Pippen v. Jenkins

• Decision Date: 05 June 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:14-cv-429
• Parties: DANIEL C. PIPPEN, Petitioner, v. CHARLOTTE JENKINS, Warden, Hocking Correctional Institution, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

DANIEL C. PIPPEN, Petitioner, v. CHARLOTTE JENKINS, Warden, Hocking Correctional Institution, Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-429

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI

June 5, 2015

District Judge Michael R. Barrett

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This habeas corpus case is before the Court for decision on the merits. Pippen brings this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and seeks relief from his conviction in the Scioto County Common Pleas Court and consequent sentence to twenty-seven years imprisonment, presently being served in Respondent's custody. He pleads the following grounds for relief:

Ground One: Whether the Petitioner is being held in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where the evidence cannot fairly be deemed sufficient to have established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Petition, Doc. No. 4, PageID¹ 35.)

Procedural History

Pippen was indicted by the Scioto County grand jury on ten drug-related charges (Indictment, Return of Writ, Doc. No. 20-1, PageID 121 et seq.). Over Pippen's objection, his case was consolidated with those of his co-defendants for trial. The drug evidence was seized from 518 Sixth Street in Portsmouth, Ohio, and Pippen's motion to suppress that evidence was denied. During trial Counts 5 and 6 relating to cocaine were dismissed and the jury convicted Pippen on the remaining charges. The trial judge sentenced Pippen to a total of twenty-seven years confinement.

Pippen appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeals which affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing. State v. Pippen, 2012-Ohio-4692, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4092 (4^th Dist. Sept. 25, 2012). Although there were subsequent appeals from the re-sentencing, they are not relevant to the instant case. The Supreme Court of Ohio eventually declined jurisdiction. State v. Pippen, 135 Ohio St. 3d 1459 (2013). Pippen then timely invoked this Court's habeas corpus jurisdiction.

OPINION

In his only Ground for Relief, Pippen asserts that his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence. The State defends the convictions on the merits, interposing no procedural defenses.

Legal Standard

An allegation that a verdict was entered upon insufficient evidence states a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Johnson v. Coyle, 200 F.3d 987, 991 (6^th Cir. 2000); Bagby v. Sowders, 894 F.2d 792, 794 (6^th Cir. 1990)(en banc). In order for a conviction to be constitutionally sound, every element of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.

[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319; United States v. Paige, 470 F.3d 603, 608 (6^th Cir. 2006); United States v. Somerset, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76699 (S.D. Ohio 2007). This rule was recognized in Ohio law at State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259 (1991). Of course, it is state law which determines the elements of offenses; but once the state has adopted the elements, it must then prove each of them beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, supra.

In cases such as Petitioner's challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and filed after enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214)(the "AEDPA"), two levels of deference to state decisions are required:

In an appeal from a denial of habeas relief, in which a petitioner challenges the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him, we are thus bound by two layers of deference to groups who might view facts differently than we would. First, as in all sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, we must determine whether, viewing the trial testimony and exhibits in the light mostfavorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). In doing so, we do not reweigh the evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the jury. See United States v. Hilliard, 11 F.3d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 1993). Thus, even though we might have not voted to convict a defendant had we participated in jury deliberations, we must uphold the jury verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty after resolving all disputes in favor of the prosecution. Second, even were we to conclude that a rational trier of fact could not have found a petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, on habeas review, we must still defer to the state appellate court's sufficiency determination as long as it is not unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 205 (6^th Cir. 2009). In a sufficiency of the evidence habeas corpus case, deference should be given to the trier-of-fact's verdict under Jackson v. Virginia and then to the appellate court's consideration of that verdict, as commanded by AEDPA. Tucker v. Palmer, 541 F.3d 652 (6^th Cir. 2008); accord Davis v. Lafler, 658 F.3d 525, 531 (6^th Cir. 2011)(en banc).

We have made clear that Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial deference. First, on direct appeal, "it is the responsibility of the jury -- not the court -- to decide what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing court may set aside the jury's verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury." Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U. S. 1, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2, 181 L. Ed. 2d 311, 313 (2011) (per curiam). And second, on habeas review, "a federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead may do so only if the state court decision was 'objectively unreasonable.'" Ibid. (quoting Renico v. Lett, 559 U. S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 176 L. Ed. 2d 678 (2010)).

Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062, (2012)(per curiam).

A habeas court cannot consider post-trial evidence in deciding a Jackson v. Virginiaclaim. McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120 (2010).

In order to demonstrate that the state court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts under § 2254(d)(2), a petitioner must both establish the "unreasonable determination" and show "that the resulting state court decision was 'based on' that unreasonable determination."

Titlow v. Burt, 680 F.3d 577, 585 (6^th Cir. 2012)(rev'd on another issue Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10) quoting Rice v. White, 660 F.3d 242, 250 (6^th Cir. 2011).

"On habeas review pursuant to § 2254, a 'court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences [and a fortiori findings] must presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.'" Blackmon v. Booker, 696 F. 3d 536, 538 (6^th Cir. 2012), quoting McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120 (2010).

When a state court decides on the merits a federal constitutional claim later presented to a federal habeas court, the federal court must defer to the state court decision unless that decision is contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established precedent of the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 140 (2005); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002); Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379 (2000).

The State Court Decision

In deciding this case on direct appeal, the Fourth District wrote:

[*P32] Here, there was substantial evidence upon which the jury could reasonably conclude the state had proven all elements of aggravated trafficking in drugs beyond a reasonable doubt.

[*P33] Timberlake testified about the various controlled substances law enforcement recovered from 518 Sixth Street. Pippen was present in the house when law enforcement recovered these.

[*P34] Megan Snyder, a forensic chemist, testified at great length about the chemical analyses she performed on each substance, identifying whether it was a controlled substance, and noting the amount of each substance. Snyder testified there were 1,824 pills that contained oxycodone (oxycodone hydrochloride). She also testified, based upon the maximum daily dosage of 90 milligrams for oxycodone and oxycodone's "bulk amount" being five times the maximum daily dosage, the pills were 121.6 times the bulk amount of oxycodone.

[*P35] Regarding the proximity of 518 Sixth Street to a school, Melinda Davis testified the residence was within 1000' of a school at which she was the principal.

[*P36] Again, there were digital scales in plain view. There was $3,090 on the floor of the upstairs bedroom. In total, there was $16,803 in cash within the house, though only one of five defendants was ostensibly employed. In addition to the 1,824 oxycodone pills, there was heroin, cocaine, and marihuana recovered from the residence. Given the sheer quantity of the oxycodone recovered, and the other evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude Pippen was involved in preparing for shipment, shipping, transporting, delivering, preparing for

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