Pitts v. State
| Decision Date | 13 April 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 34280,34280 |
| Citation | 185 So.2d 164 |
| Parties | Randoil PITTS, Jr., alias Randolph Pitts, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Eugene T. Whitworth, Joseph V. Canto and James D. Salter, Gainesville, for appellant.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and William D. Roth, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant Randoil Pitts, Jr., alias Randolph Pitts, Jr., was tried and convicted of the offense of rape and sentenced to death. He raises six points on this appeal and we shall dispose of them in the order raised.
The first point is whether the trial judge committed reversible error in submitting the case to the jury because of the legal insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and judgment of guilt.
We have examined the evidence in detail. No useful purpose would be served by narrating it here. It is sufficient to say that there is ample, competent evidence in this record to support the verdict of the jury that the appellant was guilty of ravishing and carnally knowing the victim of his assault who was over the age of ten years by force and against her will. While it is true that no deadly weapon was used in the assault, the evidence amply supports the conclusion that the defendant, by the use of superior force and strength paralyzed his victim with fear, accomplished his purpose and by choking her prevented any outcry. 1
Under this point the appellant also urges that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish the identity of the defendant as the person perpetrating the crime. We find no merit in this contention. While the evidence, as usual in cases of this kind, is conflicting, there was sufficient evidence in the record, if believed by the jury, to fully and completely establish the identity of the appellants Pitts as the person guilty of perpetrating the crime.
Appellant argues that the trial court committed error in systematically excluding several prospective jurors from service solely because they were inclined to recommend mercy, thus violating a right of appellant under the Florida statutes as well as fostering in the minds of the jurors a prejudicial impression of judicial disfavor of recommendation of mercy for the appellant.
Illustrative of the questions to which the appellant objects was one to a juror asking '* * * is your belief concerning capital punishment such that you would hesitate in rendering a verdict of guilty, if you thought the penalty would be death?' with the juror answering 'I believe it would.' Following this colloquy the court excused the juror. Similar questions were asked to other jurors and one of them answered '* * * If I knew within my own mind that he was guilty I would do it without hesitating about it, but I think I would recommend mercy.' Another juror in being interrogated along the same lines stated 'I would vote for guilty, if I thought the evidence warranted it, but I would also vote for mercy afterwards' irrespective of the evidence. We find nothing wrong with the action of the trial court in dispensing with the services of these prospective jurors when the whole examination on voir dire is considered and construed in the light of the applicable law. Chapter 919.23 provides that:
'(1) In all criminal trials, the jury, in addition to a verdict of guilty of any offense, may recommend the accused to the mercy of the court or to executive clemency, and such recommendation shall not qualify the verdict except in capital cases. * * *'
'(2) Whoever is convicted of a capital offense and recommenced to the mercy of the court by a majority of the jury in their verdict, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life; * * *.'
This section must be construed, however, with Section...
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Sylvia v. State, s. 67--430
...ruling by the trial judge Ferrell v. State, 45 Fla. 26, 34 So. 220; Wilson v. Johnson, 51 Fla. 370, 41 So. 395; Pitts v. State, Fla.1966, 185 So.2d 164, and it is incumbent upon the appellant to demonstrate an abuse of this discretion before this court would be warranted in reversing the co......
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Paramore v. State, 37178
...When the whole examination on voir dire is considered and construed in the light of the above authorities, together with Pitts v. State, 185 So.2d 164 (Fla.1966), we find nothing wrong with the actions of the trial court in dispensing with the services of these There is a second reason for ......
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Adkins v. State
...issue has been raised. First, it has no merit. A trial judge has the discretion to allow a party to reopen its case. See Pitts v. State, 185 So.2d 164 (Fla.1966) (ordinarily the question of allowing the reopening of cases is one involving sound judicial discretion which will rarely be inter......
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Burk v. State, 85-1465
...question involving sound judicial discretion of the trial court, a discretion rarely interfered with at the appellate level. Pitts v. State, 185 So.2d 164 (Fla.1966). It commonly occurs when either party requests the court to reopen their case so that they may present evidence. In this case......
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Appellate standards of review.
...affirmed that principle. See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 420 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103 (1983); Pitts v. State, 185 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1966); Musselwhite v. Charboneau, 709 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Fitzhugh v. State, 698 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 1st DCA Allowing Jury to R......