Pitts v. Howe Scale Co.

• Decision Date: 04 October 1938
• Docket Number: No. 1030.,1030.
• Citation: 1 A.2d 695
• Parties: PITTS v. HOWE SCALE CO. et al.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

1 A.2d 695

PITTS

v. HOWE SCALE CO. et al.

No. 1030.

Supreme Court of Vermont. Rutland.

Oct. 4, 1938.

Exceptions from Rutland County Court; Olin M. Jeffords, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law by William E. Pitts, claimant, opposed by the Howe Scale Company, employer, and the American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, insurance carrier. Judgment in favor of claimant, and the employer and insurance carrier bring exceptions.

Affirmed.

Argued before MOULTON, SHERBURNE, BUTTLES, and STURTEVANT, JJ.

Asa S. Bloomer, of Rutland, for plaintiff.

J. Boone Wilson, Charles F. Black, and Willsie E. Brisbin, all of Burlington, for defendants.

BUTTLES, Justice.

This case originated in a claim by the plaintiff against the defendants for benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law, P.L. 6480 et seq. No agreement having been reached by the parties, the claim was heard on May 16, 1936, by a special deputy commissioner of industries and as a result findings were filed on June 17,

1936, to the effect that the claimant had been injured substantially as claimed by him, by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by the defendant scale company, and that he had suffered total disability as a result thereof. An award was made of medical benefits and of compensation at the rate of $8.01 per week during the time that such total disability might continue, commencing as of January 14, 1936. It appears that a further hearing was held by the commissioner on December 30, 1936, on the question of continuation of disability, and as a result finding was made that total disability resulting from the accident had not then ended and it was ordered that payments of compensation be continued in accordance with the original award. It appears that these orders were acquiesced in by the parties without appeal, and payments were made pursuant thereto. The case was further heard by the commissioner on August 13, 1937. The commissioner's notice of this hearing was dated August 3,

1937, and contains this recital: "This case is again set for hearing at the request of the insurance company under and by virtue of P.L. 6546, only for the purpose of determining the extent of the employee's disability, if any, at the present time." On August 24, 1937, the commissioner made a finding to the effect that the disability from which the claimant was then suffering was due to causes other than the accidental injury of January 6, 1936, and ordered that compensation previously awarded end as of July 6, 1937. From this decision and findings the claimant appealed to Rutland county court and in his notice of appeal set up eight questions as the ones from which appeal was taken. These questions are identical with the questions subsequently certified by the commissioner to the court for review in accordance with the requirement of P.L. 6549 and read as follows:

"1. The finding that the original compression fracture of the first lumbar vertbrae (sic) has been healed, and that his present physical disability is due to arthritis and a severe dorsal round back, neither of which conditions has any connection with the original compression fracture.

"2. The order that compensation previously awarded end as of July 6, 1937.

"3. The action of the commissioner in going beyond the issues of the case, the citation and notice in said case being only for the purpose of determining the extent of the employee's disability, if any, at the present time, namely August 3, 1937.

"4. The dismissal of the case.

"5. The failure of the commissioner to order and award compensation for partial disability.

"6. The failure of the commissioner to order and award a continuance of payments of compensation in some form.

"7. The failure of the commissioner to order the present order of payments to start.

"8. The amount of compensation due and to become due."

In compliance with county court rule 7, par. 2, the appellant filed six objections to the decision of the commissioner, the substance of which was that he had suffered compensable disability beyond July 6, 1937, and therefore should be awarded compensation for such disability, total or partial, temporary or permanent, as the case might prove, after that date. No question is raised regarding these objections and we do not further consider them except to say that, the rule referred to having been promulgated prior to the enactment of the 1923 amendment which is now P.L. 6549, it is our view that the issues raised by the questions certified by the commissioner under this section can be narrowed but cannot be enlarged by such objections filed under the rule. Probably greater clarity might be secured by amendment of this rule.

Trial was had by jury in county court. No instruction for a general verdict was submitted to the jury and it seems apparent that under the statute a general verdict would have been impossible. A special verdict was returned by the jury which had been instructed by the court to answer the two following questions: "(1) Has claimant's total disability, caused by the accident of January 6, 1936, ceased? (2) Is the claimant, at the present time, partially disabled because of the accident of January 6, 1936?" The jury answered the first question "No" and returned no answer to the second question, which was in accordance with the court's instruction and was obviously correct since a negative answer to the first question made it unnecessary to answer the second.

From the special verdict so rendered and judgment entered thereon the defendants come to this court on bill of exceptions. The defendants, in their brief, restrict themselves to one ground of claimed error by the trial court which they state in the following language: "The single question involved in this cause is whether or not the Rutland County Court erred in disregarding the certificate of the Commissioner of Industries, framing its own questions and submitting them to the jury."

We need spend little time with defendant's contention that no questions were certified to the court by the commissioner because none of the so-called questions certified was in interrogative form. One definition of question given by Webster's New International Dictionary is "a subject or point of investigation, examination or debate; theme of inquiry; problem; matter to be inquired into; as a delicate or doubtful question." It is a matter of common knowledge, of which we take judicial notice, that a question for debate is frequently stated in the form of a resolution. For one illustration—of which a great many might be cited—of the use of the word "question" in the sense above indicated, see In re Stevens and Adams et al., 74 Vt. 408, 411, 52 A. 1034. We remark, however, in passing, that in our opinion it would be better practice to certify such questions to the court in interrogative form and would tend to obviate doubt as to the exact issues intended to be raised.

In this case the questions certified to the court certainly are indefinite and doubtful as to their exact scope and meaning. In such appeal cases we do not think the trial court is required to speculate on the meaning and scope of questions certified by the commissioner when those questions are so vague that their meaning and scope cannot be determined with certainty. It has been held in a number of jurisdictions that where a pleading is so indefinite or uncertain that the precise nature of the charge or defense is not apparent, the trial court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, may by order require an amendment to cure this defect, and further that this is an inherent power of the court not dependent upon code or statutory provision therefor. Bowers, Judicial Discretion of Trial Courts, p. 145; 49 C.J. 468; Hammers v. Southern Express Co., 80 Fla. 51, 85 So. 246; Florida East Coast R. Co. v. Knowles, 68 Fla. 400, 67 So. 122: Knight v. D. H. Dunn & Son, 47 Fla. 175, 36 So. 62; Joyce v. Rubin, 23 Idaho 296, 130 P. 793; DeCelles v. Casey, 48 Mont. 568, 139 P. 586; Ringler v. Jetter, 206 App.Div. 478, 201 N.Y.S. 523. In the type of case here under consideration there are no pleadings, but the certificate of the commissioner takes the place of the declaration in an ordinary action, and there is the same reason why the court should have the power to require clarification of the issues. We think the court has this power and that in a proper case, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, it may order the certified questions returned to the commissioner to be so amended that the questions of fact to be retried may be made definite and certain. In order to accomplish this a continuance of the case would, no doubt, usually be necessary.

In the present case, however, the court elected to try to submit the case to the jury on the basis of the questions that had been certified. The question before us is whether it succeeded in this attempt. It is apparent that it would be impossible for the court to submit to the jury the questions certified in the form in which they had been certified with any hope of getting satisfactory verdicts thereon. Seme interpretation for the benefit of the jury was necessary if this course was to be followed.

The statutory provision governing appeals from decisions of the commissioner of industries to county court has never previously been before this court for consideration. So great is the diversity among the compensation laws of the various states that adjudications from other jurisdictions arc of little or no value as precedents here. Probably the...