Plantamura, Application of

• Decision Date: 28 November 1961
• Citation: 176 A.2d 61,149 Conn. 111
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Application of Arthur J. PLANTAMURA for Admission to the Bar. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 61

176 A.2d 61

149 Conn. 111

Application of Arthur J. PLANTAMURA for Admission to the Bar.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Nov. 28, 1961.

Arthur J. Plantamura, pro se, the appellant.

Joseph G. Shapiro, Bridgeport, with whom was Joseph J. Devine, Bridgeport, for the appellee (standing committee for Fairfield County on recommendations for admission to the bar).

Before BALDWIN, C. J., and KING, MURPHY, SHEA and ALCORN, JJ.

KING, Associate Justice.

The applicant was admitted to the bar of the District of Columbia on April 24, 1953. Thereafter, he practiced patent law in Washington for more than five years. On October 19, 1960, he applied for admission to the bar of Connecticut without examination under § 8, page 27, of the Practice Book, as amended in a matter immaterial to the present controversy (Cum.Sup.1960). From a denial of his application he has appealed.

Proceedings for admission to the bar 'are in the nature of investigations by the courts or their representatives to determine whether the candidate is qualified to become an officer of the courts.' Heiberger v. Clark, 148 Conn. 177, 182, 169 A.2d 652. Such proceedings 'are taken primarily for the purpose of preserving the courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them.' Id., 183, 169 A.2d 655. Attorneys are 'officers of the court appointed to assist the court in the administration of justice and * * * the property, liberty and often the lives of their clients are in their hands, so that a very high degree of intelligence, knowledge, academic and legal training [and] judgment * * * is demanded.' Id., 186, 169 A.2d 657. It is unnecessary to repeat the principles governing admission to our bar and the paramount power of the court in that connection; these are clearly set forth in the Heiberger case, supra.

The application was denied solely on the ground that the applicant had not fulfilled the requirements in subdivision (2) of § 8, the material portions of which are set out in the footnote. ¹ Although the applicant claimed that he had practiced patent law in Washington for more than five years, he admitted that at no time had he had occasion to practice, nor had he in fact practiced, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which is 'the highest court of original jurisdiction' in the District of Columbia and is a 'district courts of the United States.' See Practice Book, § 8.

The question dispositive of this appeal is the meaning, in its application to the applicant, of the phrase 'actually practiced law for at least five years in the highest court of original jurisdiction * * * or in one or more district courts of the United States.' The claim that the applicant is entitled to admission necessarily requires a construction of 'actually practiced' as 'been authorized to practice.' Obviously, under that construction the applicant would be entitled to admission.

The word 'actually' was added by an amendment, effective February 1, 1941, to § 8 of the 1934 Practice Book. It is not to be assumed that such a change would have been made without reason. Brown v. Cato, 147 Conn. 418, 421, 162 A.2d 175. Clearly, the word 'actually' was inserted to emphasize the necessity of practice before a court as distinguished from a mere unexercised right to practice. Actual practice in the highest court of original jurisdiction provides a...