Pittman v. City of Wichita Falls, 13810.

• Decision Date: 14 October 1938
• Docket Number: No. 13810.,13810.
• Citation: 120 S.W.2d 847
• Parties: PITTMAN v. CITY OF WICHITA FALLS et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 847

120 S.W.2d 847

PITTMAN v. CITY OF WICHITA FALLS et al.

No. 13810.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Fort Worth.

October 14, 1938.

Rehearing Denied November 11, 1938.

Appeal from District Court, Wichita County; Ernest Robertson, Judge.

Action by George W. Pittman against the City of Wichita Falls, Tex., and another for hernia suffered while engaged on Works Progress Administration project of enlarging water system of defendant city. From judgment for defendants notwithstanding verdict, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Smoot & Smoot, T. R. Boone, and Kearby Peery, all of Wichita Falls, for appellant.

Thelbert Martin and T. A. Hicks, both of Wichita Falls, and Touchstone, Wight, Gormley & Price, of Dallas, for appellees.

BROWN, Justice.

Appellant, Pittman, brought suit, in the District Court of Wichita County, against the City of Wichita Falls (a Home Rule City) and one J. F. Hubbs, because of personal injuries received by him while working on what is now commonly known as a "W. P. A. project." This work, or project, was the improvement of the water supply system owned by said City.

We are familiar with such projects, as creatures of the present National Administration. The idea is, that the United States Government, acting through the agency known as the Works Progress Administration, undertakes, in co-operation with such an entity as the said City, to assist it in some public work, for the public good. The objects to be attained are, in the main, to-fold: To stimulate improvements that enure to the benefit of the public, and to furnish employment for the unemployed.

The said City is designated as the "sponsor" of the project, and it contracts to furnish certain materials and personal property and a certain per cent of the funds needed to make the improvements, as well as certain employees.

In the case at bar, the City agreed to and did furnish a certain truck, with a driver of same, which was to be used in hauling heavy, iron piping, to be used in enlarging the water system of the City.

Appellant was hired by the United States Government. He was under the control of Federal employees, who were a part of the said Works Progress Administration. The truck furnished by the City was an ordinary one and one-half or two tons truck, and was defective, when so furnished, in that two iron, or steel "loops", which were made to hold certain "standards" (used to build up the sides of the truck's bed, for the purpose of holding a larger load), were broken and defective, and two of the said "standards" were broken off and missing, one toward the front of the truck's bed, on one side, and the other toward the rear thereof, on the opposite side.

It was appellant's duty to assist in loading the heavy water pipes on the truck, and to assist in unloading same at the place where they were to be installed by other workmen. To do this, he, with other employees, rode on the truck and on the heavy pipes, from the place of loading to the place where they were unloaded.

After making several such trips, the appellant alleges he was injured when the iron pipes rolled and some of them fell from the truck. An alarm being given by someone, appellant attempted to jump clear of the moving pipes, but caught his foot between them, and was thrown so violently that he suffered two hernias.

Appellant's theory of a cause of action against the City is best understood by the issues submitted to and the findings made by the jury, to which the case was tried. The jury found that the truck belonged to said City; that it was improperly equipped for the purpose for which it was used; that the City knew, or ought to have known, by the exercise of due care, that the truck was so improperly equipped; that the City was guilty of negligence in furnishing an improperly equipped truck, and such was a proximate cause of appellant's injury; that the truck was equipped with defective "loops", and the City knew, or by the exercise of due care ought to have known, that the truck was equipped with defective "loops"; that the City was guilty of negligence in such matter, and same was a proximate cause of appellant's injury; that the truck was not furnished with "proper standards"; that the City knew, or by the exercise of due care, ought to have known, that "proper standards" were not furnished; that in such matter the City was guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of appellant's injury; that the City delivered the truck to the W. P. A. authorities, with one "standard" missing; that the City knew, or by the exercise of due care ought to have known, that the "standard" was missing; that the delivery of the truck in such condition was negligence, and such negligence was a proximate cause of appellant's injury; that the City failed to provide a chain to be put around the pipe; that such failure was negligence, and a proximate cause of appellant's injury; that the City failed to furnish a rope of sufficient strength to hold the pipe on the truck; that such failure...