Pippin v. Ellison

• Decision Date: 30 June 1851
• Citation: 12 Ired. 61,34 N.C. 61,55 Am.Dec. 403
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: LEVI PIPPIN v. WILLIAM J. ELLISON.

12 Ired. 61

34 N.C. 61

55 Am.Dec. 403

LEVI PIPPIN

v.WILLIAM J. ELLISON.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June Term, 1851.

The term “property,” in its legal sense, does not include choses in action, and in reference to personalty, is confined to “goods,” which embraces things inanimate, as furniture, &c. and to “chattels,” which term embraces living things, as horses, &c.

Where a testator devised all his “property” to his wife for life, and directed that, after her death, “it should be sold,” &c. Held, that choses in action did not pass.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Martin County, at the Spring Term, 1851, his Honor Judge ELLIS presiding.

The

case is sufficiently stated in the opinion delivered in this Court.

Rodman, for the plaintiff .

Biggs, for the defendant .

PEARSON, J.

The petitioner is the administrator de bonis non, with the will annexed, of John Wyatt, and the defendant is the administrator of Lawrence Cherry, who was the executor of said Wyatt. The petition is filed for an account of the estate of said Wyatt.

An account was taken, to which the petitioner filed four exceptions. The first and fourth were sustained. The second and third were overruled, and the defendant appealed. This presents the first and fourth exceptions for our consideration.

Both of these exceptions involve the construction of the following clause of the will: “I give and bequeath to Lydia Wyatt, all the balance of my property during her natural life, and at her death it is my will and desire, that the said property, loand to my said wife, shall be sold by my executor, with the exception of one acre of land, and the moneys arising from the sale of said property, to remain in the possession of my executor in trust for the benefit of my daughter Keziah Roby, during her natural life, to be furnished to her at such times and at all times at the discretion of my executor.” After the payment of his debts, which he directs “to be paid out of my estate,” there remained in the hands of the executor $273,80, being the principal and interest of the bonds, accounts, and claims due the testator. This amount the executor paid over to Lydia Wyatt.

The question is, whether the bonds, accounts, and other choses in action passed under the above clause, or were undisposed of and subject to distribution. The word “estate” has a broader signification than the word ““property.” The former includes choses in action. The latter does not; and in reference to...