Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Woolley
| Decision Date | 13 December 1876 |
| Citation | 75 Ky. 451 |
| Parties | Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Woolley. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
APPEAL FROM LOUISVILLE CHANCERY COURT.
GIBSON & GIBSON, For Appellant,
9 Johns. 142, Hotchkiss v. LeRoy.
3 Barb 64, Brighart v. Gardner.
4 E. D. Smith, 253, Cook v. Ritter.
2 Met 244, Savings Bank of Cin. v. Benton.
26 Ill 218, Chicago, & c. R. R. v. Larned.
22 La.Ann. 85, Voorhies v. Harrison.
ISAAC CALDWELL, For Appellee,
CITED
2 Parsons on Contracts, page 522.
4 Harrington, 454, Draper v. Randolph.
| 2 Duvall, 490 | 12 Vermont, 50. |
2 Heiskel, 367, Planters' Bank of Tenn. v. Massey.
| 38 Ill. 84, Morgan v. Roberts. | 9 Cowen, 57. |
30 Texas, 55, Ector v. Wiggins.
There is no equitable issue involved in this action. It is an ordinary proceeding, and no reason existed why it should have been instituted in the chancery court, except that the defendant was a foreign corporation, and the plaintiff desired to reach and attach a fund in the hands of the receiver of said court.
The defendant discharged the attachment by the execution of the bond prescribed by section 242 of the Civil Code of Practice, and the cause might then, upon his motion, have been transferred to the court of common pleas. The defendant entered a motion to that effect, but afterward withdrew it and allowed the cause to be tried and determined by the chancellor.
The conduct of the parties amounted in effect to the submission of the law and facts of an ordinary action to the chancellor, and thus of substituting him for the jury, which at the proper time either party might have demanded. This court has frequently held, in unpublished opinions, that under such circumstances the judgment of the chancellor, like the judgment of a circuit judge, to whom the law and facts of an ordinary action have been submitted, will be treated as the verdict of a properly instructed jury, and will not be reversed by this court, unless it is palpably against the evidence or manifestly not supported by it.
The plaintiff, an attorney at law, sued to recover the value of services rendered as such at the instance and request of the defendant.
That the services were rendered is expressly admitted; their alleged value is not questioned in the pleadings, but, independent of that fact, is abundantly proved.
That the plaintiff was employed is also admitted, but the authority of the party who assumed to employ him is expressly denied; and it is then alleged, by way of avoidance, that he violated the terms of the unauthorized employment by withdrawing from the causes he was engaged to prosecute before the litigation was terminated.
The original attorney for the defendant resided in Newport Kentucky. The actions Woolley was engaged to prosecute were pending in the Louisville Chancery Court. It was desirable, if not actually necessary, that resident counsel should be employed. The services of Woolley were secured by Hallam, the original attorney of the...
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