Pittman v. Time Securities

• Decision Date: 10 April 1957
• Docket Number: No. 13145,13145
• Citation: 301 S.W.2d 521
• Parties: Carl T. PITTMAN, a Minor, by Next Friend, H. O. Pittman, Appellant, v. TIME SECURITIES et al., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 521

301 S.W.2d 521

Carl T. PITTMAN, a Minor, by Next Friend, H. O. Pittman Appellant, v. TIME SECURITIES et al., Appellees.

No. 13145.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.

April 10, 1957.

James P. Wolf, Edward Anderson, Ellis M. Brown, Corpus Christi, for appellant.

Nye & Cohn, Bernard W. Schrader, Corpus Christi, for appellees.

BARROW, Justice.

This suit was brought by Carl T. Pittman, alleged to be a minor, suing by next friend, his father, H. O. Pittman, against Time Securities and 'Mr.' Osborne, d/b/a Osborne Motor Company. The suit was brought to rescind a contract entered into between Carl T. Pittman and Osborne Motor Company, whereby Carl Pittman purchased an automobile for the consideration of $1,236.70, with the trade-in credit of $300 and an installment chattel mortgage note in the sum of $936.70, which note and lien were transferred from Osborne Motor Company to Time Securities. The contract was made on August 28, 1955, at which time the plaintiff, Carl T. Pittman, was eighteen years old and unmarried, but he did marry on September 3, 1955, and was married at the time of the hearing in the trial court. The grounds for rescission are the alleged minority of the plaintiff, Carl T. Pittman. The suit was filed June 19, 1956.

The defendants answered by plea in abatement, setting up Section 3, Subdivision (t), Probate Code, Vernon's Tex.Civ.Stats., and that by virtue of such law the plaintiff was emancipated at the time suit was filed and therefore the suit could not be prosecuted by next friend. The court sustained the plea and dismissed the suit.

The parties will be referred to as they were in the trial court.

This decision involves the construction of Subdivision (t) of Section 3, of the Texas Probate Code, which went into effect on January 1, 1956. The question is whether the law is of general application or applies to probate matters only. The Act in question reads as follows:

'Sec. 3. Definitions and Use of Terms

'When used in this Code, unless otherwise apparent from the context: * * *

'(t) 'Minors' are all persons under twenty-one years of age who have never been married, except persons under that age whose disabilities of minority have been removed generally, except as to the right to vote, in accordance with the laws of this State.'

It is the contention of plaintiff that the heading of Section 3 of the Code has the effect of limiting and restricting the term 'Minors' to probate matters, and does not have the effect of emancipating males under twenty-one years of age who have been married. With this contention we do not agree.

The purpose of the adoption of the Texas Probate Code was to codify and bring into one code all laws relating to wills, inheritances, heirship, and the administration of the estates of deceased persons, minors, persons of unsound mind and all related matters. This Code is the result of the joint labor and study of a number of eminent Texas attorneys whose labors consumed several years. As many as eight different dreafts were made of the Code before its final draft was passed by the 54th Legislature. So it must be said that this legislation was carefully considered. One of the purposes of this Act was to eliminate, rather than create, confusion, uncertainty and ambiguity.

Under the common law, all persons under twenty-one years of age, both male and female are minors. However, the general rule that all statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed no longer exists in Texas. The rule now is, that where the common law is inconsistent with the statutes the common law must yield. Art. 10, subd. 8, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stats.; 3 Black, Statutory Construction, (3d Ed.) Sec. 6205. We think the rules of construction most applicable hare are that the ascertainment of the legislative intent and purpose should be paramount, that a liberal construction should be given the language used with reference to the purposes and objects of the Act. Section 3(t) should be construed together with and in the light of other provisions of the Act in pari materia, and the Act should be construed so as to avoid absurdities and inconsistencies. In State Highway Department v. Gorham, 139 Tex. 361, 162 S.W.2d 934, 936, the Court said:

'A statute will not be construed so as to ascribe to the Legislature an intention of doing an unjust thing by its enactment, or of causing confusion thereby, if the statute is reasonably susceptible of a contruction showing the Legislature's intention to have been otherwise.'

In Austin v. Collins, Tex.Civ.App., 200 S.W.2d 666, 670, ref. n. r. e., the Court said:

'We should not give to a statute such a construction as will throw the law into a state of confusion if it can be fairly said that the legislature had expressly or necessarily implied some other purpose.'

Examining the numerous terms contained in the definitive section of the Act, we find all these words and phrases to be those of ordinary use, meaning and understanding, and they are defined as commonly and ordinarily understood, with the exception of those which the Legislature obviously wished to change, such as the word 'Minor.' That term has been defined in Article 4104, subd. 2, R.S.1925, and we think it means the same as it has heretofore meant, both inside and outside of probate matters, except that a new group of persons (married males under twenty-one years of age) is included within the emancipating provisions. It is manifest that the limiting expression, 'When used in this Code,' is qualified by the further expression, 'unless otherwise apparent from the context.' We think these qualifying...