Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Sheppard
| Decision Date | 02 February 1897 |
| Citation | 46 N.E. 61,56 Ohio St. 68 |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
| Parties | PITTSBURGH, C., C. & ST. L. RY. CO. v. SHEPPARD. |
Error to circuit court, Franklin county.
Action by Harry D. Sheppard against the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company. Sheppard delivered to the Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad, at Lovington in the state of Illinois, a car load of horses which that company agreed to transport over its line to Indianapolis Ind., and there deliver them to plaintiff in error for carriage to the city of Columbus, Ohio. The contract with the former company is in writing, and contains a stipulation that, ‘in case of any loss or damage, the liability of said company and of any connecting line shall not exceed $100 per head.’ The horses were safely delivered to the plaintiff in error, at Indianapolis, and received by it in good condition; but, while being transported over its line in this state, a defective wheel of one of the cars in the train gave way, in consequence of which one of the horses was killed, and the others were injured. Sheppard brought suit in the court of common pleas of Franklin county against the plaintiff in error for damages, alleging that his loss was occasioned by the company's negligence. The company denied negligence on its part, and pleaded the stipulation in the contract, above set forth, as a limitation on its liability, averring that the contract was made in the state of Illinois, where, under the law of that state, such stipulation is valid. Issue was joined on the allegations of the answer, and on the trial evidence was given by both sides tending to prove what the law of Illinois on the subject was when the contract was made. The plaintiff recovered more than the amount limited by the contract, and that judgment was affirmed by the circuit court. The railway company prosecutes error here to obtain the reversal of both judgments. A further statement of the facts pertinent to the questions raised will be found in the opinion. Reversed.
One who has been engaged for 10 years in building cars, and has given special attention to the construction of car wheels, is competent to give an opinion of the value of the hammer test as a means of discovering defects in car wheels.
1. It is the settled law of this state that a common carrier cannot, by special agreement, relieve himself from responsibility for his own negligence, nor limit his liability for losses resulting therefrom.
2. A contract made in one state or country, to be performed in another, is governed by the laws of the latter, which determine its validity, obligation, and effect.
3. Where a railroad company receives live stock in another state, under a contract there made, to transport it to a designated place in this state, and, while the stock is being carried in this state, it is injured by the company's negligence, the rights of the parties, in an action for damages for the loss, are governed by the laws of this state and not by those of the state where the contract was made.
4. In an action to recover the value of a trotting horse, evidence of his pedigree, and that some of his blood relations have a record for speed, is competent as affecting his value.
5. When such record is published by authority of a recognized trotting association, and the publication is accepted and acted upon by those interested in and conversant with such matters, as authentic and official, it is not error to admit evidence of the speed as shown by that record, but the testimony of a witness to information he claims to have obtained from the record is incompetent.
6. One who for 10 years has made car building his business, and given special attention to car wheels and their construction is competent to give an opinion of the value of the hammer test as a means of discovering defects in car wheels.
Watson, Burr & Livesay and F. M. Sackett for plaintiff in error.
J. W. Mooney, for defendant in error.
WILLIAMS, C. J. (after stating the facts).
It is not contended there is sufficient ground for disturbing the judgments below, for lack of evidence tending to prove that the negligence charged against the defendant was the cause of the plaintiff's loss; but it is claimed the evidence did not establish gross or willful negligence, and that under the law of Illinois where the contract for the transportation of the horses was made, it was competent for a common carrier of goods to limit his liability, by special agreement, except as against his negligence of that character. And the principal contention of counsel for the plaintiff in error is that the trial court erred in its charge concerning the law of Illinois on that subject; the complaint being that the charge, in substance, was a statement of the rule established in this state, instead of that which obtains in Illinois. The parties put in evidence several decisions of the supreme court of that state to prove the law of the state, and counsel in argument seek to maintain different interpretations of those decisions favorable to their respective clients. But if the rights of the parties are to be determined by the laws of this state, and not by those of Illinois, the charge was not erroneous or prejudicial, though given as the law of that state. There is nothing to show that any traffic arrangement existed between the two railroad...
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