Pittsburgh, C. & S. L. R. Co. v. Spencer

• Decision Date: 11 November 1884
• Docket Number: 11,193
• Citation: 98 Ind. 186
• Parties: Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railroad Company v. Spencer et al
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

98 Ind. 186

Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railroad Company v. Spencer et al

No. 11,193

Supreme Court of Indiana

November 11, 1884

From the White Circuit Court.

Judgment reversed, with instructions to sustain appellant's motion for a venire de novo.

N. O Ross and G. E. Ross, for appellant.

R Gregory, for appellees.

OPINION

Elliott, C. J.

The complaint seeks the recovery of damages for injuries received by Lilla E. Spencer.

The only objection urged to the complaint which is not founded upon a misconception of its language, is, that it is bad because there is no allegation that the negligence of the railroad company on whose train Mrs. Spencer was a passenger did not contribute to the injury, and this objection is not well founded. A passenger who is himself without fault is entitled to recover for injuries inflicted through the negligence of another railroad company in running into the train of the company that has undertaken to carry him, even though the latter company has been guilty of negligence. The authorities are full and satisfactory upon this point. Town of Albion v. Hetrick, 90 Ind. 545 (46 Am. R. 230); Robinson v. New York Central, etc., R. R. Co., 66 N.Y. 11 (23 Am. R. 1); Chapman v. New Haven R. R. Co., 19 N.Y. 341; Barrett v. Third Avenue R. R. Co., 45 N.Y. 628; Wylde v. Northern R. R. Co., 53 N.Y. 156; Bennett v. New Jersey, etc., Co., 7 Vroom 225 (13 Am. R. 435); Danville, etc., Co. v. Stewart, 2 Met. (Ky.) 119; Steamer New Philadelphia, 1 Black 62; Thompson Carriers, 284.

The verdict in this case was a special one, and all that is stated in it upon the subject of the appellant's negligence is contained in the specification which reads thus: "We, the jury, find that on the 10th day of December, 1881, Lilla E. Spencer was a passenger on a train of the Indianapolis and Chicago Air Line Railway Company, and that the road of said company passes through White county, Indiana, and crosses the railroad track of the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railway Company, the defendant herein, at right angles, in the town of Monticello; that while said Air Line train was passing over and across said crossing the train of said Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railway Company backed down upon the car in which said Lilla E. Spencer was sitting as a passenger, and upset said car, injuring her; that there was no fault on the part of Lilla E. Spencer, nor on the part of the Indianapolis and Chicago Air Line Company, but that said car of the Air Line Company was upset, and the injuries to said Lilla E. Spencer caused by the carelessness, negligence and fault of the defendant."

"The design of a special verdict," said the court in Goldsby v. Robertson, 1 Blackf. 246, "is to exhibit the facts of the case in such a manner that the court can decide according to law, and relieve the jury from the necessity of deciding legal questions, on which they may have doubts." In a text-book of excellent standing it is said: "A special verdict which does not find the material facts in detail, can not be supported as such; it must be set aside, and a new trial awarded." 3 Graham & Waterman New Trials, 1418. There are many cases in our reports sustaining this doctrine. Dixon v. Duke, 85 Ind. 434; Vinton v. Baldwin, 95 Ind. 433. The code declares that "A special verdict is that by which the jury find the facts only, leaving judgment thereon to the court." Sec. 545, R. S. 1881. Facts only are to be found, and not matters of law. All the facts essential to a recovery must be found, and mere conclusions of law are disregarded. Dixon v. Duke, supra; 2 Tidd Pr. 897, auth. n.

The question in this case is whether the special verdict does find the facts so that the court can declare the law, for if it does not it is bad. The facts, so far as the controlling issue of negligence or no negligence is concerned, and the only facts, stated in the verdict, are, that the train of the appellant was backed down upon the car of the Air Line company, and that the car was passing over the crossing of the two roads. If it can be decided as matter of law that the bare fact of backing into another train constitutes negligence, then the verdict may be sustained, but we are satisfied that this can not be held. It may be perfectly proper to back a train, and from that fact alone negligence can not be declared to exist as matter of law. Nor from the fact that a collision occurred can negligence be adjudged to exist, for a collision may occur through the tort of a stranger, through unavoidable accident, or from some cause for which the carrier is not answerable. One whose right to a recovery depends on negligence must secure a special verdict stating facts which the court in pronouncing the law can declare to constitute negligence. The jury have nothing at all to do with the law in cases where they return a special verdict, but they must state the facts so fully that the court can, in a case like this, declare that the law is, that such facts constitute actionable negligence. It is not sufficient to state facts not in themselves constituting negligence, and then by an epithet or conclusion of law characterize them as negligent, but the facts must be so stated as to afford the court grounds for adjudging that the law is that they do constitute negligence. Suppose that an action is brought for injuries received by a collision on a highway crossing, would a verdict be good which simply found that the railway train backed into the wagon? Or, suppose the collision to be between two wagons at the crossing of two highways, would it be sufficient to find that the defendant backed into the plaintiff's wagon? Again, suppose the verdict in a case against a municipal corporation to find that there was an excavation in a public street, would that finding be enough to authorize the court to declare as matter of law that there was negligence? It seems quite clear that in all these cases the verdict would be insufficient, and in principle they are the same as the case in hand. Upon principle and authority no special verdict can be good in a case where negligence is the material issue, without stating such facts as in law constitute negligence.

Conclusions of law in a special verdict are without force, and a general statement that an act was negligently done is but a conclusion of law. The facts showing how the act was done are essential, for without them the court can not ascertain or pronounce the law. All the authorities agree that the law is exclusively for the court in cases where special verdicts are returned, but if it be held that a general statement of negligence is good, then nothing at all is left to the court, for the jury have determined both the law and the facts. To allow this would be to permit the jury to usurp the functions of the court and decide the whole case. In that event the court would be without power and without functions, and this surely can not be the law. If the jury's decision, stated in general terms, that an act is negligent, is sufficient, then what need for a court? All that would be necessary, if that were the law, would be to take a special verdict embodying the jury's opinion. Something is to be done by the court in every case of a special verdict, and that something is to declare the law upon the facts found; but if we hold that the jury's general statement that an act was negligent is sufficient, we affirm the converse of this, because, by so holding, we declare that the verdict of the jury settles everything, the law as well as the facts, leaving the court nothing to do except make the mere formal entry of judgment.

We understand it to be a fixed principle that the court does rule upon all questions of negligence. If it were otherwise there would be no element of law in such a case; everything would be pure matter of fact, nothing would be matter of law. It would be strange indeed if in any case a judgment could be had without the application of rules of law, and in all civil cases the law comes from the court. It has been said scores and scores of times that negligence is generally a mixed question of law and fact, and it has also been often said that where the facts are undisputed, and the inferences to be drawn from them unequivocal, it may be a question of law. Gagg v. Vetter, 41 Ind. 228, vide authorities p. 254; Bellefontaine R. W. Co. v. Hunter, 33 Ind. 335; Ohio, etc., R. W. Co. v. Collarn, 73 Ind. 261; S. C., 38 Am. R. 134; Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Williams, 74 Ind. 462; Louisville, etc., R. W. Co. v. Richardson, 66 Ind. 43; S. C., 32 Am. R. 94; Binford v. Johnston, 82 Ind. 426, see page 431 (42 Am. R. 508); Woodruff, etc., Co. v. Diehl, 84 Ind. 474 (43 Am. R. 102); Purcell v. English, 86 Ind. 34 (44 Am. R. 255); Catawissa R. R. Co. v. Armstrong, 52 Pa. 282; Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274. If it be true, as undeniably it is, that the question is always either one of law, or one of mixed law and fact, then it must be true that in all cases the court must pronounce the law. In the case of a special verdict it is only possible to do this by acting upon the facts stated in the verdict.

Where a general verdict is sought, the court instructs the jury as to the law of negligence, and thus pronounces the law of the case; but in cases where a special verdict is asked, the law is pronounced, not in instructions to the jury, but upon the facts stated by the jury. If the jury for themselves state the...