Piper v. U.S. Dept. of Justice

• Decision Date: 29 July 2004
• Docket Number: Civ.A. No. 98-1161 RCL.
• Citation: 339 F.Supp.2d 13
• Parties: Harry C. PIPER, III, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

339 F.Supp.2d 13

Harry C. PIPER, III, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., Defendants.

Civ.A. No. 98-1161 RCL.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

July 29, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Daniel S. Alcorn, Falls Church, VA, for plaintiff.

Beverly M. Russell, Charlene Denise Bey-Proctor, Michael C. Johnson, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

LAMBERTH, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff's motion for an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Upon consideration of the motion, the opposition thereto, plaintiff's reply, and the record in this case, plaintiff's motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual background of this case is laid out in detail in the Court's Memorandum Opinion of December 1, 2003. A synopsis of that background was subsequently laid out in the Court's disposition of defendants' motion to reconsider. A review of the case's pertinent facts in relation to plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees, however, is in order.

Plaintiff filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, on May 8, 1998 regarding the 1972 kidnapping of his mother, Virginia Lewis Piper, and subsequent FBI investigation and DOJ prosecution. The Government filed a motion for a four year Open America stay on July 22, 1998. On March 26, 1999, this Court reduced the Government's four year Open America stay to two years. When the stay period expired, the Court ordered the FBI to process and release requested documents to plaintiff. Since that time, the FBI has released approximately 80,000 pages of documents to plaintiff in response to his request.

On December 1, 2003, this Court granted in part the Government's motion for summary judgment regarding the adequacy of the FBI's search and its application of FOIA Exemptions 7(D)(E) and (C). The Court granted in part plaintiff's motion for summary judgment concerning documents 206 and 309, and ordered them released to plaintiff because they were withheld improperly. The Court also granted plaintiff's motion with respect to documents 129, 130, 131, 132, 172, 312, 321, 322, 323, 324, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 337, 339, and 340, because the Government failed to justify the withholding of these documents under the asserted exemptions. On March 26, 2004, the Court reaffirmed its ruling concerning the above-mentioned documents by denying the Government's motion for reconsideration.

In light of the case's disposition, plaintiff filed this motion for an award of attorney's fees. Plaintiff seeks fees because of the Court's reduction of the Government's Open America stay from four years to two years and the Court's partial granting of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in its December 1, 2003 Memorandum Opinion and Order.

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff requests attorney's fees pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) of the Freedom of Information Act. FOIA provides that the district court, in its discretion, may "assess against the United States reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case ... in which the complainant has substantially prevailed." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). Determining whether an award of attorney's fees is appropriate under the fee-shifting provision of FOIA requires an inquiry into two related but separate issues: (1) Is plaintiff eligible for an award of attorney's fee? (2) If plaintiff is eligible for attorney's fees, is plaintiff entitled to such fees? Nationwide Bldg. Maint., Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 709, 711 (D.C.Cir.1977).

A. Plaintiff is Eligible for Attorney's Fees

In order to be eligible for attorney's fees, a FOIA plaintiff must have "substantially prevailed" in his law suit against the withholding agency. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). The meaning of the phrase "substantially prevailed" has been dramatically changed by the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001). The Buckhannon Court rejected the prior "catalyst theory" for awarding attorney's fees. The Court held instead that there must be a "judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties" for the plaintiff to be awarded attorney's fees as a prevailing party. Id. at 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835. Borrowing from Black's Law Dictionary, the Court stated that a prevailing party "is one who has been awarded some relief by the court." Id. at 603, 121 S.Ct. 1835. The Court noted two particular forms of relief that designate a party as the prevailing one. First, the Court stated that a plaintiff must "receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail." Id. at 604, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987)). Under this test, even an award of nominal damages is sufficient. Id. (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992)). Second, the Court noted that a settlement agreement enforced through a consent decree could serve as the basis for an attorney's fee award. Id. (citing Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980)). A consent decree provides the predicate change in the legal relationship between the parties sufficient to trigger a possible award of attorney's fees. Id. (citing Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989)).

In Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Dep't of Energy, the D.C. Circuit applied the Buckhannon holding to FOIA litigation. 288 F.3d 452 (D.C.Cir.2002). The D.C. Circuit held "that in order for plaintiffs in FOIA actions to become eligible for an award of attorney's fees, they must have been awarded some relief by a court, either in a judgment on the merits or in a court-ordered consent decree."¹ Id. at 456-57 (citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603, 121 S.Ct. 1835) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1. Open America Stay & Document Production

This case presents the novel issue of how to characterize the Court's reduction of the Government's Open America² stay request from four years to two years. Plaintiff argues that the Court's cutting of the Government's request from four years to two years coupled with the FBI's obligation to timely process and release records to plaintiff upon expiration of the two year stay constitutes judicial relief on the merits of his claim. (Pl.'s Mot. for Attorney's Fees at 4-5.) The Government, in contrast, argues that the Court's ruling in this matter was not a decision on the merits but instead a decision on timing. (Defs.' Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. at 5-7.) The subsequent release of 80,000 documents to plaintiff was neither a result of a judgment on the merits nor a consent decree, but rather it was the result of administrative processing. (Defs.' Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. at 6-7.) The reduction of the request from four years to two years presents the crux of the legal issue.

There is authority to aid the Court in answering this question. In Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, the D.C. Circuit analyzed whether a stipulation and order by the district court constituted judicial relief on the merits sufficient to designate plaintiff a prevailing party. The district court directed the Energy Department to complete its review of documents requested by the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Union within sixty days. The parties eventually agreed to dismiss the case and essentially worked out a private settlement agreement subject to court approval. Judge Randolph, writing for the majority, viewed the stipulation and order as an interim order and procedural ruling that could not serve as the basis for a determination that the union prevailed. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 288 F.3d at 458-59. The court reasoned that "[t]he only part of the order which arguably changed the legal status of the parties was the requirement that the Energy Department complete its record review in 60 days." Id. at 458. Because the Energy Department had no obligation to turn over any documents neither before nor after the date of the stipulation and order, the D.C. Circuit held that the interim order did not qualify as judicial relief on the merits. Id. at 458-59. The facts of this case are readily distinguishable from Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers.

Unlike the sixty day interim order at issue in Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, the order in this case reducing the FBI's Open America stay request from four years to two years required the FBI to release the requested records within two years. The FBI had an obligation to produce the requested documents upon expiration of the Open America stay, whereas the denial of the district court's sixty day interim order in Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers as judicial relief turned on the fact that Energy Department had no obligation to turn over any documents when the interim order expired. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 288 F.3d at 458-59. This Court's order reducing the FBI's stay request from four years to two years, therefore, constitutes "at least some relief on the merits" of plaintiff's claim sufficient to find him the prevailing party consistent with the law of this Circuit. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home Inc., 532 U.S. at 604, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (internal citation omitted); cf. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 288 F.3d at 458-59.

Additionally, whether plaintiff received the requested documents within four years or two years, in real world terms, substantially changed the parties' legal status because a two year stay reduction determines when and, to a large extent, how long the litigation will proceed. The stay reduction had the effect of making the Government confront plaintiff's challenges to the various FOIA disclosure exceptions the FBI invoked two years earlier than it thought it should be...