Pitt v. Belote

• Decision Date: 15 February 1933
• Citation: 146 So. 380,108 Fla. 292
• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Parties: PITT v. BELOTE et al.

146 So. 380

108 Fla. 292

PITT v. BELOTE et al.

Florida Supreme Court

February 15, 1933

En Banc.

Suit by John N. Pitt against William P. Belote, as Chairman, and others, as members, of the Board of County Commissioners of Duval County, and Frank M. Ironmonger, as Supervisor of Registration of such County. From decree dismissing plaintiff's bill of complaint, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and bill dismissed without prejudice. Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; De Witt T. Gray, judge.

COUNSEL

P. H Odom, of Jacksonville, for appellant.

Roswell King, of Jacksonville, for appellees.

OPINION

DAVIS Chief Justice.

The bill of complaint in this case alleged that the county commissioners of Duval county, acting in pursuance of chapter 15186, Sp. Acts 1931, Laws of Florida, had adopted a resolution for the issuance of county bonds if, and on condition that, said bonds be ratified at an election of freeholders as provided for in that act. The bill prayed for an injunction against holding the election or expending any public funds therefor. A motion to dismiss the bill was granted, and complainant has appealed.

The argument here is that chapter 15186, Sp. Acts 1931, is unconstitutional, and that therefore the injunction prayed for should have been granted, and the motion to dismiss the bill of complaint denied. We deal with that proposition now on the authority of State v. Southern Tel. & Const Co., 65 Fla. 67, 61 So. 119, though the election sought to be enjoined has already been held, and the appeal might therefore be properly dismissed as moot, if it were not for the important legal questions involved, which are represented to use as being of general interest to the public, and which both parties to this appeal urge us to decide, without compelling them to resort to new litigation for the purpose.

The title to the legislative act under attack is as follows:

'An Act Relating to Duval County, and Transportation Across St. Johns River; Concerning Toll Bridges in Said County, and Authorizing the County of Duval, in the State of Florida, to Issue Bonds for the Construction of an Additional Toll Bridge Across the St. Johns River in Said County, Approaches and a Connecting Road Leading Therefrom, Making Provisions in Reference to Tolls, Providing for the Investment of Sinking Funds Derived from Tolls and Charges, Providing for Powers of Eminent Domain in Said County in Connection Therewith, and for Elections, and Also Prescribing the Qualifications of Those Who Shall be Permitted to Vote in Said Elections, and Other Matters in Connection with All of the Above.'

Section 21 of article 3 of the Constitution, as it was amended in 1928, is as follows:

'Sec. 21. In all cases enumerated in the preceding section all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the State, but in all cases not enumerated or excepted in that section, the legislature may pass special or local laws except as now or hereafter otherwise provided in the Constitution; Provided, That no local or special bill shall be passed, unless notice of the intention to apply therefor shall have been published in the locality where the matter or thing to be affected may be situated, which notice shall state the substance of the contemplated law, and shall be published at least thirty days prior to the introduction into the legislature of such bill, and in the manner to be provided by law. The evidence that such notice has been published shall be established in the legislature before such bill shall be passed by having affidavit of proof of publication attached to the proposed bill when the same is introduced in either branch of the legislature, and which such affidavit constituting proof of publication shall be entered in full upon the journals of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, which entries shall immediately follow the journal entry showing the introduction of any bill. Provided, however no publication of any local or special law is required hereunder when such local or special law contains a provision to the effect that the same shall not become operative or effective until the same has been ratified or approved by a majority of the qualified electors participating in an election called in the territory affected by said special or local law.'

The bill of complaint alleged, and the motion to dismiss it admitted, that no notice of intention to pass such a law was published as required by the above-quoted section of the Constitution. It is also alleged and admitted that said act contains no provision that it should not become effective as a law until the same should be ratified and approved by a majority of the qualified electors of the county, participating in an election called and held for the purpose.

So the act is admittedly invalid as not having become a law in the manner provided by amended section 21 of article 3 of the Constitution, unless the special terms of the act, providing for a vote of freeholders on the issuance of the bonds authorized by it, saves the act from constitutional objection, because of the referendum feature evidenced thereby.

But conceding arguendo the point that, under section 6 of article 9, as amended in 1930, a special or local act of the Legislature may be validly passed, without publication of notice concerning same as required by and under section 21 of article 3 as amended, when its purpose is simply to give necessary legislative authority to issue bonds if approved pursuant to a constitutional vote of freeholders as required by section 6 of article 9, ^[1] we find that chapter 15186, supra, in its essential provisions, undertakes to do vastly more than authorize a referendum election of...