Pitts v. State
| Decision Date | 02 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 342,1987,342,1987 |
| Citation | 549 A.2d 699 |
| Parties | . STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. Supreme Court of Delaware. Submitted: |
| Court | Supreme Court of Delaware |
Superior Court, Kent County.
AFFIRMED.
Before MOORE, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices.
This 27th day of September, 1988, upon consideration of appellant's Rule 26(c) brief and the State's response thereto it appears that:
(1) The appellant, Courtland Pitts, ("Pitts") was convicted following a jury trial in the Superior Court of ten counts of felony theft and five counts of misdemeanor theft, and was sentenced to two years imprisonment on each of the felonies and one year for each of the misdemeanors. Appellant's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by this Court in Pitts v. State, Del.Supr., No. 160, 1983, McNeilly, J. (September 14, 1983) (ORDER). The Superior Court by order dated September 17, 1987, denied appellant's motion for post conviction relief filed pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35. Pitts' appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c) and a motion to withdraw as counsel. Appellate counsel has identified four arguably appealable issues and Pitts, pro se, suggests numerous additional points.
(2) Pitts directly and through appellate counsel asserts, as the first arguably appealable issue, ineffective assistance of counsel on numerous occasions throughout trial. In deciding such a claim we adhere to the two prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 694 (1984): (1) based on the facts of the particular case defendant must show that counsel's conduct was not reasonable in light of all of the circumstances, and (2) defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. "The court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 690.
In particular, Pitts' appellate attorney contends that the trial attorney failed to fully investigate and prepare for trial and review all the evidence in the possession of the prosecutor and police. Pitts' trial counsel testified at the Rule 35 hearing that he pursued a reasonably thorough investigation of the case but was hindered by a lack of cooperation on the part of the appellant.
Pitts complained that several defense witnesses had not been located for trial. Pitts himself admitted at the Rule 35 hearing that all but one of the witnesses had appeared and the failure to locate the other requested witness did not affect the outcome of the trial. Pitts has thus failed to meet the Strickland standard requiring a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different, See Id. at 694. Therefore these claims are without merit.
(3) Pitts, pro se, alleges fifteen additional instances of ineffective assistance of counsel none of which rise to a level that would meet the Strickland test.
(a) Pitts claims that because he was shackled in the back of the courtroom and could not readily communicate with trial counsel he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. Appellant was shackled after he had an altercation with several guards during which he threatened to leave the courtroom. The trial attorney testified at the Rule 35 hearing that after being shackled Pitts was sitting within eight to ten feet of counsel and was still able to communicate with counsel, but that at this time in the trial Pitts no longer was seeking the advice of counsel.
(b) Pitts claims trial counsel failed to file a Motion for a Bill of Particulars and a Motion for a Suppression Hearing. The trial attorney, however, had reasonably concluded that none of the suppression contentions had any merit because appellant had claimed that he had no connection to the house or the car from which the evidence was seized and therefore lacked standing. When a defendant does not claim a possessory or proprietary interest in either the property searched or seized he is not entitled to challenge a search of the areas in which the property is located. See Thomas v. State, Del.Supr., 467 A.2d 954, 957 (1983) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)). Further, it was reasonable for the trial attorney to believe that the seizure of the items from the car that appellant owned was legal and not subject to suppression. The items were in "plain view" in the open trunk of Pitts' car when police seized them. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983). We find these claims to be without merit.
(c) Appellant claims that he was forced to accept the representation of counsel against his will. A defendant may "knowingly and intelligently" forego the benefit of representation by counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975). During trial Pitts demanded to be given another attorney. Appellant requested to represent himself only after he realized he could not have his attorney replaced with another attorney. The request by appellant to proceed pro se was made at the time of a violent altercation during the trial proceedings. The trial transcript shows that the trial judge was concerned that if appellant proceeded pro se and was later removed from the courtroom due to his conduct, no one would remain to represent his interests. The right to self-representation is not absolute. Payne v. State, Del.Supr., 367 A.2d 1010, 1015-17 (1976). Under the difficult circumstances facing the trial judge, he properly exercised circumstances facing the trial judge, he properly exercised his discretion in denying self-representation, therefore, we find this claim without merit.
The remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail to allege particular prejudice that would result in a different result at trial and are, therefore, without merit.
(4) The second arguably appealable issue asserted by appellate counsel is whether Pitts had standing to challenge the alleged illegal search of the residence. The search was effected pursuant to a warrant. Pitts' defense at trial was premised on the claim that he did not reside in the home and therefore had no connection to the items seized. To assert standing one must be an owner or occupier of the premises. See Thomas v. State, Del.Supr., 467 A.2d 954, 957 (1983). Because Pitts had no standing to assert an illegal search argument, this claim is without merit.
(5) The third arguably appealable issue raised by appellate counsel is whether appellant had been illegally detained and if so whether the evidence seized during such time was thereby tainted. The testimony at the Rule 35 hearing revealed that appellant was under arrest at the time of the seizure of evidence that was in plain view in the trunk of Pitts' car. There is no evidence that any other search or seizure took place after his arrest that was not pursuant to a warrant. There is no evidence of an illegal detention, therefore, this claim is without merit.
(6) The fourth arguably appealable issue is that there was no probable cause for the search warrants. Appellant has not made a substantial preliminary showing that the allegations in the affidavit were false. See Franks v. State, Del.Supr., 398 A.2d 783 (1978). Nor has appellant properly alleged that no probable cause for the search existed or that the search was somehow otherwise defective. This claim is without merit.
(7) The remaining claims on appeal are asserted pro se by Pitts. First, he claims error in the denial of a Motion for Relief from Prejudicial Joinder. The "defendant has the burden of demonstrating 'substantial injustice' and unfair prejudice" in challenging a denial of a severance motion. Lampkins v. State, Del.Supr., 465 A.2d 785, 794 (1983). In this case the trial judge did not abuse his discretion since the offenses charged were of the same general nature and show evidence of a modus operandi through proof of multiple offenses. State v. McKay, Del.Supr., 382 A.2d 260, 262 (1978). See Weist v. State, Del.Supr., 542 A.2d 1193 (1988); Brown v. State, Del.Supr., 310 A.2d 870 (19...
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