Plant v. Humphries
| Decision Date | 02 November 1909 |
| Citation | 66 S.E. 94,66 W.Va. 88 |
| Parties | PLANT v. HUMPHRIES et al. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Submitted June 10, 1908.
Syllabus by the Court.
If the record of a cause shows that the court had jurisdiction, it is conclusively presumed to speak the truth in that particular, and the judgment, unless successfully assailed for fraud or collusion, is binding until reversed upon appeal or such direct rehearing as may be warranted by law.
In a suit to sell the coal of an infant, the representation of the infant by a guardian ad litem, who, it is afterwards disclosed, was interested in the sale and purchase of the coal, does not render the decree void for want of jurisdiction.
A decree for the sale of an infant's coal, which sufficiently locates and designates the tract as a whole, but is not specific in defining the location of reservations of small parcels of coal therein, is not void for uncertainty.
Fraud in the procurement of a decree may be attacked at any time if there has been diligence in discovering it and promptness in proceeding to attack it, notwithstanding the expiration of a day to show cause against the decree.
The interest of a guardian ad litem in the purchase of the infant's coal, sold in the proceeding or suit in which the infant was represented by that guardian ad litem, will render the sale voidable.
Where one has means of knowing or ascertaining his rights, where he is put on inquiry, where ordinary prudence should impel him to inquire, he must do so, or else time runs against him in the assertion of those rights.
One who would repel the imputation of laches by showing ignorance of his rights must be without fault in remaining in ignorance of those rights. Indolent ignorance and indifference will no more avail to prevent the bar of laches than will voluntary ignorance. Equity aids only the vigilant.
The possession of the surface land does not carry with it possession of the coal under that surface, where the estate in the coal has been severed as to title.
For the surface owner to aver properly possession of coal severed in title from the land, he must state that he has had actual physical possession of the coal, apart from his possession of the surface, as by operating mines.
When the statute of limitations is applicable to a cause of action arising out of fraud, it runs from the perpetration of the fraud, unless there has been fraudulent concealment of the cause of action.
Laches does not run against one asserting rights to real estate which he has had in possession during the delay in asserting those rights.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Harrison County.
Bill by William G. Plant against Enoch Humphries and others. Decree for defendants, and complainant appeals. Affirmed.
Edward G. Smith and Edward A. Brannon, for appellant.
W Scott, for appellee B. H. Brown. Davis & Davis and Osman E Swartz, for appellees Chieftain Coal Co. and others.
The coal under the land of William G. Plant was sold by his guardian, Dexter G. Fittro, while Plant was yet an infant. This sale of his coal was made under the authority of a decree in a suit which the guardian instituted for the procurement of that authority. Plant was 16 years of age at the institution of the proceedings leading to a decree to sell. A guardian ad litem was appointed for him, in the person of John W. Brown. This guardian ad litem answered in the cause on behalf of the infant, responding that it would be to the infant's interest to make sale of the coal and invest the proceeds. Plant also answered in person, to the same effect. Depositions tending to establish the propriety of the sale were taken and read in the cause. The guardian Fittro, more than two years after the date of the decree authorizing him to sell the coal of his ward, reported to the court that he had made sale to Beeson H. Brown at the price of $19 per acre. Thereupon the court confirmed the sale and directed a deed to be made by the guardian to the purchaser. This purchaser was the brother and business partner of John W. Brown, who had represented the infant as guardian ad litem. A deed was made by Fittro, guardian, in pursuance of the decree of confirmation, the day next ensuing the entry of that decree. Two days previously, however--that is, one day before the confirmation of the sale--Beeson H. Brown, the purchaser, John W. Brown, the guardian ad litem, and one Smith, styling themselves partners as "Smith, Brown & Co.," included the Plant coal in a conveyance of a large territory of coal in the same vicinity made to Pennsylvania parties. This conveyance was made for a gross sum by the partners we have mentioned and another person. No other conveyance by Beeson H. Brown of the Plant coal to any one appears. So it seems that at the time of the decree confirming sale to Beeson H. Brown, his brother, John W. Brown, the guardian ad litem, had an interest in the purchase of the infant's coal. Title to the large territory of coal, in which Plant's coal was included, conveyed to the Pennsylvania parties, has since passed by several intermediate conveyances to the Chieftain Coal Company. This company took title in 1902. Plant reached his majority nearly nine years before that time, married soon after becoming of age, settled on the land overlying the coal which he had owned, and continued to own the land and reside upon it until the date we have stated. Soon after the coal company became interested in the property, the presence of surveyors on the land caused Plant to make an inspection of the public records and thereby to find that John W. Brown, his guardian ad litem in the suit which divested him of title to his coal, was interested in the purchase of that coal by Brown's brother. The deed to the Pennsylvania parties by Smith, Brown & Co. and another, disclosing this fact, made, indeed, before confirmation of the sale of Plant's coal, was recorded a few months after its date. For nine years it had been open to the public.
Plant, upon ascertaining in 1902 the interest of his guardian ad litem in the purchase of his coal, very soon instituted his suit in equity seeking to annul the decrees of sale and confirmation in relation to the coal sold on his behalf and the deed made by his guardian in pursuance thereof, and praying that his title to the coal be quieted and that he have general relief. He alleged, in substance, that his guardian and the guardian ad litem appointed for him colluded in depriving him of his coal property; that John W. Brown and his partners were receiving $30 per acre for the coal, when his guardian ad litem, the same Brown, permitted the court to confirm a sale to Brown's brother at $19 per acre; that this fact appears by the deed made to the Pennsylvania parties, of which he knew nothing until a time shortly prior to the institution of his suit; that he knew nothing of the sale of his coal by the court proceedings and the deed of Fittro, his guardian, or of the interest of his guardian ad litem in the sale and purchase, until his examination of the records briefly previous to the institution of his suit; and that he had, until that time, been in total ignorance of the fraud and wrongs in the premises. Constructive notice to the purchasers subsequent to the date of Beeson H. Brown's deed from the guardian was alleged. Many documentary exhibits were filed with the bill, embracing the title deeds in question and the record of the suit by which Plant's coal had been sold. Further particulars of allegations in the bill need not now be stated. We may hereinafter refer to some of them if necessary to understanding and decision. The court, upon demurrers, dismissed Plant's original and amended bills, except in so far as a reformation of the deed of the guardian to Beeson H. Brown was justified because of that deed's variance from the decree authorizing its execution. A reformation of that deed to the extent that it departed from the decree was made. From the decree of dismissal, Plant has appealed.
It is submitted that the court did not have jurisdiction of the person of the infant, because of the interest of the guardian ad litem who represented him. But there was a guardian ad litem appointed. He accepted the trust and filed an answer. The infant appeared in person and answered. The necessary parties were before the court. The decrees may be voidable because of fraud practiced on the rights of the infant by collusion of the guardian and guardian ad litem or the interest of the latter in the purchase, but they are not absolutely void for want of the court's jurisdiction in such a case. That very jurisdiction thus acquired may have been the avenue of fraud, for which the decrees may be avoided. Avoidance of the decrees for fraud is quite different from avoidance of them for want of jurisdiction. There was that character of notice to the infant which the law requires in such suits. The court had cognizance of that class of cases of which the suit was one. The fact that the infant's rights may not have been well represented by the guardian ad litem does not argue that he had no guardian ad litem. The court had power to hear and determine the cause. This power is the test of jurisdiction. Sperry v Sanders, 50 W.Va. 70, 40 S.E. 327; Lemmon v. Herbert, 92 Va. 653, 24 S.E. 249. There was due process of law. The record shows jurisdiction. ...
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