PITTSFIELD CHARTER TP. v. Washtenaw County

• Decision Date: 09 July 2003
• Docket Number: Docket No. 119590, Calendar No. 7.
• Citation: 664 N.W.2d 193,468 Mich. 702
• Parties: PITTSFIELD CHARTER TOWNSHIP, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WASHTENAW COUNTY, Defendant-Appellant, and City of Ann Arbor, Defendant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

664 N.W.2d 193

468 Mich. 702

PITTSFIELD CHARTER TOWNSHIP, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WASHTENAW COUNTY, Defendant-Appellant, and City of Ann Arbor, Defendant.

Docket No. 119590, Calendar No. 7.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued November 19, 2002.

Decided July 9, 2003.

Reading, Etter & Lillich (by John L. Etter), Ann Arbor, MI, for the plaintiff-appellee.

Bodman, Longley & Dahling LLP (by Jerold Lax) and Office of Corporation Counsel (by Curtis N. Hedger), Ann Arbor, MI, for the defendant-appellant.

Cohl, Stoker & Toskey, P.C. (by Peter A. Cohl and Richard D. McNulty), Lansing, MI, for the Michigan Association of Counties.

Bauckham, Sparks, Rolfe, Lohrstorfer & Thall, P.C. (by John H. Bauckham and Robert E. Thall), Kalamazoo, MI, for the Michigan Townships Association.

TAYLOR, J.

The question presented is whether defendant Washtenaw County must comply with plaintiff Pittsfield Charter Township's zoning ordinance in the locating of the county's proposed homeless shelter. We hold that the county does not need to comply with the township's zoning ordinance and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the summary-disposition order entered by the trial court.

I

Washtenaw County owns property in Pittsfield Charter Township that the township's zoning ordinance has designated as I-1 (limited industrial). With the financial participation of the city of Ann Arbor, the county advertised a proposal to construct a new homeless shelter, which it would own, on the property. The I-1 district ordinance neither expressly nor conditionally permits such a use.

Pittsfield Township took the position that the proposed use violated its zoning ordinance and thus was impermissible because the Township Zoning Act (TZA), M.C.L. § 125.271 et seq., and specifically M.C.L. § 125.271(1),¹ gives its zoning priority that the county cannot ignore. The county, however, asserted that, pursuant to the county commissioners act (CCA), M.C.L. § 46.1 et seq., specifically M.C.L. § 46.11, county boards of commissioners are not subject to the township zoning ordinances when determining the site of, or prescribing the time and manner of erecting, county buildings. MCL 46.11(b), (d).²

The township filed a complaint in the Washtenaw Circuit Court seeking a declaration that the county must comply with the township's zoning ordinance, and seeking to enjoin the county from disregarding the zoning ordinance and proceeding with the construction of the proposed homeless shelter. The complaint also named the city of Ann Arbor as a codefendant.³

The county filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), asserting that, as a matter of law, it was immune from the zoning requirements of the township.⁴ The township filed a similar motion asserting the converse, that the TZA gave it priority and that, accordingly, the county was not immune. The circuit court, while denying the township's motion, granted the county's motion on the basis that M.C.L. § 46.11 granted the county plenary authority to choose sites for buildings and that the county was exempt from Pittsfield Township's zoning ordinances.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed.⁵ The Court outlined that the tests for determining exemptions from the requirements of a township zoning ordinance were set out in Dearden v. Detroit, 403 Mich. 257, 269 N.W.2d 139 (1978), Burt Twp. v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 459 Mich. 659, 669, 593 N.W.2d 534 (1999), and Byrne v. Michigan, 463 Mich. 652, 624 N.W.2d 906 (2001). It then characterized this case law as holding that, to be exempt from the zoning ordinances, the statute granting the county authority to site buildings must explicitly state that it supersedes the zoning ordinance. As the Court described it:

If the Legislature meant to say that the county's power to site and use its property is plenary (not subject to, but exempt from, any legal restrictions), the Legislature could have easily and expressly said so. It did not, and we conclude that it is neither permissible nor appropriate for us to graft such a plenary gloss on this statutory provision. [246 Mich.App at 362, 633 N.W.2d 10.]

The county appealed from this ruling and we granted leave to appeal. 466 Mich. 859, 643 N.W.2d 579 (2002).

II

This case is before us on a matter of statutory interpretation. Because this is a matter of law, our review is de novo. Robertson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 465 Mich. 732, 739, 641 N.W.2d 567 (2002).

III

We are called on to examine the two acts that are the sources of township and county authority, the TZA and the CCA. The TZA vests townships with broad authority to enact zoning ordinances to regulate land development and to "insure that the use of land shall be situated in appropriate locations and relationships...." M.C.L. § 125.271(1).⁶ The TZA further directs townships to define zones "to meet the needs of the state's residents for ... places of residence, recreation, industry, trade, service, and other uses of land...." Id.; MCL 125.273.⁷ This authority given to the townships, however, does not extend to the regulation or control of oil or other wells that are under the jurisdiction of the supervisor of wells pursuant to the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, M.C.L. § 324.101 et seq., particularly M.C.L. § 324.61501 et seq., or power lines that are subject to the Electric Transmission Line Certification Act, M.C.L. § 460.561 et seq.

The CCA, upon which the county relies, states at M.C.L. § 46.11⁸ that counties can determine site selection and the time and manner of erecting county buildings. However, there is one limitation on this power. It is found in the second sentence of M.C.L. § 46.11(b) and it limits the site-selection authority by directing that the county cannot disregard any requirement of law holding that a county building be located at the county seat. These provisions are, of course, potentially in tension with each other in their grants of authority. It is our undertaking to establish the proper priority between them.

IV

In adjudicating this matter, the Court of Appeals found a conflict between the authority given to the townships and the counties under the TZA and the CCA. It then resolved this conflict by construing our holdings in Dearden, Burt Twp., and Byrne to mean that there must be express indications in the statute granting the county immunity from the township's zoning power before the county could be immune.

This Court articulated in Dearden, supraat 264, 269 N.W.2d 139, that in resolving a conflict between units of government the legislative intent, "where it can be discerned," controls the question whether a governmental unit is subject to the provisions of another's zoning ordinances.

In Burt Twp., supra at 669, 593 N.W.2d 534, we reiterated this approach and cautioned that there are no "talismanic words" that convey the Legislature's intent to create immunity from local zoning. Rather, the Legislature "need only use terms that convey its clear intention that the grant of jurisdiction given is, in fact, exclusive." Id.

This Court has also conceded that discerning the legislative intent regarding whether a government unit is immune from the provisions of local zoning ordinances has "proven difficult to apply." Id. at 664 n. 3, 593 N.W.2d 534. The insight of this observation is made apparent when one looks at the difficulties the Court of Appeals discussed here⁹ and which eventuated in what is best described as an almost mechanistic approach for determining priority. The panel essentially held that if the county's authority is not addressed explicitly by the Legislature, the township ordinances prevail. As we have attempted in the past to explain, the test is not this simple. The analysis requires more than merely searching for words of exclusion. Recently in Burt Twp. we gave guidance to courts searching for this intent, stating that the Legislature need not "use any particular talismanic words to indicate its intent." Id. at 669, 593 N.W.2d 534. This may not, as we had hoped it would, make the task easier, but, at least, it must mean that there are no special words, the absence of which engenders a specific outcome.

Nevertheless, whether easy or not, the question remains: Where do we look to find the intent? The answer is that we must look for guidance to the statutes themselves to see if there are any textual indications that would convey the Legislature's intent on the issue of priority.

We believe that, closely read, the statutes here at issue indicate that the higher priority is with the county. We draw this first from the fact that in the CCA the Legislature expressly stated only one limitation on the authority of the county to site buildings. That limitation is that the county cannot use the power that was given in M.C.L. § 46.11 to site buildings if there is any other requirement of law that county buildings be located at the county seat. This language became part of the act in 1998, when the Legislature amended the CCA.¹⁰ We believe this shows that the Legislature, by explicitly turning its attention to limits on the county siting power and deciding on only one limitation, must have considered the issue of limits and intended no other limitation. This conclusion is analogous to the discernment of intent undertaken by this Court in Dearden. There we held that the authority given to the state to site prisons gave priority over local zoning ordinances on the basis of the authorizing statute, M.C.L. § 791.204, which said that "the department shall have exclusive jurisdiction over ... penal institutions...." Dearden, supra at 265, 269 N.W.2d 139. From this we found the intent of the Legislature, stating that we read this language as "a clear expression of the Legislature's intent to vest the department with complete jurisdiction over the state's penal institutions, subject only to the constitutional powers of the executive and the judiciary, and not...