Pippins v. State, A03A2112.
| Decision Date | 30 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. A03A2112.,A03A2112. |
| Citation | 588 S.E.2d 278,263 Ga. App. 453 |
| Parties | PIPPINS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jodi Dick, Atlanta, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., Dist. Atty., Elizabeth A. Baker, Anne E. Green, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee. BLACKBURN, Presiding Judge.
Following his conviction by a jury of aggravated child molestation1 and aggravated sexual battery,2 Andre Pippins appeals, arguing, among other things, that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the State failed to establish venue in Fulton County; (3) there was a fatal variance between the allegations of the indictment and the proof offered at trial; (4) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; and (5) the statements of the child victim were improperly admitted as they lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
1. Pippins contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict because the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.
The standard of review for the denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is the same as that for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. A motion for a directed verdict in a criminal case should only be granted when there is no conflict in the evidence and the evidence demands a verdict of acquittal as a matter of law. Moreover, on appeal the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, [Pippins] no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the appellate court determines the sufficiency, not the weight of the evidence, and does not judge the credibility of the witnesses. Further, we do not speculate which evidence the jury chose to believe or disbelieve.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence shows that at the time of the crimes, Pippins was living with Jacqueline Waller and her two daughters, T.W., who was ten years old, and Y.W., the four-year-old victim. On the morning of September 2, 1997, Pippins and Y.W. walked Waller to the bus stop so that she could take the bus to work, and then returned home. Shortly thereafter, Y.W. went to the bathroom. T.W., who was dressing for school, looked through the open bathroom door and saw blood coming down Y.W.'s leg. At Pippins's request, T.W. cleaned Y.W. up and put her bloodstained underwear in the dirty clothes. When T.W. asked Y.W. if anything was wrong, Y.W. replied that nothing was the matter.
T.W. caught her bus for school, but Y.W.'s bus did not come. After learning that the bus would not be coming because Waller had neglected to pay the bus fee, and needing to go to work himself, Pippins left Y.W. in the care of a neighbor, Angela Hayes.
When Waller called Pippins at work at about 2:00 p.m., Pippins told her that Y.W. had been bleeding and had started her period. Waller picked up Y.W. at Hayes's apartment about 4:00 p.m., found the bloody underwear in the laundry closet, and took Y.W. to the emergency room. Dr. Theresa Randolph, the attending physician, examined Y.W. and found generalized irritation in her vaginal area and a tear of the labia minora. Dr. Randolph testified that the labial tear was consistent with
After her daughter was discharged from the hospital, Waller and a police officer took Y.W. to the home of Shirley Harris, Y.W.'s grandmother, to spend the night, since the police advised that Y.W. could not go back to her own home if Pippins was a suspect. The next day, Y.W. told her mother that Pippins had "slapped her, put a pillow over her face and put his hand up in her." On that same day, Investigator J.L. Weldon of the Atlanta police sex crimes division interviewed Y.W. at her grandmother's home, and Y.W. told him the same story she had told her mother. Y.W. also repeated the story to Harris.
Pat Lawyer, a child advocate with the Georgia Center for Children, interviewed Y.W. and a videotape of that interview was shown to the jury. In the taped interview, Y.W. tells the same story she told her mother, grandmother, and the investigator.
Finally, Niam Hasson, an investigator with the Fulton County Department of Family and Children Services, testified that he had gone to Y.W.'s school to interview her after he learned that Pippins, who was out on bond and not supposed to contact Y.W. or her family, had been in Waller's apartment for three days in July 1998. Y.W. confirmed that Pippins had been in their home. She also said that she knew Pippins was not supposed to be at their home "[b]ecause he messed with my privates before when he was living there." This evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Pippins was guilty of aggravated child molestation and aggravated sexual battery.
2. Pippins argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crimes were committed in Fulton County.
Generally, a criminal action must be tried in the county in which the crime was committed, and the State may establish venue by whatever means of proof are available to it, including direct and circumstantial evidence. As an appellate court, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to support the verdict and determine whether the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed in the county where the defendant was indicted.
(Citations omitted.) Chapman v. State.4 "The phrase `reasonable doubt' does not mean `beyond all doubt or to a mathematical certainty.'" Harris v. State.5
Pippins contends that it was never established at trial that Y.W. lived at 425 Chapel Road on the date of the incident, and that there was no evidence that the incident occurred at 425 Chapel Road. Testimony at trial established that the crimes were committed on September 2, 1997, when Pippins, Waller, and Waller's two daughters, T.W. and Y.W., were living together. Y.W., in the videotaped interview, stated that Pippins made her bleed in her panties and touched her in his room in the apartment on Chapel Road. Waller testified that at the time she, Pippins, and her two daughters, T.W. and Y.W., lived together, they lived at 425 Chapel Road, and that 425 Chapel Road is in Fulton County. The testimony of Hasson, the Fulton County DFACS investigator, also was evidence that the home where the crimes were committed was in Fulton County. The jury was authorized to find that the DFACS investigator "acted within the territorial jurisdiction in which he testified he was employed," i.e., Fulton County, Chapman, supra at 318(4), 565 S.E.2d 442, and that Y.W. was living in the same apartment at 425 Chapel Road at the time Hasson investigated Pippins's presence in the home, given Y.W.'s statement that she knew Pippins was not supposed to make contact because "he messed with my privates before when he was living there." Testimony also established that Y.W. was not bleeding before Waller left for work, but that the bleeding occurred after Pippins and Y.W. returned to the apartment when Pippins, T.W., and Y.W. were the only ones in the apartment. "As [Pippins] has offered no evidence to the contrary, we conclude that the State met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that venue of the crimes charged is properly in Fulton County." Robinson v. State.6
3. Pippins next contends that his conviction must be reversed because there was a variance between the allegations in the indictment and the proof at trial. Specifically, Pippins argues that both counts of the indictment charged him with committing crimes by inserting his fingers into the victim's vagina, but that no evidence was presented at trial that he had penetrated the victim's vagina. This argument is without merit.
First, evidence was presented at trial that Pippins penetrated Y.W.'s vagina. Waller testified that Y.W. told her that Pippins "slapped her, put a pillow over her face and put his hand up in her." This was sufficient to show penetration.
Second, even without Waller's testimony, there was no fatal variance between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial.
Our courts no longer employ an overly technical application of the fatal variance rule, focusing instead on materiality. The true inquiry, therefore, is not whether there has been a variance in proof, but whether there has been such a variance as to affect the substantial rights of the accused. It is the underlying reasons for the rule which must be served: 1) the allegations must definitely inform the accused as to the charges against him so as to enable him to present his defense and not to be taken by surprise, and 2) the allegations must be adequate to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense. Only if the allegations fail to meet these tests is the variance fatal.
Count 1 of the indictment charged Pippins with aggravated child molestation in that he "did unlawfully take immoral, improper, and indecent liberties with the person of [Y.W.], a child under the age of sixteen (16) years, by inserting his fingers into her vagina, with intent to arouse and satisfy his sexual desires, said act involving physical injury to said child by causing her vaginal area to bleed." Count 2 charged Pippins with aggravated sexual battery in that he "did intentionally penetrate with a foreign object, to wit: his fingers, the vagina of [Y.W.], a four (4) year old child, without the consent of [Y.W.]." The language of the indictment sufficiently apprised Pippins of the charges against him, and did not mislead or prejudice him as to the criminal acts with which he was charged. Buice, supra at 59, 520 S.E.2d 258. Accordingly, any variance was not fatal.
4. In several enumerations of error, Pippins contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel...
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