Pizzitolo v. Electro-Coal Transfer Corp., ELECTRO-COAL

• Decision Date: 20 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-3006,ELECTRO-COAL,86-3006
• Citation: 812 F.2d 977
• Parties: Nicholas R. PIZZITOLO, Plaintiff-Appellant, and National Union Fire Insurance Company, Intervenor-Appellant, v.TRANSFER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 977

812 F.2d 977

1988 A.M.C. 769

Nicholas R. PIZZITOLO, Plaintiff-Appellant, and National Union Fire Insurance Company, Intervenor-Appellant, v. ELECTRO-COAL TRANSFER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 86-3006.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

March 20, 1987.

Ferdinand J. Kleppner, Victor A. Marsiglia, Jr., Metairie, La., for plaintiff-appellant.

Lance S. Ostendorf, New Orleans, La., for National Union Fire Ins. Co.

John O. Charrier, Jr., Jeanmarie LoCoco, New Orleans, La., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before GARZA, DAVIS and JONES, Circuit Judges.

W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:

Pizzitolo filed this action against his employer, Electro-Coal Transfer Corp. (Electro-Coal), to recover damages under the Jones Act for personal injuries he suffered in the course of his employment. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict for Pizzitolo but the district court granted Electro-Coal's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The district court concluded that Pizzitolo was not a seaman and his exclusive remedy against his employer was provided by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). We affirm.

I. FACTS

Electro-Coal owns and operates a coal terminal on the west bank of the Mississippi River near Davant, Louisiana. The terminal consists of shoreside buildings, a coal storage area and a dock. Electro-Coal routinely transfers coal from vessel-to-vessel and between vessels and the shoreside storage area.

Barges bringing coal to Electro-Coal are ordinarily tied to the dock adjacent to the terminal. This coal is then either loaded onto other barges, on seagoing vessels or is stored at the terminal for later loading. The vessels are loaded and unloaded by large electric powered cranes and a series of electric powered conveyor belts. Electro-Coal owns and operates four harbor tugs and a crane barge to load, unload and otherwise assist vessels calling at its terminal. A sister corporation owns twelve oceangoing tugs and barges that regularly call at the Davant terminal.

Pizzitolo is employed by Electro-Coal as an electrician. He works a standard forty-hour week. When he arrives for work in the morning he reports to the shore-based electrical shop where he receives an assignment from one of his foremen. When he finishes that assignment, he returns to the shop for a new one.

Pizzitolo spent approximately 75% of his work time maintaining and repairing the shore-based electrical machinery. The other 25% of his work time was spent replacing or repairing electrical equipment on vessels owned by Electro-Coal and its sister company while the vessels were tied up at the terminal dock.

At the time of his injury, Pizzitolo was standing on a scaffold board above the river, repairing one of the conveyors used to load and unload vessels. The scaffold board on which he was standing broke and he fell into the river.

Pizzitolo filed this suit against Electro-Coal seeking damages as a seaman under the Jones Act for injuries he suffered in the accident. During the liability phase of the bifurcated jury trial, three issues were presented to the jury: (1) whether Pizzitolo was a seaman and thus eligible to recover damages under the Jones Act; (2) whether Electro-Coal was negligent; and (3) whether Pizzitolo was contributorily negligent. The jury answered questions (1) and (2) yes. The district court disagreed with the jury's finding that Pizzitolo was a seaman and granted Electro-Coal's motion for JNOV on the issue of seaman status; Pizzitolo appeals that ruling. Electro-Coal is displeased with the district court's refusal to grant its motions for directed verdict and judgment NOV on grounds the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that it was negligent.

II.

The question we must decide is whether the jury was entitled to find that Pizzitolo, a harbor worker whose contact with vessels is limited to performing vessel repairs, was a seaman within the meaning of the Jones Act.

The parties frame the dispute as one of whether Pizzitolo qualifies as a seaman or member of the crew of a vessel under a prong of the familiar Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir.1959) test: whether Pizzitolo performed a substantial portion of his work aboard a fleet of vessels. Because coverage under the Jones Act and the LHWCA is mutually exclusive, this argument assumes that Pizzitolo is not covered by the LHWCA. For reasons that follow, we conclude that this premise cannot stand; Pizzitolo is covered by the LHWCA and is not a member of the crew of a vessel. We will first consider the reasons Congress adopted the LHWCA in 1927 and who were the intended beneficiaries of the Act. We will then examine the 1972 amendments to the Act and their effect on coverage of ship repairers like Pizzitolo under the Act.

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Before Congress passed the Jones Act in 1920, seamen had no right to sue the vessel owner for negligence. Chelentis v. Luckenback S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 38 S.Ct. 501, 62 L.Ed. 1171 (1918). The Jones Act, overruled Chelentis and granted "any seaman" an action for damages for the negligence of the vessel owner, the master or fellow crewmembers. Act of June 5, 1920, Ch. 250 Sec. 33, 41 Stat. 1007 (codified at 46 U.S.C. Sec. 688).

A compensation scheme for harbor workers developed much slower. In 1917, the Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086 (1917) held that a state could not constitutionally make its workmen's compensation laws applicable to harbor workers injured on a vessel. The Court reasoned that the application of different state statutes would result in the "destruction of the very uniformity in respect to maritime matters which the constitution was designed to establish." Id. at 217, 37 S.Ct. at 529.

Congress recognized the gap: State compensation acts covered workmen injured on the dock yet land-based harbor workers injured aboard vessels had no compensation remedy. Between 1917 and 1927, Congress struggled to provide benefits to harbor workers. Its first attempt came five months after Jensen was decided. Congress sought to make state compensation remedies available to harbor workers by amending the Saving to Suitors Clause to preserve "to claimants the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any state." Act of Oct. 6, 1917, Ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395. But the Court in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 40 S.Ct. 438, 64 L.Ed. 834 (1920) struck down this effort on grounds that Congress could not delegate such legislation to others.

Congress apparently thought that state compensation benefits could be constitutionally extended to harbor workers if they made it clear that such benefits were not available to seamen. ¹ In 1922, after enacting the Jones Act remedy for seamen, Congress tried once again to make state compensation statutes available to land-based harbor workers. This time, Congress amended the Savings to Suitors Clause to preserve "to claimants for compensation for injuries to or death of persons other than to master or members of a crew of a vessel, their rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any state, district, territory or possession of the United States, which rights and remedies when conferred by law shall be exclusive...." Act of June 10, 1922, Ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634. The exclusion of vessel crewmembers from coverage under this legislation did not save it; in Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 44 S.Ct. 302, 68 L.Ed. 646 (1924), the Court held the legislation unconstitutional.

Another significant opinion from the Supreme Court was handed down shortly before Congress passed the LHWCA. In International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50, 47 S.Ct. 19, 71 L.Ed. 157 (1926), a longshoreman was injured by the negligence of a fellow employee and the injured longshoreman sued his employer under the Jones Act. The Court allowed Haverty to recover under the Jones Act by giving an expansive interpretation to the word seaman "to include stevedores employed in maritime work on navigable waters." Id. at 52, 47 S.Ct. at 19.

In 1927, within months of the Haverty decision, Congress passed a uniform federal compensation act for maritime workers, the LHWCA. ² This Act required the employer to provide prescribed benefits "in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if a disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States ... and if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by state law." The intended beneficiaries of the Act are spelled out in the Senate report:

The purpose of this bill is to provide for compensation, in the stead of liability, for a class of employees commonly known as "longshoremen." These men are mainly employed in loading, unloading, refitting and repairing ships: but it should be remarked that injuries occurring in loading or unloading are not covered unless they are on the ship or between the wharf and the ship so as to bring them within the maritime jurisdiction of the United States.

S.R. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1927). The 1927 Act, consistent with the 1922 Act, did not extend benefits to "a master or member of a crew of any vessel...." Act of March 4, 1927, Ch. 509, Sec. 2(3), 44 Stat. at 1425.

No definition of "member of a crew" is included in the LHWCA, but two Supreme Court cases are instructive on its meaning. In South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 60 S.Ct. 544, 84 L.Ed. 732 (1940), a workman drowned while working aboard a lighter used for providing coal to steamships. The Court was presented with the question of whether his widow was entitled to benefits under the LHWCA.

The Court described generally the type workers who were covered by the Act...