorized in North Dakota for a felony. We cannot read into a clear and unambiguous North Dakota law, which specifically used the word "felony," the inclusion of an entirely separate class of offense entitled "misdemeanor" or "petty misdemeanor." North Dakota courts and the North Dakota legislature alone have the right to set a lenient or a strict rule regulating the circumstances under which officers from other states can invade the sovereignty of North Dakota. We adopt the reasoning in Goff, and find that the Minnesota officer was without authority to make an arrest, as an officer, in North Dakota for a (petty) misdemeanor offense committed in Minnesota.

The Commissioner alternatively argues that the arrest was valid as a citizen's arrest, citing State v. Sellers, 350 N.W.2d 460 (Minn.Ct.App.1984). An examination of the pertinent facts in Sellers discloses its complete inapplicability to this case. In Sellers, a Wisconsin peace officer, who stopped a driver in the State of Minnesota, had observed criminal activity (traffic violations) in both states.

Although the above discussion addresses appellant's contention that he cannot be stopped in Minnesota for a petty misdemeanor committed in Wisconsin, the facts of this case also show adequate grounds for misdemeanor arrest...