Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Gage

• Decision Date: 05 February 1919
• Docket Number: No. 12172.,12172.
• Citation: 121 N.E. 582,286 Ill. 213
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: PITTSBURGH, C., C. & ST. L. RY. CO. v. GAGE et al.

286 Ill. 213

121 N.E. 582

PITTSBURGH, C., C. & ST. L. RY. CO.

v.GAGE et al.

No. 12172.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 18, 1918.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 5, 1919.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Jesse A. Baldwin, Judge.

Petition by the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company against Stanley K. Gage and others for the condemnation of land. From a judgment for petitioner, defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded.Daniel S. Wentworth and David B. Maloney, both of Chicago, for appellants.

Loesch, Scofield, Loesch & Richards, of Chicago, for appellee.

DUNN, J.

This proceeding was begun by the filing of a petition in the circuit court of Cook county, under the Eminent Domain Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1917, c. 47), for the condemnation of certain lots adjoining the right of way and property of the railroad company for railroad purposes. A former judgment was brought to this court and reversed for the reason that the record did not show the inability of the railroad company and the property owners to agree as to the compensation for their lots, and the cause was remanded with leave to the railroad company ‘to make further proof of an attempt to agree with appellants as to the compensation they should receive for their property.’ 280 Ill. 639, 117 N. E. 726. When the cause was reinstated, a motion was made by the petitioner to make further proof, which was allowed, and the petitioner introduced evidence of efforts to agree with the owners as to the compensation for their lots. The owners moved to dismiss the petition, their motion was overruled, the cause was tried by a jury, and from the judgment rendered on their verdict the property owners have again appealed.

The petitioner, on the preliminary hearing as to the right to maintain the petition, introduced no evidence except upon the question of the attempt to agree with the appellants as to the compensation they should receive. In this motion to dismiss the appellants, in addition to this question, raised all the objections raised on the first hearing and decided adversely to them on the former appeal, and they insist that the motion should have been allowed because the evidence did not sustain the right of the petitioner to maintain the petition as against these preliminary objections. Their contention is that the preliminary hearing was de novo, and that the petitioner was required to show a prima facie case, while the appellee contends that, so far as that branch of the case is concerned, the judgment and mandate of this court limited the hearing to the question of an attempt to agree with the appellants upon the compensation. Except this question, all the objections upon this hearing were contained in the record on the former appeal, were presented to the court, and were decided to be without merit. They furnished no reason for reversing the judgment, but it was reversed, and the cause remanded for the purpose of again trying the question of the attempt to agree upon compensation. Where a judgment is reversed by an appellate court, the judgment of the appellate court is final upon all questions decided, and those questions are no longer open to consideration. If the cause has been remanded, the court to which it is remanded can take only such proceedings as conform to the judgment of the appellate court. If specific directions are given, the court can do nothing but carry out the specific directions. If specific directions are not given, it must be determined from the nature of the case what further proceedings are proper, and it is the duty of the court to which the cause is remanded to examine the opinion and proceed in conformity with it. People v. Waite, 243 Ill. 156, 90 N. E. 183;Union Nat. Bank v. Hines, 187 Ill. 109, 58 N. E. 405. In an action at law this court has no power to determine the facts on an issue of which the parties are entitled to a trial by a jury, and therefore, upon the remandment of an action at law for a new trial, the views expressed in the opinion in regard to the facts are not binding. South Park Com'rs v. Ayer, 245 Ill. 402, 92 N. E. 274; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Lee, 87 Ill. 454. So, where a cause in chancery is remanded generally for a new hearing without directions, what is said in the opinion in regard to the weight of the evidence applies only to the record then under consideration, only the legal principles announced are binding upon another hearing, new evidence is admissible, and the issue is open to consideration upon all the evidence in the case. Burton v. Perry, 146 Ill. 71,31 N. E. 60.

In the trial court there were two questions of fact requiring different methods of trial. The first, which involved the right of the appellee to exercise the power of eminent domain, was preliminary, and was to be tried by the court. It had nothing to do with the other issue, which was the amount of compensation to be awarded to the appellants and was to be tried by a jury, except that the trial of the second issue depended upon the determination of the first. The first issue included five questions, which involved the appellee's existence as a corporation, the necessity of takingthe property sought to be condemned, the inability of the appellants to agree with the appellee on the amount of compensation, the limitation of the appellee's rights by a city ordinance, and the necessity of the consent of the Public Utilities Commission to the crossing of the streets of the city of Chicago by the proposed improvement. As to these questions there was no right to a jury trial, but they were to be determined by the court. They were all determined by the court in favor of the appellee, and this court on the first appeal decided that all were determined correctly except the question of the ability to agree upon the compensation, and as to this question the cause was remanded, with leave to the appellee to introduce further evidence.

The verdict of a jury is a unit, and where several issues in a cause have been submitted to a jury for trial, if a fatal error is committed as to any issue, the verdict cannot stand. On the former appeal, however, this court did not consider the verdict of the jury or the proceedings on the trial. Having arrived at the conclusion that the motion to dismiss the petition should be sustained, there was not right to a trial of the question of the amount of compensation to be awarded, and a reversal of the judgment necessarily followed. The court might have entered an order directing the trial court to dismiss the proceedings, or it might have entered an order directing a new hearing on the motion to dismiss the proceedings. In the latter case the whole matter would have been at large on a new hearing, and evidence might have been heard upon any phase of the question. The court, however, did neither of these things, but remanded the cause, with leave to introduce evidence on a single question in issue. It was the duty of the trial court to proceed in conformity with the opinion of this court, and if the issues upon the motion had been determined on the merits adversely to the appellee, the court could have done nothing but sustain the motion and dismiss the petition, there being no right to a trial of the issue by a jury. People v. Waite, supra. The issues were all determined on the merits except as to the one objection that the evidence did not show an inability to agree on the compensation. As to that objection the order of reversal directed the court to permit the introduction of further evidence. The effect of such leave was to restrict the evidence on the preliminary hearing to that question; for, if the remandment had been general for a new hearing of the motion, evidence on that question as well as all other questions would have been admissible without any special leave.

The appellants contend that an offer to agree upon compensation was not proved because the authority of the real estate agent of the appellee was not shown. The by-laws of the appellee were introduced in evidence creating a real estate department and providing that the acquisition of all additional real estate shall be made under the direction of the first vice president, fourth vice president, or general manager, subject to the approval of the president or executive committee, and all necessary instructions shall be given by such officers to the real estate agent, who shall be furnished with a plan duly approved by the chief engineer. It is objected that the plan furnished to the real estate agent failed to show any approval by the chief engineer, but, as the plan is not shown in the abstract, that fact does not appear. In any event, the failure of the plan to show the approval of the engineer did not affect the authority of the real estate agent.

It is also objected that there is no evidence of approval of the acquisition of the land by the president or executive committee. The record of the proceedings of the board of directors was introduced in evidence, showing that on November 24, 1915, a stated meeting of the board was held, attended by 9 of the 13 directors, including the members of the executive committee, at which a report of the executive committee was submitted, accepted, and approved, and the various resolutions therein recommended were adopted. The report showed a recommendation by the fourth vice president and general manager of the purchase of the land for the purpose of extending the yards of the company and a resolution...