Pittman v. Pittman

• Citation: 2 N.W. 536,56 Iowa 769
• Parties: PITTMAN v. PITTMAN ET AL
• Decision Date: 08 October 1881
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

2 N.W. 536

56 Iowa 769

PITTMAN v. PITTMAN ET AL

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 8, 1881

Appeal from Lee District Court.

AFFIRMED.

Gillmore & Anderson, for appellant.

Casey & Hobbs and D. F. Miller & Sons, for appellee.

OPINION

DAY, J.

The plaintiff alleges in substance that the defendant Truman Knowles, as the guardian of Willie and George Heule, minors, received $ 1,500 belonging to said minors, and loaned about $ 1,000 thereof to his son-in-law G. W. Pittman on his personal security, and that G. W. Pittman failed in business and became insolvent; that afterward Knowles resigned his guardianship, and he and G. W. Pittman, for the purpose of making the plaintiff responsible for the loss of the estate of the minors, conspired together to procure the appointment of G. W. Pittman as guardian, and have the plaintiff become his surety on his guardian's bond; that G. W. Pittman was appointed guardian, and plaintiff became his surety; that G. W. Pittman executed his receipt to Knowles for the entire sum which came into his possession as guardian, and Knowles was discharged; that in fact only the sum of $ 500 was turned over to G. W. Pittman upon his appointment as guardian, the balance having been previously loaned to him and consumed. The plaintiff prays that G. W. Pittman's guardianship may be revoked, that plaintiff be released from the operation of said bond, and that Knowles be placed where he stood before his resignation, and be made liable for the full amount of money he loaned to G. W. Pittman.

The abstract contains simply the pleadings and the evidence. It does not show what decree the court entered, nor in favor of which party it was rendered. It does not show the service of any notice of appeal, and does not even state that any appeal has been taken. An argument has been filed in which Knowles is designated as appellant, from which we may infer that the decree rendered is regarded by him as in some manner adverse to his interests. It is apparent, however, that we cannot undertake to reverse a decree without knowing what it is. If the decree were set out in the abstract, it might appear to be wholly unobjectionable. In the state of the record no course is left for us but to order that the judgment be

AFFIRMED.