Piquet v. Clareway Props. Ltd.

• Decision Date: 12 November 2020
• Docket Number: No. 3D20-0839,3D20-0839
• Citation: 314 So.3d 423
• Parties: Cristiano PIQUET, et al., Petitioners, v. CLAREWAY PROPERTIES LIMITED, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

314 So.3d 423

Cristiano PIQUET, et al., Petitioners,

v.CLAREWAY PROPERTIES LIMITED, et al., Respondents.

No. 3D20-0839

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed November 12, 2020.

The Bobadilla Law Firm, and D. Fernando Bobadilla, for petitioners.

Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, and Carlos M. Sires (Fort Lauderdale), for respondents.

Before FERNANDEZ, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ.

LINDSEY, J.

Petitioners (defendants below) Cristiano Piquet and Jade Office, LLC seek certiorari review of an order granting Respondent (plaintiff below) Clareway Properties Ltd.’s motion to sever Piquet and Jade's counterclaims and denying their motion to consolidate the underlying action with a prior pending action. We grant the petition and quash the order because some of the counterclaims are inextricably intertwined with the claims alleged in Clareway's Complaint.¹

I. INTRODUCTION

In addition to Clareway, Respondents herein are Luis Pedro Miranda Pinto ("Pinto Sr."); Pedro Pinto ("Pinto Jr."); Spectrum Realty Group, LLC ("Spectrum"); Rodolfo Manzon ("Manzon"); Paul Mcrae ("Mcrae Sr."); and Blaine Mcrae ("Mcrae Jr."). These other Respondents are defendants in a prior pending action in which Piquet and Piquet Realty are the plaintiffs: Piquet Realty, LLC and Cristiano Piquet v. Luis Pedro Miranda Pinto, Pedro Pinto, Spectrum Realty Group, LLC, Rodolfo Manzon, Paul Mcrae and Blaine Mcrae, Case No. 14-13200-CA-01 (the "First Action"). The underlying action giving rise to the petition before us is Clareway Properties Limited v. Cristiano Piquet and Jade Office, LLC, Case No. 15-03087-CA-01 (the "Instant Action").²

II. BACKGROUND

In its two-count Complaint filed below, Clareway sued Piquet individually for breach of contract and both Piquet and Jade for conspiracy to breach. According to the Complaint, the contract at issue is a Membership Interest Purchase Agreement (the "Agreement") executed by Pinto Sr., on behalf of Clareway, and by Piquet, individually. Piquet owned 100% of the membership units of Jade, a Florida limited liability company. Pursuant to the Agreement, Clareway purchased a 20% membership interest in Jade. Jade owned a Brickell Bay Drive condominium unit, which was sold. The Agreement provided that upon the sale of the condominium unit, Piquet would pay Clareway "the greater of twenty percent (20%) or $600,000 from the net proceeds[.]" The Complaint alleges Piquet did not pay Clareway the amount due under the Agreement.

In response to the Complaint, Piquet and Jade filed an Amended Answer and Amended Counterclaim (the "Amended Counterclaim").³ In addition to asserting claims against Clareway, the Amended Counterclaim asserts claims against six additional counter-defendants: Pinto Sr., Pinto Jr., Spectrum, Manzon, Mcrae Sr., and Mcrae Jr.

According to the Amended Counterclaim, Piquet founded Piquet Realty, a luxury real estate firm in Miami. Piquet was the sole member and 100% owner of Piquet Realty. A mutual friend introduced Piquet and Pinto Sr., who allegedly is the principal of, and controls, Clareway. This introduction led to a business relationship and eventually to the execution of the Agreement. In addition, this introduction led to a more personal relationship wherein Pinto Sr. asked Piquet, as a personal favor, to hire his son, Pinto Jr., a student attending the University of Miami. Pinto Jr., through his internship, had access to Piquet Realty's computer infrastructure and electronic and physical data, data which Piquet claims he spent over 17 years amassing and compiling.

The Amended Counterclaim further alleges the Pintos lured valued employees away from Piquet Realty to launch Spectrum, a competing real estate business, and began soliciting former clients of Piquet Realty. The launch of Spectrum was allegedly facilitated by Pinto Jr. as a result of having unlawfully downloaded files from Piquet Realty's computer system during his internship. Further, Mcrae Sr., on behalf of Spectrum and in conspiracy with other counter-defendants, allegedly made defamatory statements about Piquet and Piquet Realty.

As a result of the foregoing, Piquet and Jade asserted claims against Pinto Jr. and Clareway for fraud in the inducement and fraud with respect to the Agreement. Piquet also asserted claims against Clareway for breach of the Agreement and, alternatively, for breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Finally, Piquet asserted several claims against Manzon and Mcrae Sr. for defamation and claims against all the counter-defendants for conspiracy.

The lower court dismissed Piquet's counterclaims against Clareway for breach of contract and for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, leaving Piquet's counterclaims for fraud in the inducement, fraud, conspiracy, and defamation. Thereafter, Clareway moved to sever the Amended Counterclaim, and Piquet moved to consolidate the Fist Action with the Instant Action. The lower court granted the motion to sever and denied the motion to consolidate.⁴ This petition followed.

III. JURISDICTION

The Florida Constitution gives authority to a District Court of Appeal to grant a petition for writ of certiorari. Art. V, § 4, Fla. Const. An order granting a motion to sever is not an appealable non-final order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130, so a petition for writ of certiorari is the appropriate avenue to seek review of such an order. See Ludeca, Inc. v. Alignment & Condition Monitoring, Inc., 276 So. 3d 475 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) ("Certiorari is an appropriate remedy for orders severing or bifurcating claims which involve interrelated factual issues because severance risks inconsistent outcomes." (quoting Kavouras v. Mario City Rest. Corp., 88 So. 3d 213, 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) )); Choi v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 224 So. 3d 882, 884 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) ("[T]he trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by granting the motion to sever three inextricably interwoven claims. We therefore grant the petition for certiorari and quash the order granting Auto–Owners’ motion to sever."); Kavouras, 88 So. 3d 213 (granting petition for writ of certiorari and quashing order granting motion to sever).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A party seeking certiorari review must demonstrate (1) that the contested order results in material injury in the proceedings that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal and (2) that the order departs from the essential requirements of the law. Nader v. Fla. Dept. of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 87 So. 3d 712, 721 (Fla. 2012). "[T]he Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that ‘[a] finding that the petitioning party has "suffered an irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on direct appeal" is a ‘condition precedent to invoking a district court's certiorari jurisdiction.’ " Damsky v. Univ. of Miami, 152 So. 3d 789, 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (quoting Bd. of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Am. Educ. Enters., LLC, 99 So. 3d 450, 454 (Fla. 2012) ). Departure from the essential requirements of law must constitute a "violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice." ACT Servs. v. Sch. Bd., 29 So. 3d 450, 452-53 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d 885, 889 (Fla. 2003) ).

V. ANALYSIS

We begin with the recognition that

[A] petition for writ of certiorari is not an appeal. It is an original action seeking an extraordinary writ. It differs from an appeal in many ways. Among other things, the standard of review governing a petition for certiorari is much higher than the standard governing an appeal of right.

Damsky, 152 So. 3d at 791-93 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). Certiorari review is limited because "piecemeal review of nonfinal trial court orders will impede the orderly administration of justice and serve only to delay and harass." Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Ass'n, 104 So. 3d 344, 348-49 (Fla. 2012).

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.270(b) generally gives courts the discretion to sever claims "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice." The decision to sever is normally within the trial court's discretion. Travelers Express, Inc. v. Acosta, 397 So. 2d 733, 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). But severing claims that are inextricably intertwined is a departure from the essential requirements of the law due to the risk of inconsistent verdicts. Choi, 224 So. 3d at 884.

In determining the probability of inconsistent verdicts, courts should consider whether the finding of liability in one case will necessarily be preclusive of a potential finding in the other case, the degree of factual similarity between the claims, the relationship of various plaintiffs or defendants to the claims, and whether reasonable persons could return each of the possible verdicts. T...