Welch v. Fargo & Moorhead Street Railway Co.

• Decision Date: 01 February 1913
• Docket Number: 81912
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

140 N.W. 680

24 N.D. 463

WELCH v. FARGO & MOORHEAD STREET RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation

No. 81912

Supreme Court of North Dakota

February 1, 1913

On petition for rehearing March 7, 1913.

Appeal from the District Court for Cass County; Pollock, J.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries received by reason of the alleged negligence of defendant. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Stambaugh & Fowler, for appellant.

The special verdict herein was insufficient to sustain the judgment entered thereon. A special verdict should find the ultimate physical facts put in issue by the pleadings, and will not support a judgment if it merely finds conclusions of law or conclusions of fact. Lee v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 101 Wis. 352, 77 N.W. 717; Davis v Farmington, 42 Wis. 425; Laird v. Otsego, 90 Wis. 25, 62 N.W. 1042; Morrison v. Lee, 13 N.D. 600 102 N.W. 223; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v Hadley, 12 Ind.App. 516, 40 N.E. 760; Gaston v Bailey, 14 Ind.App. 581, 43 N.E. 254; Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Spencer, 98 Ind. 186, 11 Am. Neg Rep. 437; Chicago, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Burger, 124 Ind. 275, 24 N.E. 981; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Miller, 141 Ind. 533, 37 N.E. 343; 9 Am. Neg. Cas. 288; Walkup v. May, 9 Ind.App. 409, 36 N.E. 917; Evansville & T. H. R. Co. v. Taft, 2 Ind.App. 237, 28 N.E. 443, 24 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1, note, particularly pp. 30-78.

Right to attack sufficiency of special verdict to support the judgment, is not waived or lost, by failure to object that other questions are not submitted, or failure to request them. Where a judgment is based upon a special verdict alone, which fails to determine all the material and controverted facts in issue, there can be no waiver. Sherman v. Menominee River Lumber Co. 77 Wis. 14, 45 N.W. 1079; Johnson Bros. v. Glaspey, 16 N.D. 335, 113 N.W. 602.

The respondent was guilty of such contributory negligence as to preclude a recovery. He failed to look and listen. A driver of a vehicle--particularly when crossing track in the middle of a block, and not at a street crossing or intersection--must both look and listen before crossing. 2 Thomp. Neg. § 1438; 7 Thomp. Neg. § 1438; Nellis, Street R. Acci. Law, 2d ed. p. 947, p. 968.

Such rule has been adopted in the following states: Ala.--Highland Ave. & Belt R. Co. v. Sampson, 112 Ala. 425, 20 So. 566; Birmingham R. Light & P. Co. v. Oldham, 141 Ala. 195, 37 So. 452, 3 Ann. Cas. 333; Cal.--Harrington v. Los Angeles R. Co. 140 Cal. 514, 63 L.R.A. 238, 98 Am. St. Rep. 85, 74 P. 15; Bailey v. Market Street Cable R. Co. 110 Cal. 320, 42 P. 914; Del.--Cox v. Wilmington City R. Co. 4 Penn. (Del.) 162, 53 A. 569; Snyder v. People's R. Co. 4 Penn. (Del.) 145, 53 A. 433; Ga.--Cain v. Macon Consol. Street R. Co. 97 Ga. 298, 22 S.E. 918; Ind.--Robards v. Indianapolis Street R. Co. 32 Ind.App. 297, 66 N.E. 66, 67 N.E. 953; McCoy v. Kokomo R. & Light Co. 158 Ind. 662, 64 N.E. 92; Young v. Citizens' Street R. Co. 148 Ind. 54, 44 N.E. 927, 47 N.E. 142, 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 703; Iowa--Reem v. Tama & T. Electric R. & Light Co. 104 Iowa 563, 73 N.W. 1045; Kan.--Honick v. Metropolitan Street R. Co. 66 Kan. 124, 71 P. 265; Burns v. Metropolitan Street R. Co. 66 Kan. 188, 71 P. 244; Metropolitan Street R. Co. v. Agnew, 65 Kan. 478, 70 P. 345, 12 Am. Neg. Rep. 599; La.--Schutt v. Shreveport Belt R. Co. 109 La. 500, 33 So. 577; Cowden v. Shreveport Belt R. Co. 106 La. 236, 30 So. 747; Snider v. New Orleans & C. R. Co. 48 La.Ann. 1, 18 So. 695; Md.--Baltimore Traction Co. v. Helms, 84 Md. 515, 36 L.R.A. 215, 36 A. 119, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 63; Me.--Warren v. Bangor, O. & O. T. R. Co. 95 Me. 115, 49 A. 609, 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 67; Mass.--Hurley v. West End Street R. Co. 180 Mass. 370, 62 N.E. 263; Bierne v. Lawrence & M. Street R. Co. 197 Mass. 173, 83 N.E. 359; Mich.--McCarthy v. Detroit Citizens' Street R. Co. 120 Mich. 400, 79 N.W. 631; Mo.--Giardina v. St. Louis & M. River R. Co. 185 Mo. 330, 84 S.W. 928; N. J.--VanNess v. North Jersey Street R. Co. 75 N.J.L. 273, 67 A. 1027; Shuler v. North Jersey Street R. Co. 75 N.J.L. 824, 127 Am. St. Rep. 834, 69 A. 180; N. Y.--Martin v. Third Ave. R. Co. 27 A.D. 52, 50 N.Y.S. 284; McKinley v. Metropolitan Street R. Co. 77 A.D. 256, 79 N.Y.S. 213; Rider v. Syracuse Rapid Transit R. Co. 171 N.Y. 139, 58 L.R.A. 125, 63 N.E. 836; Or.--Wolf v. City & Suburban R. Co. 45 Ore. 446, 72 P. 329, 78 P. 668; Pa.--Moser v. Union Traction Co. 205 Pa. 481, 55 A. 15; R. I.--Price v. Rhode Island R. Co. 28 R. I. 220, 125 Am. St. Rep. 736, 66 A. 200; Beerman v. Union R. Co. 24 R. I. 275, 52 A. 1090; Tenn.--Knoxville Traction Co. v. Brown, 115 Tenn. 323, 89 S.W. 319; Tex.--Citizens' R. Co. v. Holmes, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 266, 46 S.W. 116; Va.--Portsmouth Street R. Co. v. Peed, 102 Va. 662, 47 S.E. 850; Wis.--Cawley v. La Crosse City R. Co. 101 Wis. 145, 77 N.W. 179; W. Va.--Riedel v. Wheeling Traction R. Co. 63 W.Va. 522, 16 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1123, 61 S.E. 821.

It is negligence, as a matter of law, for a driver of a vehicle to turn suddenly across a street car track in front of a moving car, without ascertaining whether a car is coming. 2 Thomp. Neg. § 1470 and cases cited.

A clear case of contributory negligence is where the driver suddenly and without warning, and without looking, turns his horse across a street railway track directly in front of an approaching car. Indianapolis Street R. Co. v. Marschke, Ind.App. , 70 N.E. 494; Indinapolis Street R. Co. v. Schmidt, 35 Ind.App. 202, 71 N.E. 663, 72 N.E. 478; Fairbanks v. Bangor, O. & O. R. Co. 95 Me. 78, 49 A. 421; Hannon v. North Jersey Street R. Co. 65 N.J.L. 547, 47 A. 803; McHugh v. North Jersey Street R. Co. N.J.L. , 46 A. 782; Reichenberg v. Interurban Street R. Co. 84 N.Y.S. 523; Reed v. Metropolitan Street R. Co. 58 A.D. 87, 68 N.Y.S. 539; Fritz v. Detroit Citizens' Street R. Co. 105 Mich. 50, 62 N.W. 1007; Boerth v. West Side R. Co. 87 Wis. 288, 58 N.W. 376; Cawley v. La Crosse City R. Co. 101 Wis. 145, 77 N.W. 179; Borshall v. Detroit R. Co. 115 Mich. 473, 73 N.W. 551; Moser v. Union Traction Co. 205 Pa. 481, 55 A. 15; McGee v. Consolidated Street R. Co. 102 Mich. 107, 26 L.R.A. 300, 47 Am. St. Rep. 507, 60 N.W. 293; Kessler v. Citizens' Street R. Co. 20 Ind.App. 427, 50 N.E. 891; Davidson v. Denver Tramway Co. 4 Colo. App. 283, 35 P. 920; Christensen v. Union Trunk Line, 6 Wash. 75, 32 P. 1018; Cicardi v. St. Louis Transit Co. 108 Mo.App. 462, 83 S.W. 980; Seele v. Boston & N. Street R. Co. 187 Mass. 248, 72 N.E. 971; Butler v. Rockland, T. & C. Street R. Co. 99 Me. 149, 100 Am. St. Rep. 267, 58 A. 775; Harris v. Lincoln Traction Co. 78 Neb. 681, 111 N.W. 580; Hurley v. West End Street R. Co. 180 Mass. 370, 62 N.E. 263; Kelly v. Wakefield & S. Street R. Co. 175 Mass. 331, 56 N.E. 285; Dunn v. Old Colony Street R. Co. 186 Mass. 316, 71 N.E. 557; Riedel v. Wheeling Traction Co. 63 W.Va. 522, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1123, 61 S.E. 821; Helber v. Spokane Street R. Co. 22 Wash. 319, 61 P. 40.

Where the facts disclose a case wherein the failure to look and listen was such clear negligence that no two minds could differ in pronouncing it such, the court should rule, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was guilty of such contributory negligence as to prevent him from recovery. Terien v. St. Paul City R. Co. 70 Minn. 532, 73 N.W. 412; Russell v. Minneapolis Street R. Co. 83 Minn. 304, 86 N.W. 346; Hickey v. St. Paul City R. Co. 60 Minn. 119, 61 N.W. 893; Donovan v. Lynn & B. R. Co. 185 Mass. 533, 70 N.E. 1029; Seele v. Boston & N. Street R. Co. 187 Mass. 248, 72 N.E. 971; Robinson v. Rockland, T. & C. Street R. Co. 99 Me. 47, 58 A. 57, 16 Am. Neg. Rep. 356; Helliesen v. Seattle Electric Co. 56 Wash. 278, 105 P. 458.

The traveler should look and listen both ways attentively, for a coming car, at places where these acts will be reasonably certain to effect their purpose, and this duty is not performed by a traveler who looks when he first enters on a street, but does not thereafter, until he is on the track. 2 Thomp. Neg. § 1444; 7 Thomp. Neg. § 1439; Snider v. New Orleans & C. R. Co. 48 La.Ann. 1, 18 So. 695; Healey v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. 18 A.D. 623, 45 N.Y.S. 393; Cawley v. La Crosse City R. Co. 101 Wis. 145, 77 N.W. 179; McGee v. Consolidated Street R. Co. 102 Mich. 107, 26 L.R.A. 300, 47 Am. St. Rep. 507, 60 N.W. 293; Winch v. Third Ave. R. Co. 12 Misc. 403, 33 N.Y.S. 615; Hemingway v. New Orleans City & Lake R. Co. 50 La.Ann. 1087, 23 So. 952; Tesch v. Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co. 108 Wis. 593, 53 L.R.A. 618, 84 N.W. 823, 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 388; Denver City Tramway Co. v. Cobb, 90 C. C. A. 459, 164 F. 41; Hart v. Northern P. R. Co. 116 C. C. A. 12, 196 F. 180.

The doctrine of "last clear chance" does not apply in this case. To take advantage of such rule, it must be properly pleaded. Clancy v. St. Louis Transit Co. 192 Mo. 615, 91 S.W. 509; Gront v. Central Electric R. Co. 125 Mo.App. 552, 102 S.W. 1026.

The burden of proof is upon plaintiff to prove not only negligence on the part of defendant, but that the "last clear chance" doctrine is established. Crenshaw v. Asheville & B. Street R. & Transp. Co. 144 N.C. 314, 56 S.E. 945.

Plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence, not only the defendant's negligence, but that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. Ibid; McGauley v. St Louis Transit Co. 179 Mo. 583, 79 S.W. 461; Markowitz v. Metropolitan Street R. Co. 186 Mo. 350, 69 L.R.A. 389, 85 S.W. 351; Denver City Tramway Co. v. Cobb, 90 C. C. A. 459, 164 F. 43, and cases cited; Alger S. & Co. v. Duluth-Superior Traction Co. 93 Minn. 314, 101 N.W. 298, 17 Am. Neg. Rep. 95; Fellenz v. St. Louis & Suburban R. Co. 106 Mo.App. 154, 80 S.W. 49; Drown v. Northern Ohio Traction Co. 76 Ohio St. 234, 10 L.R.A.(N.S.) 421, 118...